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ABSTRACT
The national wave of tort reform that began in the 1980s wrought
procedural and substantive changes in Idaho law. This article focuses
on one such change: the 1987 enactment of the Idaho law that restricts
the pleading of punitive damages, Idaho Code § 6-1604(2). That law,
similar to laws in seven other states, bars punitive damage claims from
an initial complaint and allows a punitive damage claim to be included
in an amended complaint only if the plaintiff demonstrates a reasonable
likelihood that he or she will prove facts sufficient to recover a punitive
damage award at trial. This article addresses whether this state law re-
stricting the pleading of punitive damages applies in federal-court di-
versity actions. The federal district courts in Idaho have held that, un-
der the Erie doctrine, the Idaho law does apply in diversity actions. This
article argues that those courts are incorrect. The Idaho law and similar
state laws restricting the pleading of punitive damages do not apply in
federal court because they conflict with the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure ("FRCPs'). Moreover, even if the FRCPs are interpreted not to
conflict with these state laws, federal courts should still disregard the
state laws, in the exercise of the federal courts' inherent power to make
procedural rules for their own proceedings that trump state law.
Idaho and other states have pursued tort reform for more than
twenty years.1 Some of the state laws born of this effort are purely
1. See, e.g., John T. Nockleby & Shannon Curreri, 100 Years of Conflict: The
Past and Future of Tort Retrenchment, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1021, 1026-34 (2005) (offer-
ing a brief history of tort reform); James McMillan, Contributory Negligence and Statu-
tory Damage Limits-An Old Alternative to a Contemporary Movement?, 42 IDAHO L.
REv. 269, 291-92 (2005) (discussing "the wave of tort reform in the mid-1980s" in Idaho);
John 0. Ward, Origins of the Tort Reform Movement, VI CONTEMP. ECON. POLY 97 (1988)
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substantive, while others are partly substantive and partly proce-
dural. To cite a purely substantive example, Idaho and other states
have enacted laws capping punitive damage awards.2 These punitive
damage caps are substantive because they define tort plaintiffs' right
to a particular legal remedy. 3 To cite an example of a type of tort re-
form law that is partly substantive and partly procedural-and that is
the focus of this article-laws in Idaho and seven other states restrict
the pleading of punitive damages. 4 More specifically, these laws re-
quire plaintiffs in certain cases to get the court's permission before in-
cluding a request for punitive damages in the complaint. 5 Though
procedural in operation, these state-law restrictions on pleading puni-
tive damages seem to have a substantive purpose and effect: by limit-
ing unsubstantiated punitive damage claims, the laws seem designed
to limit unwarranted punitive damage awards. Thus, these state laws
restricting the pleading of punitive damages occupy a borderland
where procedure and substance blend.
State laws in the substance-procedure borderland pose a chal-
lenge when it comes to determining their applicability to diversity
cases in federal court.6 The applicability of state laws in diversity
cases is governed by the doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tomp-
kins.7 Roughly speaking, Erie requires federal courts adjudicating
("In 1986, 39 states passed tort reform laws in response to the 'great liability insurance
crisis' of 1984-1986.").
2. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1604(3) (2005), amended by ch. 122, § 3, 2003 Idaho
Sess. Laws 372. See generally 1 JOHN J. KIRCHER & CHRISTINE M. WISEMAN, PUNITIVE
DAMAGES: LAW AND PRACTICE § 5:31 (2d ed. 2006) (discussing various states' caps on pu-
nitive damages).
3. See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 428 (1996) (accept-
ing the parties' agreement that "a statutory cap on [tort] damages would supply substan-
tive law for Erie purposes!); Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257,
278 (1989) ("In a diversity action, or in any other lawsuit where state law provides the ba-
sis of decision, the propriety of an award of punitive damages for the conduct in question,
and the factors the jury may consider in determining their amount, are questions of state
law.').
4. See infra Part IA-B.
5. The laws apply to punitive damage claims asserted in complaints as well as
in answers (in connection with counterclaims) and in cross-claims. See, e.g., Harwood v.
Talbert, 39 P.3d 612, 615-16 (Idaho 2001) (applying IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1604 to coun-
terclaim including request for punitive damages). For simplicity's sake, however, this ar-
ticle will refer to the laws as governing the contents of complaints.
6. The Erie doctrine applies in diversity cases as well as when federal courts
adjudicate state law claims within supplemental jurisdiction. For simplicity's sake, how-
ever, this article will refer to the universe of cases to which Erie applies as "diversity"
cases.
7. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). This article uses the term "Erie doctrine" in its broad
signification, which actually encompasses several different situations pitting federal law
against state law. See John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV.
693, 698 (1974) (stating that use of "the single rubric of 'the Erie doctrine"' has obscured
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state-law claims to apply federal procedural law and state substantive
law.8 Under Erie, for example, a federal court sitting in diversity
clearly must apply a state law capping punitive damage awards be-
cause such state laws are substantive; they put a substantive restric-
tion on a legal remedy. 9 Less clear is whether Erie also requires fed-
eral courts to apply state laws, such as Idaho's, that restrict the plead-
ing of punitive damages; such laws mandate a procedure that may
have a substantive purpose and effect.
The lower federal courts disagree on the issue of whether state
laws restricting the pleading of punitive damages, such as Idaho's,
apply in diversity cases. The United States Courts of Appeals for the
Eighth and Ninth Circuits have reached results that conflict with the
result reached in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
The federal district courts have likewise reached conflicting results.
The federal district courts of Idaho have held that the Idaho law re-
stricting the pleading of punitive damages does apply in diversity ac-
tions. Many other district courts have reached a contrary conclusion
with respect to substantially similar laws of other states. Moreover,
even courts that reach the same result use differing approaches. In-
deed, a thorough survey of the case law shows a bewildering array of
approaches, some of which reflect fundamental misunderstanding of
the Erie doctrine.
The U.S. Supreme Court may very well need to resolve this dis-
agreement on the applicability of state laws restricting the pleading of
punitive damages. The issue is important as a matter of federalism,
because it concerns whether a state's tort reform efforts can reach into
the federal courts in that state.10 The issue has great importance for
individual litigants, too, for it will control the outcome of many law
"what are really three distinct and rather ordinary problems of statutory and constitu-
tional interpretation").
8. See, e.g., Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 427 ("Under the Erie doctrine, federal courts
sitting in diversity apply state substantive law and federal procedural law."); see also
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (citing Erie for proposition that
federal courts should apply state law when exercising pendent (today "supplementa) ju-
risdiction over state-law claims); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465 (1965) ('The broad
command of Erie was... [that] federal courts are to apply state substantive law and fed-
eral procedural law.").
9. See Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 428-29 (starting its analysis from a point ac-
cepted by the parties: namely, "that a statutory cap on damages would supply substantive
law for Erie purposes"); id. at 426 (parties arguing that New York law is "substantive" be-
cause it "controls how much a plaintiff can be awarded").
10. J. Benjamin King, Note, Clarification and Disruption: The Effect of
Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc. on the Erie Doctrine, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 161, 162
(1997) ("As more state law is labeled 'substantive' for Erie purposes, more state law flows
into federal court.").
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suits brought in the federal courts in eight states," including Califor-
nia, the most populous state. 12 Despite the importance of the issue
and its unsettled resolution, the issue has received little scholarly at-
tention. 13 This article attempts to fill the gap.
This article concludes that federal courts should not apply the
Idaho law and other state laws that similarly restrict the pleading of
punitive damages. These state laws cannot apply in federal court be-
cause they conflict with two Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. They
conflict with FRCP 8(a)(3) by prohibiting initial complaints from in-
cluding punitive damage requests. Additionally, they conflict with
FRCP 15 by requiring plaintiffs seeking to amend their complaint to
request punitive damages to demonstrate a likelihood of success in re-
covering those damages. Because FRCP 8(a)(3) and 15 are valid, they
prevent federal courts in diversity cases from applying Idaho law re-
stricting the pleading of punitive damages and similar state laws.
Thus, this article concludes that the Idaho federal courts have erred
in applying the Idaho law in diversity actions.
Contrary to the analysis proposed in this article, some courts
have interpreted the FRCPs not to conflict with state laws restricting
the pleading of punitive damages. Even if those courts are correct,
federal courts in diversity should not apply the state laws. Instead,
they should refuse to apply the state law as a matter of federal com-
mon law.
Precedent recognizes that, in the absence of a federal statute or
FRCP, federal courts have inherent power to devise rules of procedure
as a matter of federal common law. In diversity cases, the federal
11. See infra Part I.A-B (discussing the eight state statutes).
12. California is the most populous state. See U.S. Census Bureau, 2005 Popula-
tion Estimates, http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/GCTTable?_bm=y&-geo-id=OlOOOUS
&-_box_headnbr=GCT-T1-R&-ds name=PEP_2005_EST&-_lang--en&-format=US-9S&-
_sse=on (last visited Nov. 17, 2006). Also included among the eight states that have laws
restricting the pleading of punitive damages are the populous states of Florida and Illi-
nois. See infra notes 29-30.
13. See, e.g., Josh Jacobson, Pleading Punitive Damages: An Erie Dilemma, 58
BENCH & BAR MINN. 17, 17-19 (2001) (focusing on decisions of federal district courts in
the District of Minnesota holding that Erie requires them to apply Minnesota statute re-
stricting the pleading of punitive damages and concluding that those decisions are incor-
rect); Jeffrey A. Parness et al., The Substantive Elements in the New Special Pleading
Laws, 78 NEB. L. REV. 412, 420-21, 433-35 (1999) (discussing state-law rules for pleading
punitive damages in several states and case law addressing the applicability of those
rules in federal court actions); Rhett Traband, An Erie Decision: Should State Statutes
Prohibiting the Pleading of Punitive Damages Claims Be Applied in Federal Diversity Ac-
tions?, 26 STETSON L. REV. 225, 227 (1996) (concluding that "these state statutes are sub-
stantive in nature and must be applied by the federal courts sitting in diversity"). See
generally 2 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 8.04(8)(c), at 8-31
(3d ed. 2006) ("TIhe lower federal courts have divided on [the] applicability [of state pro-
fessional malpractice pleading statutes] under Erie.").
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courts can apply these federal judge-made rules if their application, in
lieu of conflicting state laws, would not disserve the twin aims of Erie:
avoidance of forum shopping and inequitable administration of the
laws. Furthermore, even if the application of federal judge-made rules
would fail this "modified outcome-determinative" test, federal courts
my be able to apply their own judicially created rules, instead of con-
flicting state law, if a strong enough federal interest supports their
application. 14 Thus, the federal courts' inherent power to make proce-
dural rules can trump state law.
This article argues that-if state laws restricting the pleading of
punitive damages are found not to conflict with any FRCPs-federal
courts should use their inherent power to disregard those state laws.
True, the federal courts' application of their own rules in this situa-
tion probably fails the "modified outcome-determinative" test. It
would encourage plaintiffs seeking punitive damages to choose federal
court over state court, to avoid the stricter pleading requirements of
state law. Defendants in these federal-court cases could be exposed to
punitive damages claims to which their state-court counterpart would
not be exposed, a seemingly unfair disparity. Nonetheless, federal-
court disregard of state laws restricting the pleading of punitive dam-
ages is justified to preserve the uniform, simplified system of pleading
and the liberal standards for amendment of pleadings established in
the FRCPs. That is because these have become "essential characteris-
tic[s] of [the federal court] system."
15
This article proceeds in six parts. Part I describes the Idaho stat-
ute and similar state laws restricting the pleading of punitive damage
claims. Part II briefly describes the Erie framework in general. Part
III surveys the case law that has applied the Erie framework to the
Idaho statute and similar state laws. Part IV discusses the doctrinal
confusion and practical importance of this issue. Part V explains how
state laws restricting the pleading of punitive damages should be ana-
lyzed under Erie. Part VI concludes by urging the Idaho federal
courts to revisit the issue.
14. See Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 431-32; Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop.,
Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 537-38 (1958).
15. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 431 (quoting Byrd, 356 U.S. at 537) (second alteration
in original).
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I. STATE LAWS RESTRICTING THE PLEADING OF PUNITIVE
DAMAGES
A. Idaho
The statute with which we are principally concerned is Idaho
Code section 6-1604 (though, as we will see, Idaho's statute resembles
those in seven other states).16 Section 6-1604 was enacted in 1987 as
part of a larger legislative attempt at tort reform. 1 7 Section 6-1604
was significantly amended in 2003, in a later round of legislative tort
reform.18
As amended in 2003, section 6-1604 contains three subsections.
The first subsection establishes a standard of proof for recovering pu-
nitive damages at trial:
(1) In any action seeking recovery of punitive damages, the
claimant must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, op-
pressive, fraudulent, malicious or outrageous conduct by the
party against whom the claim for punitive damages is as-
serted. 19
16. See infra Part I.B (discussing state statutes similar to Idaho Code § 6-
1602(2)).
17. For historical background pre-dating the tort reform of the 1980s, see Doug-
las D. Kramer & Thomas J. Schnebeck, Punitive Damages in Idaho, 17 IDAHO L. REV. 87
(1980). In Idaho, the tort reform effort was led by the Idaho Liability Reform Coali-
tion. Telephone Interview by Nance Ceccarelli with Matt Fullenbaum, Director of Legis-
lation, American Tort Reform Coalition, in Washington, D.C. (Sep. 19, 2006). Supporters
of reform feared "social norming," in which individual plaintiffs come to expect large
awards beyond actual damages and juries are desensitized to making large
awards. Telephone Interview by Nance Ceccarelli with Kenneth R. McClure, Givens
Pursely, LLP and founder and executive director of Idaho Liability Reform Coalition, in
Boise, Idaho (Oct. 11, 2006). Opponents argued that Idaho did not have a record of un-
usually large jury awards and that restrictions on such awards could harm plaintiffs with
legitimate claims. Telephone Interview with Matt Fullenbaum, supra; telephone inter-
view by Nance Ceccarelli with Governor James Risch, former member of the Idaho Sen-
ate Judiciary Committee, in Boise, Idaho (Oct. 25, 2006).
18. 2003 Idaho Sess. Laws 371-72, Ch. 122.
19. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1604(1) (2005). As originally enacted in 1987, the stat-
ute required proof "by a preponderance of the evidence." 1987 Idaho Sess. Laws 576, Ch.
278, § 1. In 2003, the provision was amended to increase the burden of proof to the cur-
rent "clear and convincing evidence" standard. 2003 Idaho Sess. Laws 371, Ch. 122,
§ 3. This change was prompted by concern that trial judges were not adequately perform-
ing the gatekeeping role contemplated for them in the 1987 legislation, under which they
were supposed to prevent poorly supported punitive damage claims from going to the
jury. The judge's failure to fulfill that role, in turn, was apparently influenced in part by
the liberal standard for amending pleadings established by the Idaho Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. Telephone Interview with Kenneth R. McClure, supra note 17; telephone inter-
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The second subsection, our main focus, prescribes the procedure and
standard for pleading punitive damages:
(2) In all civil actions in which punitive damages are
permitted, no claim for damages shall be filed containing a
prayer for relief seeking punitive damages. However, a party
may, pursuant to a pretrial motion and after hearing before
the court, amend the pleadings to include a prayer for relief
seeking punitive damages. The court shall allow the motion to
amend the pleadings if, after weighing the evidence pre-
sented, the court concludes that, the moving party has estab-
lished at such hearing a reasonable likelihood of proving facts
at trial sufficient to support an award of punitive damages. A
prayer for relief added pursuant to this section shall not be
barred by lapse of time under any applicable limitation on the
time in which an action may be brought or claim asserted, if
the time prescribed or limited had not expired when the origi-
nal pleading was filed.
2 0
The third subsection caps punitive damage awards at "the greater of'
$250,000 or three times the amount of compensatory damages.
2 1
As stated above, this article focuses on subsection (2) of section 6-
1604, which governs the procedure for pleading punitive damages. I
have described subsections (1) and (3) as well because a statutory pro-
vision is known by the company it keeps. Subsection (2)'s restriction
on the pleading of punitive damages keeps company with two other
subsections that have the substantive purpose and effect of limiting
liability for punitive damages. We might reasonably infer that a simi-
lar, substantive purpose underlies subsection (2), even though it is
view with Senator Denton Darrington, chair, Idaho Senate Judiciary Committee, in
Boise, Idaho (Oct. 25, 2006); see also IDAHO R. CIv. P. 15(a) & 16(c)(2), (d)(2).
20. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1604(2) (2005). As originally enacted in 1987, the stat-
ute did not explicitly require the court to consider evidence when deciding whether to al-
low the pleadings to be amended to include a claim for punitive damages. Rather, the
1987 statute provided that the court would allow the amendment "if the moving party es-
tablishes at such hearing a reasonable likelihood of proving facts at trial sufficient to sup-
port an award of punitive damages." 1987 Idaho Sess. Laws 576, Ch. 278, § 1. The 1987
version could plausibly have been read to allow a party to establish the requisite likeli-
hood through a proffer of evidence, instead of producing actual evidence. That option
seems foreclosed by the 2003 amendment, which provides for the court to allow an
amendment of pleadings to include a punitive damage request "after weighing the evi-
dence presented" at the hearing on a motion to amend the pleadings. 2003 Idaho Sess.
Laws 372, Ch. 122, § 3. See generally Paterson v. State, 128 Idaho 494, 501 (1996) (apply-
ing IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1604(2)).
21. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1604(3) (2005), as amended by 2003 Idaho Sess. Laws
372, Ch. 122, § 3.
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procedural in its operation (restricting the pleading of punitive dam-
ages).
The inference of section 6-1604(2)'s substantive purpose gains
strength from section 6-1604's location. It is in Chapter 16 of Title 6 of
the Idaho Code. Chapter 16 is entitled 'Periodic Payment of Judg-
ments-Limitation on Certain Tort Damages and Liabilities." The
second part of that title-referring to limitations on tort damages and
liabilities-signifies that its provisions impose substantive limita-
tions.
22
In the 1987 legislation that created section 6-1604, the Idaho leg-
islature also created section 5-335.23 Section 5-335 is described here
because it shows how the legislature apparently pursued a substan-
tive purpose (limiting tort defendants' liability for punitive damage
awards) partly through procedural means restricting a tort plaintiffs
ability to plead punitive damages.
Section 5-335 is entitled "General rules of pleading-Claims for
relief." Reflecting that title, section 5-335 prescribes rules specifically
for the required contents of complaints and other pleadings contain-
ing claims. Most of section 5-335 closely resembles Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure (IRCP) 8(a), which was on the books when section 5-335
was enacted. Section 5-335 not only replicates IRCP 8(a) but also in-
cludes additional language, not found in IRCP 8(a), which is italicized
below:
A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an
original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim,
shall contain (1) if the court has limited jurisdiction, a short
and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court's ju-
risdiction depends, (2) a short and plain statement of the
claims showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a
demand for judgment for the relief to which the pleader
22. See, e.g., Comm'r of Internal Revenue v. Stern, 357 U.S. 39, 45 (1958) (de-
scribing Erie as requiring federal courts in diversity to "apply state ... law in defining
state-created rights, obligations, and liabilities") (emphasis added). Interviews conducted
on the history of Section 6-1604 confirm its substantive purpose. The principal drafter of
the provision and of the 2003 legislation amending it was Kenneth R. McClure. Mr.
McClure stated that the background to subsection (2) of section 6-1604 was to discourage
punitive damage claims that lacked adequate support from being pleaded for purely stra-
tegic purposes. It was common ground that on occasion punitive damage claims were be-
ing used as a sword to force settlement, and that such claims could have this effect even
when they would not survive FRCP 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss or FRCP 56 motions for
summary judgment. In addition, the amounts claimed for punitive damages sometimes
reflected the defendant's financial statement and not necessarily the degree of wrongdo-
ing or appropriate deterrence. Telephone Interview with Kenneth R. McClure, supra note
17.
23. 1987 Idaho Sess. Laws 581, Ch. 278, § 9.
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deems himself or herself entitled. Relief in the alternative or
of several different types may be demanded. In any action for
recovery because of personal injury or death, the claim for re-
lief shall not specify the amount of damages claimed, but
shall, instead, contain a general allegation of damage and
shall state that the damages claimed are within any minimum
or maximum jurisdictional limits of the court to which the
pleading is addressed. At any time after service of the plead-
ing, the defendant may, by special interrogatory, demand a
statement of the amount of damages claimed by the plaintiff,
which shall be answered within fifteen (15) days. The informa-
tion provided in the response to the special interrogatory shall
not be admissible into evidence at trial, nor shall it be commu-
nicated to the jury by argument or otherwise, nor shall it affect
or limit the verdict rendered by the jury or the judgment issued
by the court, in accordance with Idaho rule of civil procedure
54(c).2
4
One apparent purpose of the portion of section 5-335 that has
been italicized above is to prevent circumvention of section 6-1604(2)'s
restriction on pleading punitive damages. Section 6-1604(2) prohibits
a specific request for punitive damages in the initial complaint. Sec-
tion 5-335 prevents a plaintiff from circumventing that prohibition by
requesting an astronomical amount of damages that reflects (but does
not expressly request) an amount sought as punitive damages.
Section 5-535 goes further. Section 6-1604(2) allows the plaintiff
to move to amend the initial complaint to pray for punitive damages.
Section 5-335, however, appears to prohibit even the amended com-
plaint from seeking a specific amount of punitive damages. This read-
ing of section 5-335 finds support in IRCP 9(g), which is entitled
'Damages," providing in relevant part: "When items of general dam-
age or punitive damages are claimed, no dollar amount or figure shall
be included in the complaint beyond a statement reciting that the ju-
risdictional amount established for filing the action is satis-
fied. ' '25 FRCP 9(g) was amended to prohibit complaints from referring
to dollar figures in 1987, a few months after enactment of the 1987
legislation that created sections 6-1604 and 5-335.26
24. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5-335 (2005) (emphasis added).
25. IDAHO R. CIrV. P. 9 (g).
26. 1 IDAHO CT. R., at 115 (Compiler's notes).
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In sum, Idaho has, as part of its tort reform effort, clamped down
on punitive damages.2 7 The effort comprises both a substantive law
that limits defendants' liability for punitive damage awards and pro-
cedural laws that restrict plaintiffs' ability to plead punitive damages.
B. Other States
Seven other states have laws restricting the pleading of punitive
damages that are similar to Idaho Code section 60-1604(2). They are
California, 28 Florida,2 9 Illinois,30 Kansas, 3 1 Minnesota, 3 2 North Da-
kota,33 and Oregon. 3 4 These states' statutes concern us because they,
like the Idaho statute, have generated case law on the Erie issue on
which this article focuses.
The other states' statutes track Idaho's in three key ways. First,
they prohibit plaintiffs from putting punitive damage claims in their
initial complaint. 3 5 Second, having barred punitive damage requests
27. Idaho's restrictions on punitive damages reflect only part of the state's tort
reform legislation. Other significant legislation restricts awards of "noneconomic dam-
ages" in personal injury actions. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1603 (2005).
28. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 425.13 & 425.14 (West 2004).
29. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.72(1) (West 2005).
30. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-604.1 (West 2003). A 1995 statute amending
Section 5/2-604.1 was held unconstitutional, the effect of which was to restore the version
in effect before the amendment. See Probasco v. Ford Motor Co., 182 F. Supp. 2d 701, 703
(C.D. Ill. 2002).
31. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3703 (2004).
32. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.191 (West 2000).
33. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-11 (2005).
34. OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 31.725(2) (West 2004).
35. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.13(a) ("[Nlo claim for punitive damages shall
be included in a complaint or other pleading unless the court enters an order allowing an
amended pleading that includes a claim for punitive damages to be filed."); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 768.72(1) (West 2005) ("[N]o claim for punitive damages shall be permitted unless
there is a reasonable showing by evidence in the record or proffered by the claimant
which would provide a reasonable basis for recovery of such damages. The claimant may
move to amend her or his complaint to assert a claim for punitive damages as allowed by
the rules of civil procedure.'); 735 ILL. COmP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-604.1 ('[N]o complaint shall
be filed containing a prayer for relief seeking punitive damages. However, a plaintiff may,
pursuant to a pretrial motion and after a hearing before the court, amend the complaint
to include a prayer for relief seeking punitive damages."); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3703 ("No
tort claim or reference to a tort claim for punitive damages shall be included in a petition
or other pleading unless the court enters an order allowing an amended pleading that in-
cludes a claim for punitive damages to be fied."); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.191 ('Upon
commencement of a civil action, the complaint must not seek punitive damages. After fl-
ing the suit a party may make a motion to amend the pleadings to claim punitive dam-
ages."); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-11 ("Upon commencement of the action, the complaint
may not seek exemplary damages. After filing the suit, a party may make a motion to
amend the pleadings to claim exemplary damages."); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31.725(2) ("At
the time of filing a pleading with the court, the pleading may not contain a request for an
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from initial complaints, the statutes authorize the plaintiff to move to
amend the complaint to add a request for punitive damages.3 6 Third,
they require the court-when ruling on the motion to amend-to as-
sess the likelihood that the plaintiff will prove entitlement to punitive
damages. 3 7 Thus, all seven states, like Idaho, condition requests for
punitive damages on court approval, which depends on the court's as-
sessment of the plaintiffs likelihood of success in ultimately recover-
ing punitive damages.
The other states' statutes differ from Idaho's, and from each
other, in some ways. Specifically, they differ in describing the range of
civil actions to which they apply.38 In addition, they differ in describ-
award of punitive damages. At any time after the pleading is filed, a party may move the
court to allow the party to amend the pleading to assert a claim for punitive damages.").
36. See supra note 35.
37. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.13 ("The court may allow the filing of an
amended pleading claiming punitive damages on a motion by the party seeking the
amended pleading and on the basis of the supporting and opposing affidavits presented
that the plaintiff has established that there is a substantial probability that the plaintiff
will prevail on the claim pursuant to Section 3294 of the Civil Code," which prescribes the
standard of proof for recovery of punitive damages); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.72 (1) (allowing
a claimant to move to amend a complaint to add a claim for punitive damages and requir-
ing "a reasonable showing by evidence in the record or proffered by the claimant which
would provide a reasonable basis for recovery of such damages"); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/2-604.1 ('The court shall allow the motion to amend the complaint if the plaintiff
establishes at such hearing a reasonable likelihood of proving facts at trial sufficient to
support an award of punitive damages."); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3703 ('CThe court may al-
low the filing of an amended pleading claiming punitive damages on a motion by the
party seeking the amended pleading and on the basis of the supporting and opposing affi-
davits presented that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the
plaintiff will prevail on the claim pursuant to K.S.A. 60-209," which prescribes the stan-
dard of proof for recovering punitive damages.); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.191 (requiring
the motion to amend the complaint to seek punitive damages to "be accompanied by one
or more affidavits showing the factual basis for the claim" and requiring the court to
grant the motion if it "finds prima facie evidence in support of the motion"); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 32-03.2-11 ("If the court finds, after considering all submitted evidence, that there
is sufficient evidence to support a finding by the trier of fact that a preponderance of the
evidence proves oppression, fraud, or actual malice, the court shall grant the moving
party permission to amend the pleadings to claim exemplary damages."); OR. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 31.725(3)(a) (requiring court to deny motion to amend a pleading to add a request
for punitive damages if "[tihe court determines that the affidavits and supporting docu-
mentation submitted by the party seeking punitive damages fail to set forth specific facts
supported by admissible evidence adequate to avoid the granting of a motion for a di-
rected verdict to the party opposing the motion on the issue of punitive damages in a trial
of the matter").
38. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 425.13(a) (applying "[iun any action for damages
arising out of the professional negligence of a health care provider"); id. § 425.14 (applica-
ble to claims "for punitive or exemplary damages against a religious corporation or reli-
gious corporation sole"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.72(1) (applying "[iun any civil action"); 735
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-604.1 (applying "[iun all actions on account of bodily injury or
physical damage to property, based on negligence, or product liability based on any theory
or doctrine, where punitive damages are permitted); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3703 (govern-
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ing the material that the court should consider when ruling on the
plaintiffs motion to amend the complaint to request punitive dam-
ages. 39 They also differ in prescribing the standard the court should
apply in deciding whether to allow the amendment. 40
Despite those differences, the statutes' essential similarity might
lead you to expect that federal courts would treat them similarly
when deciding their applicability in diversity actions. As we will see,
nothing could be further from the truth. The federal courts diverge
widely in analyzing these statutes under Erie. We will explore that
case law after a brief, general description of Erie analysis.
II. ERIE ANALYSIS IN GENERAL
Erie analysis loosely refers to principles used to determine when
state law applies in federal courts' adjudication of claims arising un-
der state law. These principles stem in part from the Rules of Decision
Act (RDA),4 1 in part from the Rules Enabling Act (REA),42 and in part
ing any "tort claim or reference to a tort claim for punitive damages... in a petition or
other pleading); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.191 (covering claims for punitive damages in "a
civil action"); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31.725(1) ("A pleading in a civil action may not con-
tain a request for an award of punitive damages except as provided in this section.").
39. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.13(a) (requiring court to consider "support-
ing and opposing affidavits); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.72(1) (requiring court to consider
"evidence in the record or proffered by the claimant"); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-
604.1 (West 2003) (providing for "a hearing before the court" on a plaintiffs pretrial mo-
tion to amend the complaint to contain a prayer for relief seeking punitive damages);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3703 (2004) (requiring court to consider "supporting and opposing
affidavits'); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.191 (requiring plaintiff to submit "one or more affida-
vits showing the factual basis for the [punitive damages] claim"); OR. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 31.725(2) (permitting parties to submit supporting and opposing "affidavits and docu-
mentation").
40. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.13(a) (requiring court to allow amendment if
'plaintiff has established that there is a substantial probability that the plaintiff will pre-
vail on the [punitive damages] claim"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.72(1) (requiring plaintiff to
establish "a reasonable basis for recovery of [punitive] damages"); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/2-604.1 (stating that a court may allow amendment if plaintiff establishes "a rea-
sonable likelihood of proving facts at trial sufficient to support an award of punitive dam-
ages"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3703 (permitting court to allow amendment if the plaintiff
"has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the [punitive
damages] claim"); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.191 (permitting court to grant motion to amend
"if the court finds prima facie evidence in support of the motion"); OR. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 31.725(3) (permitting court to deny motion to amend if it finds that affidavits and sup-
porting documentation "fail to set forth specific facts supported by admissible evidence
adequate to avoid the granting of a motion for a directed verdict to the party opposing the
motion on the issue of punitive damages in a trial of the matter).
41. The RDA states: 'The laws of the several states, except where the Constitu-
tion or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide,
shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in
cases where they apply." 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2000). In Erie, the Court held that, except in
matters governed by the U.S. Constitution or acts of Congress, the RDA obligates federal
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from the Constitution. 4 3 The analysis results in a determination of
whether the federal court must apply state law or, instead, must ap-
ply federal law to the issue at hand.
4 4
In Erie analysis, a federal court must first determine whether
the issue at hand is covered by a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
(FRCP).4 5 If so, the court must apply the FRCP, rather than the state
law, as long as the FRCP is valid. 46 An FRCP will be valid if Congress
could have constitutionally enacted the rule itself and the rule falls
within the scope of the rulemaking power that Congress has dele-
courts to apply not only state statutory law but also the decisional law of the states' high-
est courts, whether or not the decisional law concerned matters of local law or of general
law. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tomkins, 304 U.S. 64, 71-78 (1938).
42. The REA, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2000), authorizes the U.S. Supreme Court "to
prescribe the general rules of practice and procedure ... for cases in the United States dis-
trict courts ... and courts of appeals." Id. § 2072(a). The REA's second sentence, however,
limits this authority by providing: "Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any
substantive rights." Id. § 2072(b).
43. The Court in Erie explained that federal courts in diversity cases must apply
state law in the absence of valid federal law because "[t]here is no federal general com-
mon law. Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in
a state whether they be local in their nature or 'general,' be they commercial law or a part
of the law of torts. And no clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a power
upon the federal courts." 304 U.S. at 78. Thus, state law fills the vacuum left by the ab-
sence of federal law. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471-72 (1965) ("[N]either Congress
nor the federal courts can, under the guise of formulating rules of decision for federal
courts, fashion rules which are not supported by a grant of federal authority contained in
Article I or some other section of the Constitution; in such areas state law must govern
because there can be no other law.").
. 44. Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 727 (1988) ("It is never the case un-
der Erie that either federal or state law-if the two differ--can properly be applied to a
particular issue .... ").
45. Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1987) ('The initial step is
to determine whether, when fairly construed, the scope of [an FRCP] is sufficiently broad
to cause a direct collision with the state law or, implicitly, to control the issue before the
court, thereby leaving no room for the operation of that law.') (internal quotation marks
omitted); Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749-50 (1980) ('CThe first question
must therefore be whether the scope of the Federal Rule in fact is sufficiently broad to
control the issue before the Court."); see also Hanna, 380 U.S. at 470-71 (distinguishing
case law involving conflict between state law and FRCPs from cases in which state law
did not conflict with FRCP). If state law conflicts with the U.S. Constitution, the Consti-
tution of course preempts the state law. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (Supremacy
Clause). Similarly, if state law conflicts with a federal statute, the federal statute pre-
empts state law as long as the federal statute is valid. See, e.g., Stewart Org. v. Ricoh
Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 27 (1988) ("[A] district court sitting in diversity must apply a federal
statute that controls the issue before the court and that represents a valid exercise of
Congress' constitutional powers.").
46. Burlington N., 480 U.S. at 5 (stating that if FRCP covers the issue at hand,
"[t]he Rule must then be applied if it represents a valid exercise of Congress' rulemaking
power, which originates in the Constitution and has been bestowed on [the U.S. Supreme]
Court by the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072.'); see also Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471-74
(discussing analysis for validity of FRCP).
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gated to the U.S. Supreme Court in the Rules Enabling Act.47 Analy-
sis of whether state law conflicts with a valid FRCP is known as
"Hanna Part II" analysis because it was famously described in the
second part of the Court's decision in Hanna v. Plumer.48
The test for an FRCP's validity under Hanna Part II is lenient.
Congress has power under the Constitution to create the lower federal
courts.4 9 That power, as augmented by the Necessary and Proper
Clause, "carries with it congressional power to make rules governing
the practice and pleading in those courts, which in turn includes a
power to regulate matters which, though falling within the uncertain
area between substance and procedure, are rationally capable of clas-
sification as either."50 In the Rules Enabling Act (REA), Congress
delegated to the U.S. Supreme Court "the power to prescribe general
rules of practice and procedure... for cases in the United States dis-
trict courts.., and courts of appeals."51 The REA limits that power
by providing that the rules prescribed under it "shall not abridge,
enlarge or modify any substantive right."52 The Court has, at least
until recently, interpreted this limit to be almost toothless. 53 The
Court has said: "Congress' prohibition of any alteration of substantive
rights... was obviously not addressed to such incidental effects as
necessarily attend the adoption of the prescribed new rules of proce-
dure."5 4 The Court has interpreted an FRCP narrowly to avoid the
47. Burlington N., 480 U.S. at 5.
48. 380 U.S. at 469-74; Ely, supra note 7, at 698 (arguing that situations involv-
ing FRCPs require "discrete" inquiry from those involving federal judge-made rules; the
first is governed by REA, the second by RDA); see also Megan Barbero, Note, Interpreting
Rule 68 to Conform with the Rules Enabling Act, 57 STAN. L. REV. 2017, 2032 (2005) (de-
scribing "Hanna Part r' and "Hanna Part Ir).
49. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9 (empowering Congress "[t]o constitute tribunals
inferior to the Supreme Court"); see also id. art. III, § 1 (vesting judicial power of U.S. "in
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish").
50. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 472; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 18 (empowering
Congress "[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Exe-
cution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Gov-
ernment of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof).
51. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2000).
52. Id. § 2072(b).
53. See Leslie M. Kelleher, Taking "Substantive Rights" (in the Rules Enabling
Act) More Seriously, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 47, 48-49 (1998) (arguing that Court has be-
gun giving more effect to the portion of REA that prohibits rules from altering substan-
tive rights).
54. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 465; see also Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480
U.S. 1, 5 ("The cardinal purpose of Congress in authorizing the development of a uniform
and consistent system of rules governing federal practice and procedure suggests that
Rules which incidentally affect litigants' substantive rights do not violate this provision
[i.e., 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b)] if reasonably necessary to maintain the integrity of that system
of rules."); Miss. Publ'g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 445-46 (1946) (holding that the
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REA's bar on rules that alter substantive rights, 55 but the Court has
never invalidated a rule under that bar. 56 Thus, when a federal court
in a diversity case determines that a state law conflicts with an FRCP,
it is a good bet that the FRCP will prevail.
When state law does not conflict with an FRCP or any federal
statute or provision in U.S. Constitution, federal courts in diversity
use what is called "Hanna Part I" analysis. 57 Hanna Part I analysis
determines whether a federal court's use of a federal judge-made rule,
in lieu of the forum state's law, in a diversity case would disserve the
twin aims of Erie: "discouragement of forum-shopping" that would
cause litigants to choose federal court over state court (when that
choice is available); and "avoidance of inequitable administration of
the laws."58 If application of the federal judge-made rule would dis-
serve those twin aims, the state law is said to satisfy the Court's
"modified outcome-determination" test,5 9 and the federal court ordi-
narily should apply the state law instead of federal judge-made
law.60 It is possible, however, that a federal court should apply a fed-
eral judge-made rule instead of state law-even if the state law satis-
fies the modified outcome-determination test-if application of the
federal judge-made law is justified by a strong enough federal inter-
FRCP at issue there did not alter substantive rights, even though it would "undoubtedly
affect [defendant's] rights," because it "relates merely to 'the manner and the means by
which a right to recover * * * is enforced."') (quoting Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S.
99, 109 (1945)); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941) ("The test [under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2072(b)] must be whether a rule really regulates procedure,-the judicial process for en-
forcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering rem-
edy and redress for disregard or infraction of them.").
55. See Semtek Intl, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 503 (2001)
(rejecting an interpretation of FRCP 41(b) in part because that interpretation "would ar-
guably violate the jurisdictional limitation of the Rules Enabling Act: that the Rules 'shall
not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right,' 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b)"); see also Am-
chem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 612-13 (1997) (interpreting FRCP 23 "mind-
ful that" its requirements "must be interpreted in keeping.., with the Rules Enabling
Actrs instruction] that rules of procedure 'shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any sub-
stantive right" (citations omitted)); Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., 500 U.S. 90, 96 (1991)
(rejecting an interpretation of FRCP 23.1, implying that the interpretation would violate
REA).
56. See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Not Bad for Government Work- Does Anyone Else
Think the Supreme Court Is Doing a Halfway Decent Job in its Erie-Hanna Jurispru-
dence?, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 963, 978 (1998) (stating that Court has upheld every
FRCP that it has found to conflict with state law).
57. See Barbero, supra note 48, at 2032.
58. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 27 n.6 (1988).
59. See, e.g., Patrick Woolley, The Source of Federal Preclusion After Semtek, 72
U. CiN. L. REv. 527, 531 (2003).
60. See Stewart, 487 U.S. at 27 n.6. As to which state's law should apply, the
federal court in a diversity case applies the choice of law rules of the state in which the
federal court sits. See Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496-97 (1941).
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est. This possibility largely depends on the continuing vitality of the
Court's decision in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electronic Cooperative,
Inc.
6 1
Although Erie analysis can raise hard questions, its outlines are
clear.6 2 Applied to Idaho Code section 6-1604(2), for example, the first
step under Erie is to determine whether section 6-1604(2) conflicts
with an FRCP. If so, federal courts-even in diversity cases-must
apply the FRCP, instead of section 6-1604(2), as long as the FRCP
falls within Congress's rulemaking power under the Constitution and
the Court's rulemaking power under the REA. If section 6-1604(2)
does not conflict with any FRCP or federal statute, section 6-1604(2)
applies in federal courts unless, perhaps, a strong enough federal in-
terest compels that the state law be rejected in favor of federal judge-
made law.
However, the actual course that analysis has taken in the lower
federal courts has been much rockier than the paragraph above sug-
gests, as discussed below.
III. CASE LAW
Federal courts have purported to apply Erie analysis to analyze
all of the eight state statutes that restrict the pleading of punitive
damages. I say "purported" because many of the courts misunder-
stand Erie. Indeed, the decisions sketch out a bewildering array of
analyses. This section undertakes a comprehensive survey of the case
law. The survey (1) demonstrates the depth of the confusion among
federal courts on this issue; (2) illustrates the basic misconceptions
about Erie that are rampant; and (3) lays out the strands of case law
that point to a correct analysis of the issue.
A. Case Law on the Idaho Statute
The first published federal district court opinion analyzing Idaho
Code section 6-1604(2) under Erie was Windsor v. Guarantee Trust
Life Insurance Co.6 3 Windsor remains the leading decision on this is-
sue among the Idaho federal courts, and it therefore deserves close
examination.
61. 356 U.S. 525 (1958); see also Rowe, supra note 56, at 965 (noting uncertainty
among commentators about the continuing place of Byrd in Erie doctrine).
62. See Rowe, supra note 56, at 966 (arguing that, "since the Court decided
Hanna in 1965 it has provided and maintained a reasonably stable, workable, and sensi-
ble structure" for analysis).
63. 684 F. Supp. 630 (D. Idaho 1988); see also supra notes 16-22 and accompa-
nying text (describing Idaho Code § 6-1604).
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In Windsor, an insured sued his insurance company for the tort
of bad faith in settling his claim under a policy. 6 4 In his initial com-
plaint, the insured sought $100,000 in punitive damages from the in-
surance company.6 5 The company argued that Idaho Code section 6-
1604(2) barred the initial complaint's request for punitive
damages.6 6 The company further argued that, without the punitive
damages claim, the complaint failed to plead the amount-in-
controversy required for diversity jurisdiction. 6 7 The district court
believed that the company's argument required the court to decide
whether Idaho Code section 6-1604(2) applies in federal court
actions. 6 8 The court concluded that section 6-1604(2) "is substantive
in nature and therefore controlling in federal court in a diversity
case."6 9 The court gave two reasons for finding section 6-1604(2)
"substantive."70 "First," the Windsor court said, section 6-1604(2)
"does not directly conflict with the federal rule."7 1 "Second," the court
added, "the statute requires the plaintiff to meet an additional burden
of proof directly affecting the outcome of the case."
7 2
The court's approach seems to reflect the Hanna Part I analysis.
At the first step, the court found that Idaho Code section 6-1604 does
not conflict with any FRCP or federal statute. At the second step, the
court held that section 6-1604(2) satisfies the modified outcome-
determination test.
In finding no "direct[] conflict" between section 6-1604(2) and
"the federal rule," the court did not say what "federal rule" it had in
mind. The court apparently meant the federal rule for determining
whether the amount-in-controversy requirement is satisfied. 73 Under
64. Windsor, 684 F. Supp. at 632.
65. Id. at 631.
66. Id. at 633.
67. Id. The amount-in-controversy requirement is a statutory restriction on the
federal courts' power to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over actions between citizens
of different states. At the time of the action in Windsor, the relevant federal statute au-
thorized federal courts to hear actions between citizens of different states "where the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (1988).
In 1988, the statute was amended to increase the amount-in-controversy requirement to
$75,000, where it now stands. 28 USCA § 1332(a)(1) (2005).
68. Windsor, 684 F. Supp. at 632-33.




73. Id. at 631-32 (describing "[t]he rule governing dismissal for want of jurisdic-
tion in cases brought in federal court," under which "the sum claimed by the plaintiff con-
trols if the claim is apparently made in good faith," unless "it is apparent, to a legal cer-
tainty, that the plaintiff cannot recover the amount claimed... if actual damages are less
than the jurisdictional amount but, when combined with punitive damages, the total
amount is greater than the jurisdictional amount, federal jurisdiction exists.') (citing,
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this rule, courts consider not only the actual damages, but also the
punitive damages claimed by the plaintiff in the complaint. 74 The
Windsor court acknowledged that section 6-1604(2) would prevent
some plaintiffs-such as Windsor himself-from pleading the required
amount in controversy in the initial complaint by preventing them
from including a claim for punitive damages. 75 The court thought that
plaintiffs in this situation could avoid dismissal by moving to amend
their complaints to include a claim for punitive damages. 76 In the
court's view, the problem that Windsor and similarly situated plain-
tiffs face in initially pleading the requisite amount in controversy "is
so easily resolved that the Court need not recharacterize [section] 6-
1604(2) as procedural simply for cases like this one."
7 7
Like the first step of the Windsor court's analysis, the second
step was not fully explained. The court said that section 6-1604(2) "re-
quires the plaintiff to meet an additional burden of proof directly af-
fecting the outcome of the case."78 By "burden of proof," the court ap-
parently meant section 6-1604(2)'s requirement that a plaintiff "estab-
lish[ ] ... a reasonable likelihood of proving the facts at trial sufficient
to support award of punitive damages."79 The Windsor court did not
explain how this statutory requirement for amending a complaint to
request punitive damages could "affect the outcome of the case," much
less how it could do so "directly."8 0 Perhaps the court meant that
plaintiffs in Windsor's situation who could not meet this "additional,"
state-law pleading requirement for pleading punitive damages would
have their cases dismissed from federal court for failure to satisfy the
amount-in-controversy requirement. In contrast, plaintiffs who did
not have to meet this additional, state-law requirement could plead
the requisite amount in controversy in their initial complaint under
more lenient federal standards and might ultimately recover a judg-
ment rather than having their case dismissed, as would have occurred
if the state-law pleading requirement had been applied. 8 1 Even if
among other cases, St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283 (1938), and
Bell v. Preferred Life Assurance Soc'y, 320 U.S. 238 (1943)).
74. Windsor, 684 F. Supp at 632 ("m[f actual damages are less than the jurisdic-
tional amount but, when combined with punitive damages, the total amount is greater
than the jurisdictional amount, federal jurisdiction exists.') (citing, inter alia, Bell, 320
U.S. 238).
75. Id. at 633 ("A problem... arises when, as in this case, the underlying claim
[for actual damages] is insufficient to support federal jurisdiction standing alone').
76. See id. at 633-34.
77. Id. at 633.
78. Id.
79. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1604(2) (2004).
80. Windsor, 684 F. Supp. at 633.
81. As discussed infra notes 295-96 and accompanying text, the Idaho Code
does indeed put an "additional burden" on plaintiffs seeking punitive damages, compared
to the requirements of federal law. Idaho law requires the plaintiff to establish a 'reason-
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such a plaintiff ultimately recovered a judgment for less than the re-
quired amount in controversy, that would not result in dismissal of
the case.8 2 Thus, for some plaintiffs, section 6-1604 could mean the
difference between dismissal and a favorable judgment on the mer-
its.
83
This discussion of Windsor is detailed because the United States
District Court for the District of Idaho has consistently followed Win-
able likelihood" of proving entitlement to punitive damages at a hearing after which the
court is instructed to "weigh] the evidence presented." IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1604(2). The
plaintiff who makes this showing can amend the initial complaint to request punitive
damages. In contrast, FRCP 8(a)(3) allows a plaintiff to request punitive damages in the
initial complaint. Rather than requiring a "reasonable likelihood" of success to request
punitive damages, FRCP 11(b) more modestly requires the punitive damage claim, like
all other claims, to be "warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law" and
to be supported by factual allegations that "have evidentiary support or, if specifically so
identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for fur-
ther investigation or discovery." FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2), (b)(3). The punitive damage claim
can be dismissed only if it is clear to a legal certainty from the face of the pleadings, even
taking all the allegations as true, that the plaintiff will not be able to recover the punitive
damages claimed. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) (quoted in, e.g., Davis v.
Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 654 (1999), see Jones v. Miller, No. CIV A.
6:06-CV-00014, 2006 WL 1867321, at *2 (W.D. Va. June 30, 2006) (applying this standard
on motion to strike punitive damages claim); Northwest Pipe Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co.,
No. C-02-04189JF, 2003 WL 24027882, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2003) (applying the same
standard as in Jones); Ross-Simons v. Baccarat, 182 F.R.D. 386, 399-400 (D.R.I. 1998)
(applying the same standard as in Jones); see also Sharp Elecs. Corp. v. Copy Plus, Inc.,
939 F.2d 513, 515 (7th Cir. 1991) (granting motion to dismiss for failure to allege requisite
amount in controversy, the court considered whether punitive damages were available
under applicable state law and whether plaintiffs factual allegations met state-law stan-
dard).
82. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289 (1938) ('The
inability of plaintiff to recover an amount adequate to give the court jurisdiction does not
show his bad faith or oust the jurisdiction.").
83. See also Gamma-10 Plastics, Inc. v. Am. President Lines, Ltd., 32 F.3d 1244,
1255-58 (8th Cir. 1994) (upholding district court's refusal to allow complaint to be
amended to seek punitive damages on state law claim, because plaintiff could not satisfy
Minnesota law similar to Idaho Code section 6-1604(2); but reversing district court's re-
fusal to allow complaint to be amended to seek punitive damages on federal maritime
claim, because plaintiff did satisfy standard for amending complaint in Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(a)); Baumann v. Hall, No. 98-2126-JWL, 1998 WL 513008, at *1 (D. Kan. July 15,
1998) (viewing plaintiffs ability to provide evidence to support punitive damage claim
with skepticism, as would have been required by Kansas law similar to Idaho Code sec-
tion 6-1604(2), but the court granted the motion to amend the complaint to request puni-
tive damages because "fi]t cannot say... that plaintiff could prove no set of facts entitling
her to punitive damages. Evidence supporting such a claim is better considered in a mo-
tion for summary judgment."). But cf. Whittenburg v. L.J. Holding Co., 830 F. Supp. 557,
566 (D. Kan. 1993) (stating although plaintiffs in diversity action did not have to satisfy
Kansas statute requiring them, at pleading stage, to prove a likelihood of recovering pu-
nitive damages, they still had to satisfy summary judgment standards of FRCP 56, and
they "have not made a sufficient showing to withstand the defendant's motion for sum-
mary judgment on the issue of punitive damages").
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dsor with little discussion. 84 For example, the court in Doe v. Cutter
Biological cited Windsor in applying Idaho Code section 6-1604(2) to a
diversity action based on Idaho tort law. 85 The Cutter court noted,
however, "the tension existing between the principles of Rule 15(a) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for example, that leave to amend
pleadings shall be 'freely given,' and the limiting provisions of Idaho
statutory and case law, which disfavor punitive damages."8 6 Cutter
was cited by the district court in Strong v. Unumprovident Corp. to
support applying the Idaho statute in a diversity action. 8 7 Strong, in
turn, has been cited in three recent diversity cases in Idaho federal
court to justify applying section 6-1604(2).88
The Ninth Circuit has not analyzed the applicability of section 6-
1604(2) in diversity. In three cases, however, the Ninth Circuit has
assumed that section 6-1604(2) does apply in diversity cases.8 9 In two
of those cases, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding
that the plaintiff did not satisfy section 6-1604(2) and therefore could
84. The federal district courts in Idaho apply Idaho Code section 6-1604(2) even
in cases in which they find the law of a different state governs the state law claims as-
serted. See Strong v. Unumprovident Corp., 393 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1025-27 (D. Idaho
2005) (applying Idaho Code section 6-1604(2) to case in which court concluded that Texas
law governed claims). This reflects that a forum state's law may be considered "substan-
tive" for Erie purposes (in the sense that it applies in federal courts sitting in that state)
even though the same law is considered "procedural" for choice-of-law purposes (in that it
applies even in cases where another state's law is found to govern the substance of the
claims). See Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 721-30 (1988) (holding that a state
court could, consistently with Full Faith and Credit and Due Process Clauses, apply a fo-
rum state's statute of limitations to claims that the Constitution requires to be governed
by the substantive law of other states); see also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S.
797, 822 (1985) (holding that state court's application of forum state law to all claims be-
fore it, the vast majority of which involved leases in other states, "is sufficiently arbitrary
and unfair as to exceed constitutional limits").
85. Doe v. Cutter Biological, 844 F. Supp. 602, 609 (D. Idaho 1994).
86. Id. at 610.
87. 393 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1025 (D. Idaho 2005); see also id. at 1018 (noting the
case was a diversity action).
88. DeShazo v. Estate of Clayton, No. CV 05-202-S-EJL, 2006 WL 1794735, at
*10-11 (D. Idaho June 28, 2006); DBSI Signature Place, LLC v. BL Greensboro, L.P., No.
CV 05-051-SLMB, 2006 WL 1275394, at *17-18 (D. Idaho May 9, 2006); Prado v. Potlatch
Corp., No. CV 05-256-C-LMB, 2006 WL 1207612, at *3-4 (D. Idaho May 1, 2006).
89. Kuntz v. Lamar Corp., 385 F.3d 1177, 1187 (9th Cir. 2004) (applying Idaho
Code section 6-1604(2) to hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in deny-
ing plaintiff leave to amend complaint to add punitive damages); Native Am. Servs., Inc.
v. Givens, 213 F.3d 642 (9th Cir. 2000) (unpublished table decision), opinion at 2000 WL
328137, at *3 ("[Plaintiff] cites no authority, and we have discovered none, to support its
contention that the district court erred in dismissing NASrs claim for punitive damages
for its failure to comply with [Idaho Code] section 6-1604(2).'); Bendocchi v. Howmedica,
Inc., 2 F. App'x 711, 713 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating in dicta of this unpublished opinion that
"section 6-1604(2) controls the disposition of a motion to amend pleadings to state a puni-
tive damage claim").
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not request punitive damages. 90 (In the third case, the Ninth Circuit
said that section 6-1604(2) "controls the disposition of a motion to
amend pleadings to state a punitive damages claim," but the court re-
jected the defendants' argument that section 6-1604(2) also applies to
the trial judge's determination of whether to send a punitive damage
claim to the jury.9 1) In none of these cases case did the Ninth Circuit
analyze section 6-1604(2) under Erie.
Indeed, none of the post-Windsor decisions applying section 6-
1604(2) discusses the Erie issue. They treat Windsor as the final, com-
prehensive resolution of that issue. That treatment is unwarranted.
Windsor addressed only whether section 6-1604(2) conflicted with the
federal rule for determining whether the plaintiff has satisfied the
amount-in-controversy requirement. 92 The Windsor court did not ad-
dress whether section 6-1604(2) conflicts with other federal rules gov-
erning pleadings. As discussed below, other courts have done so and
reached differing results.
B. The Eleventh Circuit
In Cohen v. Office Depot, the Eleventh Circuit addressed a situa-
tion similar to that of Windsor: the plaintiff in a diversity action could
satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement only if the plaintiffs
claim for punitive damages was considered. 9 3 The defendant in Cohen
moved to strike the claim for punitive damages in plaintiffs initial
complaint, relying on a Florida statute similar to Idaho Code section
6-1604(2). 94 The Florida statute prohibits plaintiffs from including
punitive damage claims in their complaints except upon leave of the
90. Kuntz, 385 F.3d at 1187 (holding that the district court did not abuse its dis-
cretion in concluding that plaintiff failed to satisfy Idaho Code section 6-1604(2)'s re-
quirements for seeking punitive damages); Native Am. Servs., Inc., 213 F.3d 642, at *3
(affirming district court's dismissal of plaintiffs punitive damages claim, stating that
"[plaintiff] cites no authority, and we have discovered none, to support its contention that
the district court erred in dismissing [plaintiffs] claim for punitive damages for its failure
to comply with [Idaho Code] section 6-1604(2)").
91. Bendocchi, 2 F. App'x at 713 ("While [Idaho Code] section 6-1604(2) controls
the disposition of a motion to amend pleadings to state a punitive damages claim-
normally, as the statute contemplates, in the pretrial context it does not address the cen-
tral issue before us: the exercise of the court's discretion whether to instruct a jury on pu-
nitive damages after the close of evidence. On that issue, Idaho courts have consistently
held that '[t]he decision of whether to instruct on punitive damages is within the discre-
tion of the trial judge.").
92. See supra notes 63-83 and accompanying text.
93. Cohen v. Office Depot, Inc., 184 F.3d 1292, 1295-99 (11th Cir. 1999), vacated
in part on other grounds, 204 F.3d 1069 (11th Cir. 2000).
94. Id. at 1295 (discussing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.72 (West 2005)).
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court on a motion to amend.9 5 To obtain leave to amend, the Florida
statute requires "a reasonable showing by evidence in the record or
proferred by the claimant which would provide a reasonable basis for
recovery of such damages."
9 6
Unlike the Windsor court, the Eleventh Circuit held that the
state statutory requirement for pleading punitive damages does not
apply in diversity actions in federal court. 97 The Cohen court observed
that the first question in Erie analysis is whether the state statute
conflicts with a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure. "If it does, the federal
procedural rule applies and the state provision does not."98 The Cohen
court held that the Florida statute conflicts with FRCP 8(a)(3). FRCP
8(a)(3) states, "A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief.., shall
contain... (3) a demand for judgment for the relief the pleader
seeks."9 9 The Eleventh Circuit had previously explained that, under
FRCP 8(a)(3), the plaintiff must "identifyj the remedies...
sought."10 0 The Cohen court reasoned, "[plunitive damages are a rem-
edy, so under the rule a request for them should be included in the
complaint."10 1 Under this reasoning, FRCP 8(a)(3) requires plaintiffs
seeking punitive damages to request them specifically in their com-
plaint, whereas the Florida statute prohibits such requests. Thus,
FRCP 8(a)(3) and the Florida statute conflict.
The Cohen court continued, "[e]ven if Rule 8(a)(3) does not re-
quire a plaintiff to include in a complaint a request for all the relief
sought, there is still a conflict between [Florida Statutes] section
95. Cohen, 184 F.3d at 1295 (observing that "the Florida Supreme Court has in-
terpreted [section] 768.72 as requiring the dismissal of any request for punitive damages
asserted without leave of the court") (citing Simeon, Inc. v. Cox, 671 So. 2d 158, 160 (Fla.
1996)).
96. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.72. The showing required by the Florida statute re-
sembles that of Idaho Code section 6-1604(2), which requires the plaintiff to establish "a
reasonable likelihood of proving facts at trial sufficient to support an award of punitive
damages." IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1604(2) (2004).
97. Cohen, 184 F.3d at 1299 ("[Wle hold that the pleading requirements of Flor-
ida Statutes [section] 768.72 are inapplicable in federal diversity cases."). On rehearing,
the Eleventh Circuit partially vacated its original panel opinion. 204 F.3d 1069 (11th Cir.
2000). In doing so, however, the Eleventh Circuit stated, "[w]e adhere to and leave... in-
tact" the portion of its opinion holding the Florida statutory requirement for pleading pu-
nitive damages inapplicable in federal court. Id. at 1072; see also Porter v. Ogden, Newell
& Welch, 241 F.3d 1334, 1341 (11th Cir. 2001) ('This court has held that the pleading
rules set forth in FRCP 8(a)(3) preempt [Fla. Stat. section] 768.72's requirement that a
plaintiff must obtain leave from the court before including a prayer for punitive dam-
ages.').
98. Cohen, 184 F.3d at 1296.
99. FED. R. CIv. P. 8(a)(3).
100. Cohen, 184 F.3d at 1297 (quoting Goldsmith v. City of Atmore, 996 F.2d
1155, 1161 (11th Cir. 1993)).
101. Cohen, 184 F.3d. at 1297-98.
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768.72 and Rule 8(a)(3). ' ' 10 2 The conflict still exists "because the [fed-
eral] rule clearly allows the plaintiff to include a request for punitive
damages in her initial complaint, whereas [Florida Statutes] section
768.72 prevents her from doing so."103 The court observed that "[a]
state law may conflict with a Federal Rule even where it violates no
affirmative command or requirement of the [federal] rule."10 4 In sup-
port of this observation, the court cited the Supreme Court case of
Hanna v. Plumer.10 5 In Hanna, a Massachusetts statute required in-
hand service of process on the defendant whereas the relevant Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure allowed in-hand service as well as other
methods of service. 10 6 The express language of the Federal Rule at is-
sue in Hanna could have been read as not conflicting with the state
statute, since the Federal Rule allowed the method of service that the
state statute required. Nonetheless, the Court in Hanna found an
"unavoidable" conflict between them. 107 The Cohen court stated as fol-
lows:
Likewise, in this case, because Rule 8(a)(3) allows a plaintiff
to request in her initial complaint all the relief she seeks, it
says "implicitly, but with unmistakable clarity" that a plain-
tiff is not required to wait until a later stage of the litigation
to include a prayer for punitive damages, nor is she re-
quired to proffer evidence or obtain leave of court before do-
ing so. 108
Having found a conflict between the state law and an FRCP, the
Cohen court recognized that the Supreme Court's Erie doctrine re-
quired it to apply the federal rule unless the rule "transgresses the
Rules Enabling Act or the Constitution."10 9 The Cohen court found no
transgression and accordingly held that federal courts must apply
FRCP 8(a)(3) instead of the Florida statute that restricts the pleading
of punitive damages.
1 10
Cohen conflicts with Windsor in the result. Windsor held that
federal courts in diversity cases must apply an Idaho statute that
closely resembles the Florida statute.1 1 1 As noted above, the Ninth
102. Id. at 1298.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. (discussing Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965)).
106. 380 U.S. at 461-62.
107. Cohen, 184 F.3d at 1298.
108. Id. at 1298-99 (quoting Hanna, 380 U.S. at 470).
109. Id. at 1299.
110. See id.
111. See supra notes 63-83 and accompanying text.
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Circuit has, consistently with Windsor, assumed that the Idaho stat-
ute applies in federal court. 112 Thus, the Ninth Circuit and the Elev-
enth Circuit have come out differently on the question whether Erie
requires federal courts to apply state statutes restricting the pleading
of punitive damages. Considering the disarray among yet other





Like the law in Idaho and Florida, Oregon law allows a plaintiff
to request punitive damages only after a court has granted a motion
to amend the complaint to add the request. 114 The Oregon statute,
like Florida's and Idaho's, requires the plaintiff to present evidence to
support the motion to amend. 115 In Pruett v. Erickson Air-Crane Co.,
the federal district court for the District of Oregon held that the Ore-
gon statute does not apply in federal court. 1 16 Like the Eleventh Cir-
cuit in Cohen, the Pruett court concluded that state law conflicts with
the FRCPs and is therefore preempted.
The Pruett court found a conflict between the Oregon statute and
FRCP 8(a). The court observed that, in contrast to the Oregon statute,
"the Federal Rules permit a plaintiff to pray for punitive damages in
their complaint."1 17 In particular, "FRCP 8(a) enunciates the liberal
112. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text
113. Although two of the Ninth Circuit decisions creating the conflict are unpub-
lished, that does not prevent the Court from granting certiorari to resolve the conflict.
See, e.g., Comm'r of Internal Revenue v. McCoy, 484 U.S. 3, 7 (1987) ('We note in passing
that the fact that the Court of Appeals' order under challenge here is unpublished carries
no weight in our decision to review the case.'); see also United States v. Janis, 428 U.S.
433, 439 (1976) (granting review of an unpublished court of appeals opin-
ion).
114. OR. REV. STAT. § 31.725 (2004). Whereas Idaho Code 6-1604(2) requires the
evidence to establish a "reasonable likelihood" of success at trial, the Oregon statute, sec-
tion 31.725, requires "admissible evidence adequate to avoid the granting of a motion for
a directed verdict to the party opposing the motion." Id. § 31.725(3)(a). In addition to pre-
scribing a different standard for amendment, section 31.725 differs from Idaho's statute
in other ways. Specifically, section 31.725 requires the court to hold a hearing and make a
decision on the motion to amend within prescribed time periods. Id. § 31.725(5) (generally
requiring court to hold a hearing not more than 30 days after motion to amend is filed
and served, and to decide the motion within 10 days after the hearing.). It also restricts
discovery on a defendant's ability to pay. Id. § 31.725(6). Idaho law imposes no similar re-
strictions.
115. OR. REV. STAT. § 31.725.
116. 183 F.R.D. 248, 249-52 (). Or. 1998).
117. Id. at 250.
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notice pleading concept.., by requiring that a plaintiff provide a
short and plain statement of the claim showing s/he is entitled to re-
lief and a demand for the relief sought."1 18 The Pruett court deter-
mined:
These minimal pleading requirements would be frustrated if
the court were forced to say that, while the pleading re-
quirements of the Federal Rules are met, the plaintiff must
now make a factual and evidentiary showing that they are
entitled to punitive damages before being permitted to pray
for punitive damages. 
1 19
Thus, Pruett, like Cohen, found a conflict between a state law restrict-
ing the pleading of punitive damages and FRCP 8(a)(3). 120
The Pruett court also found a conflict between the Oregon statute
and FRCP 9(g). FRCP 9(g) requires items of special damages to be
"specifically stated."12 1 Under FRCP 9(g), the Pruett court observed,
"a plaintiff need not offer evidence sufficient to sustain the claim be-
fore pleading special damages." 122 "In contrast," the Oregon statute
"requires plaintiff to make an evidentiary showing sufficient to with-
stand a directed verdict before plaintiff may plead punitive dam-
ages."123 The court concluded that application of the Oregon statute
would therefore "create a direct conflict" with FRCP 9(g). 1 2 4 This con-
clusion implicitly assumes that punitive damages are an item of spe-
cial damages for purposes of FRCP 9(g), an assumption that is exam-
ined in a later section.125
2. Kansas
The federal courts in Kansas take an approach similar to that of
the federal courts in Oregon. A Kansas statute requires court ap-
proval before punitive damages may be pleaded, and court approval
depends on the plaintiffs establishing "a probability" of ultimately
118. Id. at 251.
119. Id.
120. See supra notes 93-110 and accompanying text (discussing Cohen).
121. FED. R. CIrv. P. 9(g).
122. Pruett, 183 F.R.D. at 251.
123. Id.; see also OR. REV. STAT. § 31.725(3)(a) (2004) (requiring "admissible evi-
dence adequate to avoid the granting of a motion for a directed verdict to the party oppos-
ing the motion").
124. Pruett, 183 F.R.D. at 251; see also Burkhart v. L.M. Becker & Co. Corp., No.
CV-04-420-ST, 2004 WL 1920196, at *2 (D. Or. Aug. 26, 2004) (relying on Pruett to hold
that FRCP 8(a)(2), rather than OR. REV. STAT. § 31.725, governed sufficiency of plaintiffs
allegations of punitive damages in complaint).
125. See infra notes 306-16 and accompanying text.
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proving entitlement to punitive damages. 126 The Kansas federal
courts have held that this statute does not apply in diversity actions
because it conflicts with FRCP 9(g).
The earliest such case, which remains the one that discusses the
issue at the greatest length, is NAL II, Ltd. v. Tonkin.1 27 The court in
NAL II interpreted FRCP 9(g) to "requireo, in mandatory language,
that a claim for punitive damages be set forth in a party's com-
plaint."128 The court reasoned that since the Kansas statute "prohib-
its the pleading of punitive damages in a party's initial complaint,"
the Kansas statute "cannot co-exist" with FRCP 9(g). 1 2 9 The court
recognized that in light of the conflict, FRCP 9(g) must apply, instead
of the Kansas law, as long as FRCP 9(g) is "within the scope of the
Rules Enabling Act and... is constitutional. ' 130 The court "ha[d] no
problem" finding that FRCP 9(g) meets both requirements.
13 1
The NAL II court continued that "[e]ven if no conflict between
Rule 9(g) and the [Kansas] statute existed," it would "still find that
the [Kansas] statute is not applicable in federal diversity
cases."132 The court observed that Erie required federal courts to ap-
ply state law that does not conflict with any FRCP or federal statute
"if the failure to apply the [state] law would result in an inequitable
administration of the law."13 3 The court found no inequity in having
FRCP 9(g) apply in federal courts in Kansas, while Kansas state
courts apply the Kansas law. The court explained that a federal court
can still decide whether a punitive damage claim has adequate evi-
dentiary support when the court rules on a motion for summary
judgment. 13 4 Thus, "[t]he only difference resulting from the state
law's application is the time in the life of the lawsuit when the court
determines whether the claim for punitive damages is appropri-
ate."13 5 The court concluded that "[t]his difference is not material to
the character or result in the litigation" and therefore did not reflect
an inequitable administration of law.
13 6
126. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3703 (1997).
127. 705 F. Supp. 522 (D. Kan. 1989).
128. Id. at 528.
129. Id.




134. Id. at 529.
135. Id.
136. Id. In NAL II, the court recognized that, having found a conflict between the
Kansas law and an FRCP, the court did not need to decide whether the federal courts'
application of the Federal Rule, while state courts applied the state law, would result in
an inequitable administration of the laws. See id. at 528 ("[U]nder the Hanna analysis,
Rule 9(g)'s requirement must be applied in federal diversity cases."). A later decision from
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In cases after NAL II, the Kansas federal district courts have
consistently held that the Kansas law restricting the pleading of puni-
tive damages does not apply in federal courts.
137
3. Minnesota
The federal district courts in Minnesota have applied Erie analy-
sis to the Minnesota law, Minnesota Statutes section 549.191, that re-
stricts the pleading of punitive damages. After one decision to the con-
trary, 138 those courts have consistently held that section 549.191 ap-
plies in diversity actions. 139 In so holding, the Minnesota federal
courts have used two different rationales. One is flawed and under-
mines the other rationale.
In Fournier v. Marigold Foods, Inc., the district court held, "[t]he
Erie doctrine requires this court to apply section 549.191 prohibiting
pleading punitive damages without leave of court."140 The court un-
derstood the Erie doctrine to require a federal court in a diversity ac-
tion to apply state law "if application of a conflicting federal rule
would encourage forum-shopping."141 The court found that a federal
court's failure to apply section 549.191 would encourage forum shop-
ping. The court explained that section 549.191 "creates a preliminary
evidentiary burden" for pleading punitive damages.142 In the absence
of section 549.191, "a claim for punitive damages remains in the
the federal court in Kansas mistakenly believed that the inequitable-administration
analysis is necessary even though Kansas law conflicts with FRCP 9(g). See Metal Trad-
ing Servs. v. Transp. Servs., 781 F. Supp. 1539, 1546-47 (D. Kan. 1991) (observing that
Kansas statute conflicts with FRCP 9(g), court says it "must also determine whether the
character or result of the case will be materially altered by failing to apply the state law").
137. See Vance ex rel. Wood v. Midwest Coast Transp., Inc., 314 F. Supp. 2d 1089,
1090 (D. Kan. 2004) (rejecting defendants' contention that plaintiffs inclusion of punitive
damages claim violated Kansas statute requiring court's approval, and stating, "[c]ourts
in this district have repeatedly held that claims for punitive damages are properly pled in
the complaint without court order.'); Stewart v. Mitchell Transp., No. 01-2546-JWL, 2002
WL 1203650, at *1 (D. Kan. May 30, 2002) ('It is well settled that KSA. 60-3703 does not
apply to cases filed in federal court.'); Arnold ex rel Shrout v. Holmes, No. 00-2069-KHV,
2001 WL 167438, at *1 (D. Kan. Feb. 20, 2001); Schneulle v. C & C Auto Sales, Inc., 99 F.
Supp. 2d 1294, 1299 (D. Kan. 2000); Steinert v. Winn Group, 83 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1248
(D. Kan. 2000); Baumann v. Hall, No. 98-2126-JWL, 1998 WL 513008, at *1 n.1 (D. Kan.
July 15, 1998); Amundson & Assocs. Art Studio, Ltd. v. Natl Counsel on Comp. Ins., Inc.,
977 F. Supp. 1116, 1126 (D. Kan. 1997).
138. Jacobs v. Pickands Mather & Co., No. 5-87-CIV 49, 1987 WL 47387, at *1 (D.
Minn. Aug. 24, 1987) (declining to apply MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.191 in diversity case on
the ground that its provisions "are procedural in nature, and do not affect the ultimate
outcome of the plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages).
139. See infra notes 140-62 and accompanying text.
140. 678 F. Supp. 1420, 1422 (D. Minn. 1988).
141. Id. (emphasis added).
142. Id.
[Vol. 43
20061 AN ERIE OBSTACLE TO STATE TORT REFORM 65
pleadings unless and until challenged by defendant, giving plaintiff a
tactical advantage in resolving his claims."
14 3
The Fournier court misunderstood Erie. When a federal court
must choose between a state law and a "conflicting federal rule," Erie
requires the court to apply the federal rule, not the state law. 14 4 That
is true even if application of the federal rule instead of the state law
would encourage forum shopping. 145 In applying its mistaken under-
standing of Erie, the Fournier court identified the conflict between the
Minnesota law and the federal rules. The Minnesota law creates a
"preliminary evidentiary burden" for plaintiffs seeking punitive dam-
ages that they do not have under the federal rules governing plead-
ings. 146 Under the federal rules, the plaintiff can include a punitive
damage claim in her complaint and there it stays until the defendant
successfully moves to dismiss it. 147 To defeat such a motion, the plain-
tiff does not need to meet any evidentiary burden. 148
Decisions by the Minnesota federal courts after Fournier do not
repeat its mistake. The rationale of these later cases, however, is un-
143. Id.
144. See, e.g., Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 n.7 (1996)
("It is settled that if the [Federal] Rule in point is consonant with the Rules Enabling Act
and the Constitution, the Federal Rule applies regardless of contrary state law.") (cita-
tions omitted); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965).
When a situation is covered by one of the Federal Rules... the court has been
instructed to apply the Federal Rule, and can refuse to do so only if the Advi-
sory Committee, this Court, and Congress erred in their prima facie judgment
that the Rule in question transgresses neither the terms of the Enabling Act
nor constitutional restrictions.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
145. See Burlington N. R.R. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 3-8 (1987) (holding that federal
court in diversity case had to apply Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure that conflicted
with state law, without discussing outcome-determination test); cf. Stewart Org., Inc. v.
Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 32 n.11 (1998) (because federal statute controlled issue arising
in diversity action, Court did not have to determine whether application of a federal
judge-made rule would implicate the twin aims of Erie).
146. See Fournier, 678 F. Supp. at 1422.
147. See id.
148. E.g., Scheur v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). The court states as follows:
When a federal court reviews the sufficiency of a complaint, before the recep-
tion of any evidence either by affidavit or admissions, its task is necessarily a
limited one. The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but
whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claim....
"... [A] complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim
unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief."
Id. (citation omitted).
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dermined by the Fournier court's recognition-which later cases also
reflect-that the Minnesota law restricting the pleading of punitive
damages conflicts with federal law by creating an evidentiary burden
for plaintiffs seeking to plead a request for punitive damages.
In Kuehn v. Shelcore, Inc., the court observed that under Erie,
"[t]he preliminary question... [is] whether there is a Federal Rule on
point which directly conflicts with the state provision." 149 The court
rejected the plaintiffs argument that section 549.191 conflicts with
FRCP 8.150 The court admitted that unlike section 549.191, FRCP 8
"does not prohibit pleading punitive damages without leave of
court."'151 That difference, in the Kuehn court's view, created only a
"potential conflict" between FRCP 8 and section 549.191. The court be-
lieved that the two provisions could still "be given simultaneous ef-
fect" because they had different purposes: "Federal Rule 8 is con-
cerned with simplifying pleading requirements; section 549.191, how-
ever, is aimed at deterring past abusive pleading practices regarding
punitive damages in order to address a perceived insurance
crisis." 152 As support for its view that the provisions do not conflict,
the Kuehn court observed that Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 8
was almost identical to FRCP 8 and was not changed after enactment
of section 549.191.153
Despite finding no conflict between FRCP 8 and the Minnesota
law, the Kuehn court found the "variation" between them substantial
enough to encourage forum shopping and therefore justify application
of the Minnesota law under Hanna Part I. The court explained that
the variation arose because section 549.191 "keeps a claim for puni-
tive damages out of the case unless and until plaintiff can make a
prima facie showing" of entitlement to punitive damages.5 4 The court
determined that "[wihen faced with the choice between a forum which
applies section 549.191 and one which does not, a party might well
choose the latter because it provides a tactical, though non-
dispositive, advantage." 15 5 The court concluded that "this variation is
substantial enough to influence forum choice and, under Erie, must be
eliminated by applying section 549.191 in this federal diversity ac-
tion."15 6 Thus, the court found the Minnesota law applicable in diver-
149. 686 F. Supp. 233, 234 (D. Minn. 1988).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. (citations omitted).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 235.
155. Id.
156. Id.; see also Zeelan Indus. v. De Zeeuw, 706 F. Supp. 702, 705 (D. Minn.
1989) (finding that "the failure of courts to apply Minn. Stat. [section] 549.191 in federal
diversity actions has the potential to significantly influence choice of forum," and holding
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sity cases based on the absence of a "conflict," coupled with the pres-
ence of a "variation," between the Minnesota law and the FRCPs.
Relying on Kuehn, the Minnesota federal court in a later case re-
jected the argument that section 549.191 conflicts with FRCP 15(a),
which governs the amendment of pleadings. The later case is Security
Savings Bank v. Green Tree Acceptance, Inc. 157 The court in Security
Savings found no conflict because section 549.191 and FRCP 15(a) dif-
fer in scope:
Section 549.191 attempts to address the issue of whether
or not a party should be permitted to assert a claim for puni-
tive damages. FRCP 15(a) attempts to address the issue of
whether a party should be permitted to amend his pleadings
generally. There is no direct conflict between Federal Rule
15(a) and section 549.191 .... Rule 15... does not even at-
tempt to address the issue posed in section 549.191.158
The court observed that this analysis was similar to that of
Kuehn. 159 Similar to the court in Kuehn, the court in Security Savings
found evidence for the lack of a conflict in the fact that Minnesota had
a rule of civil procedure almost identical to FRCP 15(a). 160 Finding no
conflict, the Security Savings court turned to the question of whether
a federal court's failure to apply section 549.191 "is substantial
enough to raise equal protection problems or influence the choice of
forum."16 1 The court answered that question in the affirmative, as the
court did in Kuehn.
162
the Minnesota statute applicable in diversity actions). For additional federal court cases
applying Minn. Stat. section 549.191, see Knight v. Prod. Res. Group, No.
Civ.036443(MJD/JGL), 2005 WL 1630523, at *8 (D. Minn. July 11, 2005) (relying on se-
tion 549.191 to hold motion to amend to add punitive damages claim was un-
timely); Berczyk v. Emerson Tool Co., 291 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1008-18 (). Minn. 2003)
(applying section 549.191 to deny motion to amend complaint to seek punitive damages);
Olson v. Snap Prods., Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1028-40 (D. Minn. 1998) (applying sec-
tion 549.191 to grant motion to amend complaint to seek punitive damages); Hammond v.
Northland Counseling Ctr., Inc., No. CIV.5-96-353MJD/RLE, 1998 WL 315333, at *3-11
(D. Minn. Feb. 27, 1998) (applying section 549.191 to motion to amend complaint to seek
punitive damages on state law claim while applying FRCP 15(a) to motion to amend com-
plaint to seek punitive damages on federal claim); Ulrich v. City of Crosby, 848 F. Supp.
861, 866-76 (D. Minn. 1994) (applying section 549.191 to motion to amend complaint to
seek punitive damages); Stock v. Heiner, 696 F. Supp. 1253, 1263 (D. Minn. 1988) (hold-
ing that section 549.191 applied to state law claim in federal court under supplemental
jurisdiction).
157. CIV. No. 3-89-28, 1990 WL 36142 (D. Minn. Mar. 22, 1990).




162. Id. at *3.
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The Eighth Circuit has not squarely addressed whether Minne-
sota Statutes section 549.191 applies in federal court diversity cases.
The Eighth Circuit has, however, in two cases affirmed district court
decisions that relied on the Minnesota statute in diversity cases to
deny motions to amend complaints to request punitive dam-
ages. 16 3 Thus, the Eighth Circuit is in the same situation as the Ninth
Circuit. Without discussing the Erie issue, both circuits have reached
results that conflict with the result that the Eleventh Circuit reached,
after discussing the issue, in Cohen.
164
4. North Dakota
A North Dakota statute prohibits initial complaints from includ-
ing punitive damage claims but allows plaintiffs to amend their com-
plaints to request punitive damages if they provide "sufficient evi-
dence to support a finding by the trier of fact" that the plaintiff is en-
titled to punitive damages. 16 5 In Nereson v. Zurich Insurance Co., the
federal district court for the District of North Dakota held that the
North Dakota statute applies in federal court.16 6 Later decisions by
that court adhere to that holding.
16 7
The Nereson court found "no direct conflict between the North
Dakota statute and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."
1 68 Without
mentioning any particular FRCPs, the court said, "[w]hile the statute
and the federal rules are not perfectly matched, they can coexist."
16 9
The Nereson court observed that when state law does not conflict
with the FRCPs, "the court must apply state law if there is a potential
163. See Bunker v. Meshbesher, 147 F.3d 691, 696 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that
the district court did not err under section 549.191 in denying the motion to amend to add
punitive damages claim and observing, "[u]nder Minnesota law, a trial court may not al-
low an amendment [of the complaint to add a punitive damages claim] where the motion
and supporting affidavits do not reasonably allow a conclusion that clear and convincing
evidence will establish [that] the defendant[s] acted with willful indifference to the rights
or safety of others.") (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted); Gamma-10
Plastics, Inc. v. Am. President Lines, Ltd., 32 F.3d 1244, 1255 (8th Cir. 1994) ("Given
Minnesota's requirement of clear and convincing evidence and the policy considerations
behind Minn. Stat. [section] 549.191, we will not disturb the district court's ruling insofar
as it refused to permit the amendment and instruct the jury that G-10 could recover pu-
nitive damages under Minnesota law.").
164. See supra notes 89-91, 93-113 and accompanying text.
165. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-11(1) (2005).
166. Civ. No. A3-91-72, 1992 WL 212233, at *1-2 (D.N.D. Aug. 20, 1992).
167. See, e.g., Poitra v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., No. 4:04-cv-58, 2006 WL 2349981,
at *2 (D.N.D. Aug. 10, 2006); Olson v. Ford Motor Co., No. A4-04-102, 2005 WL 3271945,
at *1 (D.N.D. Nov. 29, 2005); Myers v. Richland County, 288 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1021
(D.N.D. 2003).
168. 1992WL 212233, at*l.
169. Id.
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for forum shopping or inequitable administration of the law."' 170 The
court determined that the potential for those results does exist. It ob-
served that the North Dakota statute mandates procedures that
"place the burden upon the plaintiff to show a factual and legal basis
for the [punitive damages] claim before it can be plead [sic]. ' ' 171 That
requirement, the court reasoned, "is certainly more restrictive than
the liberal pleading rule under the federal rules whereby the plaintiff
can plead a cause without any required showing and then proceed to
prove up the claim." 17 2 Considering the less restrictive nature of fed-
eral law, "plaintiffs may choose to bring their actions in federal court
rather than state court."1 73 Thus, the federal court's failure to apply
the North Dakota statute could lead to forum shopping, the preven-
tion of which "is one of the primary goals of the Erie doctrine. 1 7 4
Nereson's reasoning resembles that of the Minnesota district
court in Kuehn discussed above, 17 5 and that of the Colorado federal
courts, which are discussed below. 176 Despite finding no conflict be-
tween state law and the FRCPs, these courts rely on the difference be-
tween state law and the FRCPs to find that the federal courts' failure
to apply state law could encourage forum shopping or result in the in-
equitable administration of the laws. In effect, the courts are trying to
have it both ways. They minimize or ignore the difference between
state law and the FRCPs in order to avoid finding a conflict, yet they
rely on that same difference when applying the modified outcome-
determination test.
5. Illinois
Illinois law provides that in certain tort actions "no complaint
shall be filed containing a prayer for relief seeking punitive dam-
ages."17 7 The Illinois statute authorizes the plaintiff, however, to
move to amend the complaint to request punitive damages.1 78 The Illinois
statute requires the court to allow the amendment "if the plaintiff es-
tablishes at... [a] hearing a reasonable likelihood of proving facts at




173. Id. at *2.
174. Id.
175. See supra notes 148-56 and accompanying text.
176. See infra notes 222-43 and accompanying text.
177. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/2-604.1 (West 2003).
178. Id.
179. Id.; cf. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1604(2) (2004) ('The court shall allow the mo-
tion to amend the pleadings if, after weighing the evidence presented, the court concludes
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cases, federal district courts in Illinois have concluded that this Illi-
nois statute does not apply in diversity cases.
18 0
The earliest case is Berry v. Eagle-Picher, an asbestos-exposure
case brought in diversity.181 The defendants in Berry relied on the Il-
linois statute in moving to strike a punitive damage claim from the
initial complaint.182 The court framed the issue as "whether this Illi-
nois statute is properly viewed as substantive or procedural. '18 3 The
court found two reasons for concluding that the Illinois statute "is
procedural." 184 First, the Illinois law is in the Illinois Code of Civil
Procedure, in the portion of the Code governing pleadings. 18 5 Its "fed-
eral counterpart" is FRCP 8, "[which] provides for notice pleading and
contains no restrictions comparable to that found in [the Illinois stat-
ute]."186 These circumstances indicated that the Illinois law "is a rule
of pleading procedure which must give way to [FRCP] 8. ... ',187 Sec-
ond, the court found the Illinois law procedural when analyzed under
the modified outcome-determination test.188 The court reasoned that
in requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate a "reasonable likelihood" that
they would ultimately prove entitlement to punitive damages, the Il-
linois law imposed a burden comparable to that imposed by FRCP 11.
FRCP 11, as the court described it, "compels counsel to make reason-
able inquiry to assure that the claims asserted are well-grounded in
fact."18 9 Thus, the court did not think that the federal courts' failure to
that, the moving party has established at such hearing a reasonable likelihood of proving
facts at trial sufficient to support an award of punitive damages.").
180. See Atlas v. City of N. Chicago, No. 03 C 4814, 2004 WL 1166627, at *3 (N.D.
Ill. May 25, 2004); Dewick v. Maytag Corp., 296 F. Supp. 2d 905, 906 n.3 (N.D. Inl. 2003);
MCI Worldcom Network Servs., Inc. v. Big John's Sewer Contractors, Inc., No. 03 C 4991,
2003 WL 22532804, at *3 (N.D. i. Nov. 7, 2003); Probasco v. Ford Motor Co., 182 F.
Supp. 2d 701, 703-05 (C.D. Ill. 2002); Randle v. Chicago, No. 00 C 299, 2000 WL 1536070,
at *6 (N.D. 111. Oct. 17, 2000); Serfecz v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc., No. 92 C 4171, 1997 WL
543116, at *6-8 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 2, 1997); Johnson v. Ramesh Vermuri, Horizons, the Ctr.
for Counseling Servs., No. 94 C 2005, 1994 WL 695527, at *4-5 (N.D. II. Dec. 9, 1994);
Worthem v. Gillette Co., 774 F. Supp. 514, 515-17 (N.D. II. 1991); In re Asbestos Cases,
No. 86 C 1739, 1990 WL 36790, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 1990); Belkow v. Celotex Corp.,
722 F. Supp. 1547, 1551-52 (N.D. IMI. 1989); Berry v. Eagle-Picher, Nos. 86 C 1739, 88 C
10631, 1989 WL 77764 (N.D. Ill. June 27, 1989).
181. 1989 WL 77764, at *1.
182. Id.
183. Id.




188. Id. at *2.
189. Id. At the time of the court's decision, FRCP 11 required an attorney to sign
a pleading, and the signature represented a certification "that to the best of the signer's
knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well-grounded in
fact." FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1988). The current version of FRCP 11 says that the attorney's
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apply the Illinois law in diversity cases was likely to encourage forum
shopping or lead to inequitable administration of law. Accordingly, in
the court's view, "an outcome determinative analysis suggests that...
[the Illinois law] is procedural ..."190
The Berry court did note that FRCP 8 had "no restrictions [on
pleading punitive damages] comparable to" those of the Illinois stat-
ute.19 1 The court did not conclude from this difference that the Illinois
law conflicted with FRCP 8. Instead, the court determined that the
restrictions in the Illinois statute were "similar" to those imposed by
FRCP 11.192 Thus, the court in Berry refused to apply a state law re-
stricting the pleading of punitive damages-not because that law con-
flicted with an FRCP, which is the ground upon which other federal
courts, such as the Eleventh Circuit in Cohen, have refused to apply
similar state laws, but because it determined that the state law was
procedural, rather than substantive.
Decisions by federal courts in Illinois after Berry have generally
followed its reasoning. They cite two reasons for finding the Illinois
law procedural. The first reason, explained in Probasco v. Ford Motor
Co., concerns the law's location and equivalence to FRCP 8:
Section 5/2-604.1 "is expressly labeled as a pleading provi-
sion and is located in the Illinois Code of Civil Proce-
dure... ." "'The federal equivalent of the state pleading sec-
tion is found in Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure and is undisputably a procedural provision." This
strongly suggests that section 5/2-604.1 is procedural as
well. 
19 3
This reasoning treats state law as inapplicable in federal court not be-
cause it conflicts with FRCP 8 but because it is "equivalent" to FRCP
8, an indisputably "procedural" provision. The second reason the post-
Berry decisions give for holding the Illinois law inapplicable is that it
does not meet the modified outcome-determination test.194 One deci-
sion explained the application of the test this way:
In the first instance, forum shopping is not encouraged.
signature certifies "the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support
or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable
opportunity for further investigation or discovery." Id. 11(b)(3).
190. Berry, 1989 WL 77764, at *2.
191. Id. at*l.
192. Id. at *2.
193. 182 F. Supp. 2d 701, 705 (C.D. Ill. 2002) (quoting Serfecz, 1997 WL 543116,
at *8 and Johnson, 1994 WL 695527 at *5; see also Worthem, 774 F. Supp. at 516.
194. See, e.g., Serfecz, 1997 WL 543116 at *6.
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All a state court plaintiff must show at a hearing is a "reason-
able likelihood of proving facts at trial sufficient to support an
award for punitive damages." Under the federal rules a party
must make a good faith reasonable inquiry into the facts of
each case before it is filed. Fed.R.Civ.P. 11. Further, frivolous
suits are subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), and sum-
mary judgment pursuant to Rule 56(c)....
For the same reasons, there is no inequitable application
of laws. If anything, the federal law requires inquiry earlier
and more substantially than 2-604.1. If a litigant were seeking
to avoid the "harshness" of this law, knocking on the federal
courthouse door would provide no refuge if this law were con-
sidered procedural. 195
Cohen did not apply the modified outcome-determination test to
the state law because that test is inapplicable once it is determined
(as the court in Cohen did) that state law conflicts with a valid
FRCP. 196 In contrast, the Illinois district courts have decided to skip
the conflict analysis and "cut to the chase," finding the Illinois law
procedural-and therefore inapplicable in federal courts-because of
its similarity to an FRCP and its absence of an outcome-determinative
effect.
One decision by a federal court in Illinois possibly broke from
this rationale, focusing on FRCP 15(a). The case is Dewick v. Maytag
Corp.197 This diversity case was brought by the parents of an infant
who was injured when he crawled inside the broiler section of a
kitchen range. 198 On the parents' motion to amend their complaint to
request punitive damages, the court applied FRCP 15(a) and rejected
Maytag's argument to apply the Illinois law instead. 199 The court said
195. Worthem, 774 F. Supp. at 516; see also, e.g., Probasco, 182 F. Supp. 2d at 704
("Courts are in agreement that because Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, like [section] 5/2-604.1, re-
quires a party to make a reasonable inquiry to ensure that allegations and actual conten-
tions have or will have evidentiary support, there is little likelihood that parties will flock
to federal court to avoid Illinois' requirement of a hearing under [section] 5/2-604.1.');
Belkow v. Celotex Corp., 722 F. Supp. 1547, 1552 (noting Illinois law and FRCP 11 put "a
similar burden" on plaintiffs).
196. In addition to conflicting with the approach in Cohen, the Illinois courts dif-
fer from the Idaho district court's decision in Windsor v. Guar. Trust Life Ins. Co., which
found that a state law similar to Illinois' (namely, Idaho Code § 6-1604) could affect the
outcome of a case if it were applied instead of the federal rule for determining whether a
complaint satisfied the amount in controversy requirement of the diversity statute. 684 F.
Supp. 630, 633 (D. Idaho 1988), discussed supra note 72, 78-83 and accompanying text.
197. 296 F. Supp. 2d 905 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
198. Id. at 906.
199. Id. at 906 & n.3.
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that a federal court sitting in diversity "applies its own federal proce-
dures over conflicting state procedures, particularly where the federal
procedure is embodied in an applicable and valid provision such as
Rule 15(a).' '20 0 The court added that the Illinois law "is clearly proce-
dural rather than substantive in nature" considering its "place-
ment... in the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure." 20 1 Thus, the Dewick
court seemed to recognize that the Illinois law conflicted with FRCP
15(a) and refused to apply Illinois law primarily because of that con-
flict. Even so, its decision not to apply the Illinois law rested at least
partly on its determination that the law was procedural rather than
substantive. Reinforcing that rationale is its citation of
Probasco.20 2 As discussed above, the court in Probasco did not discuss
whether the Illinois law conflicted with an FRCP, relying instead on
its determination that the Illinois law was inapplicable in federal
court because it was procedural, rather than substantive.
20 3
Two features distinguish Illinois cases from some or all of the
other case law discussed in this section of the article. One is that after
Berry, they cite FRCP 8-not in discussing whether FRCP 8 conflicts
with the state law restricting the pleading of punitive damages (an is-
sue on which other courts disagree), but instead as a comparable pro-
vision the indisputably procedural nature of which supports labeling
the state law procedural. Their failure to address the conflict issue is
remarkable considering that the issue was mentioned (albeit glanc-
ingly) in Berry20 4 and has been discussed repeatedly (albeit with dif-
fering results) in other federal courts. 20 5 Second, the Illinois courts
continue to rely on FRCP 11 in finding that federal law imposes an
evidentiary burden on the pleading of punitive damages that is com-
parable to that imposed by the Illinois statute-even though FRCP 11
has been amended and in current form does not require evidentiary
support in all circumstances.
20 6
200. Id. at 906 n.3 (emphasis added).
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Probasco v. Ford Motor Co. 182 F. Supp. 2d 701 (C.D. Ill. 2002); see also su-
pra note 193 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 181-92 and accompanying text.
205. See, e.g., supra note 99 and accompanying text (discussing Cohen), 117-24
and accompanying text (discussing Pruett), 127-31 and accompanying text (discussing
NAL I), 168 and accompanying text (discussing Nereson); infra notes 224-35 and accom-
panying text (discussing case law on Colorado statute).
206. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(3), quoted in relevant part supra note 189.
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6. California
Section 425.13 of the California Code of Civil Procedure states in
relevant part:
In any action for damages arising out of the professional neg-
ligence of a health care provider, no claim for punitive dam-
ages shall be included in a complaint or other pleading unless
the court enters an order allowing an amended pleading that
includes a claim for punitive damages to be filed. The court
may allow the filing of an amended pleading claiming punitive
damages on a motion by the party seeking the amended plead-
ing and on the basis of the supporting and opposing affidavits
presented that the plaintiff has established that there is a
substantial probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the
claim [under the standard of proof applicable at trial] .207
The federal courts in California disagree on whether federal courts
must apply section 425.13 in diversity cases.
The federal district court for the Northern District of California
held in Jackson v. East Bay Hospital that section 425.13 does not ap-
ply in federal court.20 8 The Jackson court identified the "essential"
inquiry as whether section 425.13 is substantive or procedural.20 9 The
court determined that the law is procedural, because "[it] is essen-
tially a method of managing or directing a plaintiffs pleadings, rather
than a determination of substantive rights."2 10 This approach resem-
bles that of many federal court decisions in Illinois, which bypass the
issue of whether the state law conflicts with any FRCPs by cutting to
the chase and finding the state law procedural. 2 11
In contrast to the Northern District's decision in Jackson, the
federal district court for the Eastern District of California recently
held in Allen v. Woodford that section 425.13 does apply in federal
court.2 12 The Allen court classified section 425.13 as an "evidentiary
207. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.13 (West 2004).
208. 980 F. Supp. 1341, 1350-53 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
209. Id. at 1351 ("Mhe court's determination of whether to apply section 425.13's
requirement of seeking permission of the court to claim punitive damages raises an Erie
issue: Is the punitive damages requirement substantive, so that state law applies, or is it
procedural, so that federal law applies?); id. at 1352 (stating that cases relied upon by de-
fendant did not examine "whether [Section 425.13] is procedural or substantive, an in-
quiry this court finds essential to resolution of the issue.').
210. Id. at 1352.
211. See supra notes 181-96 and accompanying text.
212. No. 1:05-CV-01104-OWW-LJO, 2006 WL 1748587, at *20-21 (June 26,
2006).
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rule.., intimately bound up with the rights and obligations being as-
serted. '2 13 This made section 425.13 similar, in the Allen court's view,
to a Nevada law that the Ninth Circuit had previously held to be ap-
plicable in federal courts under the Erie doctrine. 214 The Nevada law
provided that the findings of medical malpractice screening boards
are admissible in malpractice actions. 215 The Ninth Circuit held that
this law applies in a diversity action.2 16 In the Ninth Circuit's view,
"where a state evidence rule is 'intimately bound up' with the rights
and obligations being asserted, Erie mandates the application of the
state rule in a federal diversity [action]. "217 In Allen, the Eastern Dis-
trict of California adopted a similar approach, and found that Section
425.13 is "intimately bound to the state substantive cause of action for
professional negligence."
2 18
Neither the Jackson court nor the Allen court addressed whether
section 425.13 conflicts with the FRCPs. Instead, the Jackson court
decided that section 425.13 does not apply in diversity actions simply
because it is procedural, rather than substantive. 219 The Allen court
decided that section 425.13 does apply in diversity actions because it
is an "evidentiary rule . . . intimately bound up with" substantive
rights.2 20 The implication of Jackson is that if a state law can confi-
dently be labeled "procedural," the federal courts do not have to apply
it under Erie, even if the state law does not conflict with any FRCP or
federal statute. The implication of Allen is that if a state law is "inti-
mately bound up" with state substantive rights, the federal courts
must apply it whether or not it conflicts with an FRCP. These implica-
213. Id. at *20.
214. Wray v. Gregory, 61 F.3d 1414, 1417 (9th Cir. 1995), cited in Allen, 2006 WL
1748587, at *20-21.
215. Id. at 1416 (citing NEv. REV. STAT. § 41A.016(2)).
216. Id. at 1417-18.
217. D'Orio v. W. Jersey Health Sys., 797 F. Supp. 371, 376 (D.N.J. 1992), quoted
in Wray, 61 F.3d at 1417; see also Allen, 2006 WL 1748587, at *20.
218. Allen, 2006 WL 1748587, at *21. The Allen court distinguished Jackson on a
ground that is incorrect. The Allen court described Jackson as reasoning that "[section]
425.13 does not apply to Plaintiffs federal cause of action." Id. at *21. The Allen court
thus distinguished Jackson from the case before it, explaining that "Allen is not bringing
a claim for punitive damages under a federal act." Id. Actually, Jackson addressed
whether section 425.13 applied to the claims that plaintiff was asserting under California
law, not her federal claims. See Jackson, 980 F. Supp. at 1345 ('This decision resolves
whether [California] Code of Civil Procedure section 425.13... [is] applicable to a pen-
dent state claim in federal court."); id. at 1351 (The parties have fully briefed the appli-
cation of state punitive damages requirements on plaintiffs state claims in federal court.
The court will now resolve that issue.").
219. Jackson, 980 F. Supp. at 1350-53.
220. Allen, 2006 WL 1748587, at *20.
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tions are evaluated later in this article. 221 For now it suffices to ob-
serve that Jackson and Allen conflict insofar as one finds a state law
restricting the pleading of punitive damages to be plainly procedural,
while the other finds the same state law "intimately bound up with"
state substantive rights.
7. Colorado
Colorado law prohibits claims for punitive damages in initial
complaints in actions "alleging negligence against a health care pro-
fessional." 222 In such cases, the Colorado law allows the plaintiff to
amend the complaint to request punitive damages only if the plaintiff
establishes "prima facie proof of a triable issue" of exemplary dam-
ages.223 In Jones v. Krautheim, the federal court for the District of
Colorado held that this Colorado law applies in diversity
actions.224 Jones provides a detailed analysis of the issue, discussing
whether the state law conflicted with several FRCPs and, having
found no conflict, whether application of the state law is warranted
under the modified outcome-determination test of Hanna Part 1.225
221. See infra notes 260-68 and accompanying text. In brief, it is true that Erie
does not obligate federal courts to apply state laws that are correctly classified as proce-
dural, even when the state law does not conflict with any FRCP or federal statute, but in
the absence of such a conflict federal courts must use the modified outcome-
determination test to determine whether a state law should be classified as procedural.
Jackson did not use this test. As for Allen, it may be true that, if a state law is "bound up
with" state substantive rights, federal courts in diversity must apply the state law, rather
than an applicable FRCP, even if the state law is procedural in operation. This depends
on whether, by preventing federal courts from applying state laws that are "bound up
with" state substantive rights, the FRCP would alter those substantive rights, in violation
of 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b). Thus, Allen may be correct that federal courts must sometimes ap-
ply state law that is "intimately bound up with" state substantive rights, rather than a
conflicting FRCP. The Allen court erred, however, by failing to determine whether any
FRCPs were applicable. Moreover, I disagree with the Allen court's determination that a
state law restricting the pleading of punitive damages is "intimately bound up with" state
tort law. See infra notes 345-65 and accompanying text.
222. CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-64-302.5(3) (West 2005). Colorado law also re-
stricts the timing of an amendment to request punitive damages. The amendment can oc-
cur "only after the exchange of initial disclosures" required under Colorado Rule of Civil
Procedure 26, which governs discovery. Id. § 13-21-102(1.5)(a).
223. Id. § 13-64-3-2.5(3) (emphasis added).
224. 208 F. Supp. 2d 1173, 1174-75 (2002).
225. See Jones, 208 F. Supp. 2d 1173. The decision in Jones was followed in Witt
v. Condos. at the Boulders Ass'n, No. CIVA04CV02000MSKOES, 2006 WL 348086, at *7
(D. Colo. Feb. 13, 2006). Jones and Witt conflict, however, with Hamilton v. Matrix Logis-
tics, Inc., No. Civ.A. 05-CV-00757LT, 2006 WL 318662, at *3 (D. Colo. Feb. 9, 2006), in
which the district court for the District of Colorado held that the Colorado law restricting
the pleading of punitive damages "dictates procedural requirements in state court and
does not apply in this action," when the plaintiff alleged both federal and state law claims.
Hamilton provides no analysis to support this holding.
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The Jones court held that the Colorado law does not conflict with
FRCP 8. Specifically, the court held that the Colorado law does not
conflict with FRCP 8(a)(2), which requires a "short and plain state-
ment of the claim," because a request for punitive damages is not a
"claim"; it is only a form of relief.2 26 The court further held that the
Colorado law does not conflict with FRCP 8(a)(3), which requires "a
demand for judgment for the relief the pleader seeks."227 The court
reasoned that the Colorado law's requirement for court approval to
plead punitive damages in an amended complaint "would create an
obvious conflict between the statute and the rule were it not for the
fact that Rule 8 imposes no timing requirement. '22 8 Thus, the court
based its finding of no conflict on the view that FRCP 8(a)(3) does not
require the request for punitive damages to be included in the initial
complaint. The court reasoned that because FRCP 8 imposes no tim-
ing requirement, FRCP 15, which allows "liberal amendment of plead-
ings," would give the plaintiff "the opportunity to amend the initial
complaint to comply with Rule 8(a)(3) before the issues are ultimately
tried. ' 229 The court seemed to recognize that "to comply with Rule
8(a)(3)," the plaintiff seeking punitive damages must specifically re-
quest them in the complaint. The court simply did not think that
FRCP 8(a)(3) requires them to be requested in the initial com-
plaint.
2 30
The Jones court also held that the Colorado law does not conflict
with FRCP 9(g), which requires items of "special damages" to be "spe-
cifically stated. '2 3 1 The court reasoned as follows:
As with Rule 8, Rule 9 contains no timing requirement and
must be construed in conjunction with Rule 15. So long as a
plaintiff can amend pleadings to state special damages in con-
formance with Rule 9(g) before the issues are tried, there is no
practical conflict between the Colorado statute and the federal
rules. 2
3 2
Thus, just like the court apparently interpreted FRCP 8(a)(3) to re-
quire the plaintiff specifically to request punitive damages in the com-
plaint, the court apparently interpreted FRCP 9(g) to require the re-




230. Cf. Cohen v. Office Depot, Inc., 184 F.3d 1292, 1297-98 (11th Cir. 1999), va-
cated in part on other grounds, 204 F.3d 1069 (11th Cir. 2000) ('Punitive damages are a
remedy, so under the rule [FRCP 8(a)(3)] a request for them should be included in the
complaint.'), discussed supra notes 93-110.
231. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(g).
232. Jones, 208 F. Supp. 2d at 1179.
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quest to be "specifically stated." In the court's view, however, FRCP
9(g) does not conflict with Colorado's bar on pleading punitive dam-
ages in initial complaints because FRCP 9(g) does not dictate when
the request for punitive damages must be "specifically stated" in the
complaint and so FRCP 9(g) can be satisfied by amending the initial
complaint to specifically state a request for punitive damages.
The Jones court similarly found no conflict between the Colorado
law and FRCPs 15, 26, and 56. The court found FRCP 15 "expressly
consistent" with the Colorado law "because [the Colorado law] author-
izes amendment by motion after a responsive pleading has been filed
with leave of court."233 The court did not discuss whether the stan-
dard for amending a complaint under FRCP 15 conflicts with the
standard for amending a complaint under the Colorado law. Then the
court turned to whether the Colorado law conflicts with FRCP 26 by
limiting the scope of discovery. The court found no conflict. It ex-
plained that whether or not a complaint expressly seeks punitive
damages, "[b]ecause basic facts can and should be stated in the initial
complaint, all facts relevant to a request for relief of exemplary dam-
ages would fall within permissible discovery under FRCP 26."234 Fi-
nally, the court did not find FRCP 56 implicated by the Colorado stat-
ute, since the filing of summary judgment motions under FRCP 56
"routinely occurs after the close of discovery and therefore would oc-
cur after an appropriate motion to amend is offered."235
Having found no conflict between the Colorado law and federal
law, the Jones court applied the "outcome-determinative test in light
of the twin aims of Erie."236 The court concluded that the federal
courts' failure to apply the Colorado law would implicate both aims,
tending to "promote forum shopping and result in inequitable admini-
stration of the laws. '237 The court reasoned that federal law would
permit plaintiffs to assert punitive damages early-as early as in
their initial complaint-and without the "factual development"
needed to support the request under the Colorado law. 238 The court
explained that the earlier assertion of punitive damages claims per-
mitted under federal law could affect the outcome of the case:
Defendant notes that awards of exemplary damages are rarely
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. The Jones court also addressed whether the Colorado law conflicted with
FRCPs 11 or 16, though plaintiff did not raise the issue. The court found that the Colo-
rado law shared with those rules the purpose and function of "simplify[ing] litigation by
preventing the waste of time and resources on frivolous claims." Id.
236. Id. (citing Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, at 752-53 (1980)).
237. Id. at 1180.
238. Id.
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covered by professional liability insurance and that insurance
carriers often are not obligated to defend against such re-
quests. When exemplary damages are asserted early in litiga-
tion, the health care defendant may be required to retain pri-
vate counsel or to incur additional legal fees in conjunction
with such issues. This burdens such defendant with additional
cost, changes the settlement dynamics and therefore affects
the determination, amount and imposition of exemplary dam-
ages.
239
In contrast to federal law, which permits the assertion of punitive
damage claims early in the litigation without factual support,
[t]he Colorado statute requires a sound factual basis for the
assertion of exemplary damage claims, enabling the health
care defendant to rely upon representation by its, his or her
insurance carrier for the initial stages of the litigation and
delaying settlement of such claims until facts have been
shown to support them.
240
In light of the differing operation of federal and state law, the court
determined that "[pilaintiffs not required to comply with [the Colo-
rado law] in diversity actions will likely prefer the federal court to
state court because the exemplary damages can be raised early in the
litigation without factual development. '241 This result would be ineq-
uitable to defendants in federal court "either because they must ob-
tain private representation to address exemplary damage issues early
in the litigation or because they must consider early settlement to
avoid such expenses."242 Application of federal law, instead of the
Colorado law, could not only influence plaintiffs' choice of forum and
disadvantage defendants in federal court; it would also defeat the
stated objective of the Colorado law, which was to achieve "consis-
tency in the determination, amount and imposition of exemplary
damages against all health care providers."
243
Most notable about the Jones decision is that, when the court
analyzed whether the Colorado law conflicted with any FRCP, the
court did not mention the Colorado law's creation of an evidentiary
requirement for pleading punitive damages that is not required under







however, in the court's discussion of whether application of the Colo-
rado law by the federal courts was warranted in light of the twin aims
of Erie. The court was trying to have it both ways: ignoring the evi-
dentiary burden created by state law when discussing whether the
state law conflicts with federal law, and then emphasizing that evi-
dentiary burden in order to show that the state law is "substantive"
under the modified outcome-determination test.
IV. SUMMARY OF CASE LAW AND IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUE
A. The Breadth and Depth of the Conflict
The chart below summarizes the approaches that federal courts
have taken to the issue whether Erie requires them to apply state
laws restricting the pleading of punitive damages. It depicts a conflict
that is broad and deep, reflecting not only difficult questions about
how Erie principles apply to these state laws, but also some misun-
derstandings of basic Erie principles.
Eleven federal courts-consisting of ten district courts and one
federal court of appeals-have addressed the issue. Three have con-
sistently held that these state laws do apply in federal court;2 44 six
have consistently held that these state laws do not apply in federal
court;2 4 5 and two have reached conflicting results.2 46 The one federal
court of appeals to address the issue expressly (the Eleventh Circuit)
reached a result-holding state laws inapplicable in federal court-
that conflicts with the results in two other circuits (the Eighth and
Ninth Circuits), which have upheld the federal district courts' applica-
tion of state law.
Besides the difference in results, the analyses diverge
widely. Indeed, some federal courts reach the same result through dif-
ferent analyses. Specifically, some courts do not address whether
state law conflicts with federal law; instead, they hold that state law
does not apply in federal court simply because the state law is proce-
dural and federal courts have no obligation under Erie to apply state
procedural law. 247 Other courts hold state law inapplicable because
244. These courts are the District of Idaho, the District of North Dakota, and the
Eastern District of California.
245. These courts are the Eleventh Circuit, the District of Oregon, the District of
Kansas, the Northern and Central Districts of Illinois, and the Northern District of Cali-
fornia.
246. These courts are the District of Minnesota and the District of Colorado.
247. See supra notes 177-206, 208-11, 225 and accompanying text (discussing
decisions on Illinois law, decision on California law by district court for Northern District
of California, and decision on Colorado law by district court for District of Colorado in
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the state law conflicts with federal law. 24 8 Moreover, courts finding a
conflict between state law and federal law rely on one or more of sev-
eral federal provisions as the source of the conflict.
24 9
The conflict among federal courts is not only broad but long-
standing and deep. State laws restricting the pleading of punitive
damages date back to the late 1980s, when states throughout the
country enacted tort reform. The twenty years since then have wit-
nessed a deepening of the conflict among federal courts over their ap-
plicability in federal courts. Over that time, federal courts in many of
the eleven jurisdictions that have addressed the issue have repeatedly
adhered to their original determination.
The following table summarizes the case law.
Hamilton v. Matrix Logistics, Inc., No. Civ.A. 05-CV-00757LT, 2006 WL 318662, at *3 (D.
Colo. Feb. 9, 2006)).
248. See supra notes 93-113, 114-25, 197-203 and accompanying text (discussing
decisions on Florida law by Eleventh Circuit, on Oregon law by District of Oregon, and on
Illinois law by District Court for Northern District of Illinois in Dewick v. Maytag Corp.,
296 F. Supp. 2d 905 (N.D. Ill. 2003)).
249. See chart entitled "Case Law Conducting Erie Analysis of State Laws Re-
stricting the Pleading of Punitive Damages Chart."
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Case Law Conducting Erie Analysis of State Laws Restrict-
ing the Pleading of Punitive Damages
Name of Does Does state Is differ- Leading
federal state law conflict ence be- case name
court law with federal tween
apply law? Which, state law
in fed- if any, fed- and fed-
eral eral law is eral law
court in conflict? outcome-
under determi-
Erie? native?
District Yes No, not with Yes Windsor v.
of Idaho federal amount Guarantee
in controversy Trust Life Ins.











11th Circuit No Yes, with Not neces- Cohen v. Of-
FRCP 8(a)(3), sary to ad- fice Depot
but not with dress
8(a)(2)
District of No Yes, with Not neces- Pruett v.
Oregon FRCP 8(a) and sary to ad- Erickson Air-
9(g) dress Crane Co.
District of No Yes, with No (alterna- NAL II, Ltd.
Kansas FRCP 9(g) tive holding) v. Tonkin
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Case Law Conducting Erie Analysis of State Laws Restrict-
ing the Pleading of Punitive Damages
Name of Does Does state Is differ- Leading
federal state law conflict ence be- case name
court law with federal tween
apply law? Which, state law
in fed- if any, fed- and fed-
eral eral law is eral law
court in conflict? outcome-
under determi-
Erie? native?








Yes Yes, because Yes, because Fournier v.
state law cre- federal law Marigold
ates a "pre- gives plain- Foods, Inc.
liminary evi- tiffs a tacti-
dentiary bur- cal advan-
den" not found tage
in federal law
Yes There is only a Yes, because Kuehn v. Shel-
"potential" con- federal law core, Inc.; see
flict between gives plain- also Bunker v.
FRCP 8 and tiffs a tacti- Meshbesher;
state law, but cal advan- Gamma-lO
no actual con- tage Plastics, Inc.
flict because v. Am. Presi-
federal law and dent Lines (8th
state law have Circuit cases























Case Law Conducting Erie Analysis of State Laws Restrict-
ing the Pleading of Punitive Damages
Name of Does Does state Is differ- Leading
federal state law conflict ence be- case name
court law with federal tween
apply law? Which, state law
in fed- if any, fed- and fed-
eral eral law is eral law
court in conflict? outcome-
under determi-
Erie? native?
District of Yes No direct con- Yes, be- Nereson v.
North Da- flict between cause state Zurich Ins.
kota state law and law is "cer- Co.
FRCPs; does- tainly more
n't discuss restrictive
any particu- than" fed-





Northern No No analysis No, because E.g., Pro-
and Central FRCPs 11 basco v. Ford
Districts of & 12(b)(6), Motor Co.;










No Appears to No direct Dewick v.
hold that analysis; Maytag
state law con- finds state Corp.
flicts with law is pro-
FRCP 15(a) cedural
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Case Law Conducting Erie Analysis of State Laws Restrict-
ing the Pleading of Punitive Damages
Name of Does Does state Is differ- Leading
federal state law conflict ence be- case name
court law with federal tween
apply law? Which, state law
in fed- if any, fed- and fed-
eral eral law is eral law
court in conflict? outcome-
under determi-
Erie? native?
Northern No No analysis No direct Jackson v.
District of analysis; East Bay
California state law Hosp.
found to be
procedural
Eastern Yes No analysis No direct Allen v.









District of Yes No, not with Yes Jones v.
Colorado FRCP 8(a)(2), Krautheim;
8(a)(3), 9(g), Witt v. Con-
15, 26, or 56 dos at the
Boulders
Ass 'n
No No analysis No direct Hamilton v.
analysis; Matrix Lo-




B. The Conflict Tends to Evade Appellate Review
As noted above, the issue examined in this article has been
squarely addressed only by one federal court of appeals, the Eleventh
Circuit. The lack of appellate case law, however, does not mean the is-
sue lacks importance. Instead, the lack of appellate case law reflects
that the issue tends to evade appellate review. With one exception to
be discussed below, a district court's ruling on whether to apply state
law on the pleading of punitive damages is not immediately appeal-
able. When the ruling cannot be appealed, later events in the district
court proceeding will often cause that interlocutory ruling not to be
challenged on appeal from a final judgment.
2 50
First, suppose that a district court holds that a state law restrict-
ing the pleading of punitive damages does apply in federal court. The
250. Wisconsin Inv. Bd. v. Plantation Square Assocs., 761 F. Supp. 1569, 1573
(S.D. Fla. 1991) ('[B]ecause a district court's decision of whether to apply a state punitive
damage pleading rule is not immediately appealable, and because the district court's rul-
ing would in all likelihood not affect the outcome of the litigation, appeal of such a ruling,
though possible in some narrow contexts, has proven elusive as of yet.") (footnotes omit-
ted).
Consider the appealability of the federal district court rulings that are most likely
to raise the issue of the applicability of a state law restricting the pleading of punitive
damages. The two rulings most likely to raise this issue are as follow. (1) Rulings on mo-
tions to strike or dismiss requests for punitive damages that have been pleaded in the ini-
tial complaint. See, e.g., Pruett v. Erickson Air-Crane Co., 183 F.R.D. 248 (D. Or. 1998)
(motion to strike); Berry v. Eagle-Picber, No. CIV. 98-571-AA, 1989 WL 77764 (N.D.
Ill. June 27, 1989) (motion to dismiss); Kuehn v. Shelcore, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 233 (D.
Minn. 1988) (motion to strike); Jacobs v. Pickands Mather & Co., No. 5-87-CIV 49, 1987
WL 47387 (D. Minn. Aug. 24, 1987) (motion to dismiss). (2) Rulings on motions to amend
the complaint to add a request for punitive damages. See, e.g., Robinson v. Raina's Resi-
dential Prop. Mgmt., No. CV-05-152-S-BLW, 2006 WL 2095871 (D. Idaho Jul 27,
2006); Strong v. Unumprovident Corp., 393 F. Supp. 2d 1012 (D. Idaho 2005); Security
Say. Bank v. Green Tree Acceptance, Inc., CIV. No. 3-89-28, 1990 WL 36142 (D. Minn.
Mar. 22, 1990). Ordinarily, rulings on motions to amend cannot be immediately appealed.
E.g., Stevens v. Brink's Home Sec., Inc., 378 F.3d 944, 946-47 (9th Cir. 2004) (order
granting amendment of complaint to add non-diverse defendants was not appealable as
final order); Encoder Commc'ns, Inc. v. Telegen, Inc., 654 F.2d 198, 202 (2nd Cir. 1981)
(denial of motion to amend complaint is not ordinarily appealable); Michelson v. Citicorp
Nat'l Servs., Inc., 138 F.3d 508, 512 (3rd Cir. 1998) (stating that orders granting or deny-
ing motion to amend complaint are not immediately appealable). Likewise, orders on mo-
tions to strike or dismiss punitive damage claims are ordinarily not immediately appeal-
able unless they dispose of the action or a separable part of the action. See In re Russell,
957 F.2d 534, 535 (8th Cir. 1992); Arizona State Carpenters Pension Trust Fund v. Miller,
938 F.2d 1038, 1040 (9th Cir. 1991); Sussex Drug Prods. v. Kanasco, Ltd. 920 F.2d 1150,
1155-56 (3rd Cir. 1990); Harvey Aluminum v. Int'l Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's
Union, Local 8, 278 F.2d 63, 63--64 (9th Cir. 1960). As discussed infra note 252 and ac-
companying text, there is one important situation in which it will be possible for a plain-
tiff to take an immediate appeal of an order dismissing or striking a punitive damage
claim, or denying a motion to amend a complaint, and that is when the effect of the order
is dismissal of the entire action or a separable part of it.
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defendant will ordinarily be happy with that ruling, since state law is
more restrictive than federal law. If the plaintiff can meet the state-
law restrictions, the plaintiff, too, will have no cause to complain of
the court's application of those restrictions: application of the state
standard will not have prevented the plaintiff from seeking punitive
damages. If, on the other hand, the plaintiff cannot meet the state-law
restrictions for pleading punitive damages, and consequently receives
no award of punitive damages, the plaintiff may, on appeal from the
final judgment, challenge the district court's application of state law.
It may not make sense for the plaintiff to take that appeal, however,
unless the plaintiff already has, or can obtain, evidence strong enough
to recover punitive damages at trial. It is possible that few plaintiffs
will have, or be likely to obtain, evidence strong enough to recover pu-
nitive damages if they have been found unable even to meet the state-
law standard for pleading punitive damages. Those plaintiffs may
reasonably decide not to appeal a district court's application of the
state-law restrictions on pleading punitive damages. In short, plain-
tiffs who cannot meet the state-law standard for pleading punitive
damages often do not have a punitive damages claim that is strong
enough to justify appealing a district court's decision to apply the
state-law standard for pleading punitive damages. Of course, some
appeals do occur in this situation.
2 5 1
Now suppose, contrary to the scenario described in the last para-
graph, that the district court holds that the state law restricting the
pleading of punitive damages does not apply in federal court. This rul-
ing will ordinarily make the plaintiff happy, because federal law is
less restrictive than state law. By the same token, this ruling will dis-
satisfy the defendant, but it will provide a basis for an appeal by the
defendant only if the plaintiff ultimately recovers punitive damages at
the district-court level. If the plaintiff does not recover punitive dam-
ages, the defendant will ordinarily lack standing to appeal the district
court's ruling that refused to apply state law to plaintiffs request for
punitive damages. If the plaintiff does recover punitive damages at
the district-court level, the defendant can appeal the district court's
ruling refusing to apply the state law restricting the pleading of puni-
tive damages. It may make sense for the defendant to appeal that rul-
ing, however, only if the plaintiffs evidence of punitive damages was
so weak that it would not have satisfied the state-law requirements
for pleading punitive damages. The plaintiff who has recovered an
award of punitive damages seldom has evidence so weak that it would
251. See Kuntz v. Lamar Corp., 385 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2004); Native Am. Servs.,
Inc. v. Givens, 213 F.3d 642 (9th Cir. 2000) (unpublished table decision); Bunker v.
Methbesher, 147 F.3d 691 (8th Cir. 1998); Gamma-10 Plastics, Inc. v. Am. President
Lines, Ltd., 32 F.3d 1244 (8th Cir. 1994).
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not even meet the state-law requirements for pleading punitive dam-
ages. In short, defendants against whom punitive damages have been
awarded often may be unable to show that the evidence of punitive
damages was so weak that it would not have met the state-law re-
quirements for pleading punitive damages; these defendants accord-
ingly may have little incentive to appeal the district court's determi-
nation that the state-law requirements for pleading punitive damages
are applicable.
There is one main situation in which a party can immediately
appeal a district court's ruling on whether to apply a state law re-
stricting the pleading of punitive damages. An immediate appeal is
possible when the district court rules that (1) the state law does apply;
(2) the plaintiff has failed to meet the state-law requirements for
pleading punitive damages; and (3) that failure requires dismissal of
all or part of plaintiffs case. The third situation can arise, for exam-
ple, if the plaintiff relies on diversity jurisdiction and cannot meet the
amount-in-controversy requirement for a diversity case unless he is
allowed to plead punitive damages. This situation, indeed, led to
Cohen v. Office Depot, Inc., which is the only court of appeals decision
expressly addressing whether federal courts must apply state laws re-
stricting the pleading of punitive damages.
25 2
In sum, the Erie issue of whether federal courts should apply
state laws restricting the pleading of punitive damages tends to evade
appellate review. Rulings addressing the issue are seldom subject to
an immediate appeal-with Cohen representing the one significant,
exceptional situation in which an immediate appeal is possible. In
cases where the rulings are not immediately appealable, later trial
court proceedings tend either (1) to render the ruling on the Erie issue
not subject to appeal by the party whom the ruling disfavored; or (2)
to cause an appeal to be unwise because of the likelihood that the
party who would take the appeal will not ultimately prevail on the
merits of the punitive damage claim.
C. The Conflict Concerns an Important Issue
The question whether federal courts in diversity cases must ap-
ply state laws restricting the pleading of punitive damages has doc-
trinal and practical importance. Its importance surely warrants the
U.S. Supreme Court's resolution of the deep, broad conflict among the
lower courts on this issue.
The doctrinal importance sounds in federalism. Justice Harlan
regarded Erie as "one of the modern cornerstones of our federal-
252. 184 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 1999), vacated in part, 204 F.3d 1069 (11th Cir.
2000), discussed supra notes 93-110 and accompanying text.
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ism."253 He is not alone in this view. 2 54 Erie safeguards federalism by
helping ensure that state courts remain viable institutions for resolu-
tion of state-law disputes and that state law preserves its integrity
when applied by federal courts. Both interests are potentially threat-
ened, and significant state policy thwarted, to the extent that state
tort reform measures apply in a state court but not the federal court
that may sit across the street from the state court and that, like the
state court, adjudicates state tort claims.
25 5
This becomes evident when one considers the state concerns un-
derlying the state laws restricting the pleading of punitive damages.
The concern is to prevent the assertion of unwarranted punitive dam-
age claims.2 56 This concern reflects the perception that-for various
reasons, including a desire to avoid bad publicity-the mere pleading
of a large punitive damage request can force a defendant to settle the
case quickly and on unfavorable terms. 25 7 This dynamic can arise re-
253. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
254. See, e.g., Ely, supra note 7, at 695 ("[Erie] implicates, indeed perhaps it is,
the very essence of our federalism.'); Winton D. Woods, Jr., Erie Enigma: Appellate Re-
view of Conclusions of Law, 26 ARIz. L. REv. 755, 757 (1984) ('CThere is wide agreement
that the Erie doctrine is, to use Justice Harlan's phrase, 'one of the modern cornerstones
of our federalism."'); see also Guaranty Trust Co. v. New York, 326 U.S. 99, 110 (1945) ("A
policy so important to our federalism [the Erie doctrine] must be kept free from entan-
glements with analytical or terminological niceties.').
255. Martin H. Redish & Carter G. Phillips, Erie and the Rules of Decision Act: In
Search of the Appropriate Dilemma, 91 HARV. L. REV. 356, 378 (1977) ("[T]o the extent a
federal diversity court refuses to follow the applicable state rule, it may significantly un-
dermine the attainment of legitimate state objectives.').
256. See, e.g., Gamma-JO Plastics, 32 F.3d at 1255 (finding that a Minnesota law
restricting pleading of punitive damages "was enacted to prevent frivolous punitive dam-
age claims by allowing a court to determine first if punitive damages are appropriate");
Worthem v. Gillette Co., 774 F. Supp. 514, 516 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (quoting legislative mate-
rial stating that Illinois law restricting the pleading of punitive damages "employs the de-
vice of prescribing pleading restrictions as a way of indirectly affecting the ultimate right
to recover") (emphasis omitted); Central Pathology Serv. Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Superior
Court, 832 P.2d 924, 929 (Cal. 1992) (finding that a California statute restricting the
pleading of punitive damages had overall purpose of giving health care providers "relief
from unsubstantiated claims of punitive damages).
257. See, e.g., Thomas Koenig, The Shadow Effect of Punitive Damages on Set-
tlements, 1998 Wis. L. REV. 169, 172 ("[Elven though the empirical research consistently
shows that punitive damages are rare and well-controlled by the judiciary, this remedy
plays a significant role in driving settlements.'); Arvin Maskin, Litigating Claims for Pu-
nitive Damages: The View From the Front Line, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 489, 489-90 (1998)
('Regardless of whether or not awards for such damages are empirically on the rise, there
is no doubt that the possibility of an extraordinary punitive damages award influences
the dynamics of personal injury litigation by increasing plaintiffs' opportunities and de-
fendants' exposure."). But see, e.g., Thomas A. Eaton et al., The Effects of Seeking Punitive
Damages on the Processing of Tort Claims, 34 J. Legal Stud. 343, 343 (2005) ("[W]e find
that seeking punitive damages has no statistically significant effect on most phases of the
tort litigation process.'); 5 CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL
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gardless of the merits of the claim. It is a particularly strong dynamic
when the defendant's insurance company refuses to defend against
the punitive damage claims. 258 State laws that require evidentiary
showings to support punitive damage requests aim to prevent quick,
plaintiff-favorable settlements forced by unsupported punitive dam-
age claims. If federal courts do not enforce these state laws, federal
courts enable plaintiffs who can bring their cases in federal courts to
avoid having the state laws enforced against them, even when en-
forcement would further the state's important interests.
For the same reasons, the applicability in federal courts of state
laws restricting the pleading of punitive damages has great impor-
tance for individual litigants. These state laws can affect the outcome
of many cases in the eight states with those laws on the books. The
mere inclusion of punitive damage claims in a civil complaint can in-
fluence the timing and terms of settlements. The inclusion of these
claims also can influence the outcome of trials and dispositive mo-
tions. This is not to say that the state laws weed out only punitive
damage claims that lack merit. To the contrary, some plaintiffs who
could ultimately prove entitlement to punitive damages will not be
able to meet these state law requirements for pleading punitive dam-
ages-even though those same plaintiffs could meet the more liberal
federal standards for pleading punitive damages. The outcome of
these plaintiffs' cases will vary depending on whether the state laws
are applied to them or not.
Thus, as esoteric as the Erie doctrine is considered by some to be,
it has real world significance in the balance of power between the fed-
eral government and the states and in the fortunes of litigants. The
Erie doctrine protects important state policy judgments, such as those
underlying the tort reform measures under discussion here, and it can
mean the difference between success and failure for litigants in many
cases-specifically including the success and failure of punitive dam-
age claims. The doctrinal and practical significance, coupled with the
broad and deep division among federal courts over the issue discussed
here warrants Supreme Court resolution.
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1259, at 519 (3rd ed. 2004) (specifying amount of damages in
complaint may cause "unfavorable publicity).
258. See generally 14 LEE R. RuSS & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE
3D § 201:25, at 201:57-58 (discussing case law on insurers' duty to defend actions involv-
ing punitive damage claims).
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V. ERIE ANALYSIS
A. Necessity of Conflict Analysis
It is well established that the first step of Erie analysis is to de-
termine whether the state law conflicts with federal law, including an
FRCP. 2 59 Surprisingly, some of the decisions discussed in Part III
skip the conflict-analysis step and go directly to the question of
whether, in a generic sense, the state law is substantive or proce-
dural.2 60 This approach is wrong for two reasons.
First, the question whether a state law is substantive or proce-
dural cannot be answered in a vacuum. 26 1 For example, a state law
may be procedural for conflict-of-law purposes but substantive for
Erie purposes. 26 2 For that very reason, Erie can require a federal
259. See, e.g., Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1987) ("The ini-
tial step is to determine whether, when fairly construed, the scope of [a federal rule] is
,sufficiently broad' to cause a 'direct collision' with the state law or, implicitly, to 'control
the issue' before the court, thereby leaving no room for the operation of that law.") (cita-
tions omitted); Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749-50 (1980) ('The first ques-
tion must.., be whether the scope of the Federal Rule in fact is sufficiently broad to con-
trol the issue . . .
260. These courts include federal district courts in the District of Minnesota, see
Jacobs v. Pickands Mather & Co., No. 5-87-CIV 49, 1987 WL 47387, at *1 (D. Minn. Aug.
24, 1987) (holding that MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.191 did not apply in diversity case because
it is "procedural in nature, and doles] not affect the ultimate outcome of the plaintiffs
claim for punitive damages"); the District of Colorado, see Hamilton v. Matrix Logistics,
Inc., No. Civ.A. 05-CV-00757LT, 2006 WL 318662, at *3 (D. Colo. Feb. 9, 2006) (holding
that Colorado statute restricting the pleading of punitive damages "dictates procedural
requirements in state court and does not apply in this action"); the Central District
of Illinois, see Probasco v. Ford Motor Co., 182 F. Supp. 2d 701, 705 (C.D. Il. 2002), dis-
cussed supra note 193 and accompanying text; and the Northern District of California, see
Jackson v. East Bay Hosp., 980 F. Supp. 1341, 1351-52, (N.D. Cal. 1997) discussed supra
notes 208-11; cf. Beul v. ASSE Int'l, Inc., 233 F.3d 441, 449 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that
federal court adjudicating state-law claim should reject state law in favor of federal law
governing method of instructing jury, without analyzing whether state law conflicts with
federal law, but instead relying on the determination that "[r]ules of general applicability
and purely managerial character governing the jury, such as the form in which a civil
jury is instructed, are quintessentially procedural for purposes of the Erie rule'). But see
Fournier v. Marigold Foods, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 1420, 1422 (D. Minn. 1988) (understanding
Erie doctrine to require a federal court in a diversity action to apply state law "if applica-
tion of a conflicting federal rule would encourage forum-shopping) (emphasis added), dis-
cussed supra notes 140-48 and accompanying text.
261. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. New York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945) (stating that
the terms "substance" and "procedure" "impl[y] different variables depending upon the
particular problem for which [each term] is used").
262. See, e.g., Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 726 (1988) (noting that the
Court has rejected "the notion that there is an equivalence between what is substantive
under the Erie doctrine and what is substantive for purposes of conflict of laws").
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court to apply the forum state's statute of limitations (the statute of
limitations being considered "substantive" for Erie purposes) even
when adjudicating a cause of action that, under the forum state's
choice-of-law rules, would be governed in other respects by the law of
another state (the statute of limitations being considered "procedural"
for choice-of-law purposes). 26 3 Likewise, Erie may require a federal
court in a diversity action to apply the forum state's law governing the
burden of proof (the burden of proof being "substantive" for Erie pur-
poses) even when adjudicating a cause of action otherwise governed
by the laws of another state (the burden of proof being "procedural"
for choice-of-law purposes).2 64 In short, the terms "procedure" and
"substance" have no fixed meaning, and therefore courts err when
they attempt to decide whether state laws restricting the pleading of
punitive damages are "substantive" or "procedural" in a generic sense.
More fundamentally, even if it were possible to label a state law
substantive or procedural in some generic sense, that label would not
determine its applicability in diversity actions. If a state law conflicts
with a valid federal law, the state law cannot apply in a federal diver-
sity action even if, in the abstract, the state law could reasonably be
characterized as substantive.2 65 For example, while a state law fixing
the burden of proof for a category of civil actions may reasonably be
considered "substantive" because of its effect on a litigant's substan-
tive right to recover a judgment, the state law could probably be pre-
empted by a federal law prescribing a uniform burden of proof for di-
versity actions. 26 6 By the same token, if the state law does not conflict
263. See id. (upholding application of Kansas statute of limitations to a claim
brought in state court in Kansas even though Kansas lacked sufficient contacts to the
controversy to apply its own substantive law).
264. See JOSEPH W. GLANNON, CIVIL PROCEDURE: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS
230 (5th ed. 2006).
265. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965).
It is true that both the Enabling Act and the Erie rule say, roughly, that
federal courts are to apply state 'substantive' law and federal 'procedural'
law, but from that it need not follow that the tests are identical. For they
were designed to control very different sorts of decisions. When a situation
is covered by one of the Federal Rules, the question facing the court is a
far cry from the typical, relatively unguided Erie Choice: the court has
been instructed to apply the Federal Rule, and can refuse to do so only if
the Advisory Committee, this Court, and Congress erred in their prima fa-
cie judgment that the Rule in question transgresses neither the terms of
the Enabling Act nor constitutional restrictions.
Id. Hanna thus contemplates that federal rules can override state laws that are ra-
tionally capable of classification as substantive.
266. See, e.g., Sampson v. Channell, 110 F.2d 754, 757 (1st Cir. 1940) (stating in
dicta that, if FRCP 8(c) "could be construed as imposing upon the defendant the burden of
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with any federal law, Erie may require federal courts to apply the
state law in diversity cases even though the state law could reasona-
bly be characterized as procedural. 26 7 Again, a state law prescribing
the burden of proof illustrates the point. A burden of proof rule is pro-
cedural in the sense that it controls the order in which the parties
present evidence at trial and other procedural matters, but state laws
prescribing the burden of proof nonetheless generally apply in federal
court diversity actions, in the absence of conflicting federal laws, be-
cause of their outcome-determinative effect.
2 68
Thus we can set aside as erroneous federal court decisions that
cut to the chase by determining whether state laws restricting the
pleading of punitive damages are procedural or substantive in some
generic sense. No universal criteria govern that determination, and,
in the Erie analysis, the determination is meaningless without a prior
determination of whether the state law under analysis conflicts with
federal law.
B. Determining Whether There is a Conflict Between State Laws
Restricting the Pleading of Punitive Damages and the FRCPs or
Other Federal Law
Most of the cases that address the applicability of state laws re-
stricting the pleading of punitive damages have discussed whether
the state law conflicts with federal law.26 9 All but one of the cases
that perform conflict analysis consider, more specifically, whether the
state laws conflict with any FRCPs. Windsor is the exception: the
Windsor court analyzed whether state law conflicted with federal ju-
dicially developed rules governing determination of the amount in
controversy.
This section first explores whether state law restricting the
pleading of punitive damages conflict with any of the FRCPs dis-
cussed in the case law. That exploration begins with a discussion of
how FRCPs should be interpreted when they assertedly conflict with
state law, and then it discusses each of the FRCPs that federal courts
have cited as conflicting with state laws that restrict the pleading of
proof of contributory negligence, it seems that this would be valid and conclusive" in a di-
versity case).
267. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 555 (1949) (stating
that in the absence of conflicting federal law, a state law will be inapplicable in federal di-
versity actions as "mere" procedural rule only if not outcome determinative under Hanna
part I).
268. See Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U.S. 208, 212 (1939) (rejecting the
view that Texas law governing the burden of proof in land dispute "was only one of prac-
tice" and concluding, instead, that "it relates to a substantial right").
269. See supra Part III.
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punitive damages. Thereafter, the analysis turns to the District of
Idaho's Windsor analysis.
1. Whether the FRCPs Should be Construed Broadly, Narrowly, or
Neutrally
Often a court must interpret an FRCP to determine whether it
conflicts with state law. 2 70 Thus, a threshold issue in Erie conflict
analysis is whether the FRCPs should be interpreted with a thumb on
the scale. The issue has importance in our situation. As discussed
above, federal courts disagree on whether state laws restricting the
pleading of punitive damages conflict with any FRCPs. The disagree-
ment reflects that there may be more than one reasonable interpreta-
tion of one or more FRCPs, in which case a rule of construction may
be determinative. Thus, we need to know whether Erie doctrine in-
cludes (and should include) any principle that requires the FRCPs to
be interpreted narrowly, broadly, or neutrally.
The Supreme Court has not approached this interpretive issue
consistently. Sometimes the Court has suggested that the FRCPs
should be interpreted neutrally. 27 1 Other times the Court has sug-
gested that the FRCPs should be interpreted narrowly. 2 72 Indeed, in
one case the Court said one thing and did the other. In Walker v.
Armco Steel, the Court endorsed a "plain meaning' approach in an
opinion that read an FRCP narrowly. 2 73 In short, the Court has not
been predictable in applying a rule of narrow construction.
270. See, e.g., Semtek Intl Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 501-06
(2001) (construing FRCP 41(b) to determine whether it conflicted with state law); see also
Rowe, supra note 56, at 969-70 (stating that the Erie analysis includes consideration of
"judicial constructions" of FRCPs). The determination of whether state law conflicts with
an FRCP in connection with Erie analysis is a species of preemption analysis. In the
broader realm of preemption doctrine, the Court likewise has observed that preemption
analysis "requires us to consider the relationship between state and federal laws as they
are interpreted and applied, not merely as they are written." Jones v. Rath Packing Co.,
430 U.S. 519, 526 (1977).
271. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 750 n.9 (1980) ('This is not to
suggest that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are to be narrowly construed in order to
avoid a 'direct collision' with state law. The Federal Rules should be given their plain
meaning. If a direct collision with state law arises from that plain meaning, then the
analysis developed in Hanna v. Plumer applies.').
272. See infra notes 274-82, 345-65 and accompanying text
273. In Walker, the Court said that the FRCPs should be given their 'plain mean-
ing," but it interpreted the FRCP at issue narrowly, apparently to minimize trenching on
important state interests. See id., 446 U.S. at 750 n.9 (The Federal rules should be given
their plain meaning.'); id. at 750-52 (interpreting FRCP 3 not to conflict with an Okla-
homa statute that "is an integral part of the several policies served by the statute of limi-
tations).
[Vol. 43
2006] AN ERIE OBSTACLE TO STATE TORT REFORM 95
Moreover, the Court has identified three different situations for
interpreting the FRCPs narrowly. One is when a broad reading would
arguably abridge, alter, or modify substantive rights. 2 74 This narrow-
interpretation principle reflects the command of the REA, which for-
bids the FRCPs from altering substantive rights. 27 5 A second occasion
for a narrow interpretation of an FRCP, the Court has held, is when a
broad interpretation of an FRCP would encourage forum shopping or
result in the inequitable administration of laws.2 76 This narrow-
interpretation principle reflects the twin aims of the Erie doctrine, as
the doctrine was clarified in Hanna.27 7 The third situation in which
the Court has seemingly endorsed narrow interpretation is when a
broad interpretation of an FRCP would conflict with "important state
regulatory policies." 2 78 This narrow-interpretation principle seems to
have originated in a leading casebook on federal courts.
27 9
274. See Semtek, 531 U.S. at 503 (rejecting an interpretation of FRCP 41(b) in
part because that interpretation "would arguably violate the jurisdictional limitation of
the Rules Enabling Act: that the Rules 'shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substan-
tive right,' 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b)'); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 612-13
(1997) (interpreting FRCP 23 "mindful that [its] requirements must be interpreted in
keeping... with the Rules Enabling Act, which instructs that rules of procedure 'shall
not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right"); Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs.,
Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 96 (1991) (rejecting an interpretation of FRCP 23.1, implying that the
interpretation would violate REA); see also Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518
U.S. 415, 437 n.22 (1996) ("Whether damages are excessive for the claim-in-suit must be
governed by some law. And there is no candidate for that governance other than the law
that gives rise to the claim for relief-here, the law of New York. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072(a)
and (b) CSupreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules of... procedure';
'[s]uch rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right);... .'); Elizabeth
T. Lear, Congress, the Federal Courts, and Forum Non Conveniens: Friction on the Fron-
tier of the Inherent Power, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1147, 1184-85 (2006) (discussing these cases).
275. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2000).
276. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 504 (rejecting interpretation of FRCP 41(b) that not only
would arguably alter substantive rights, in violation of REA, but also "would in many
cases violate the federalism principle of Erie ... by engendering substantial variations in
outcomes between state and federal litigation which would likely... influence the choice
of a forum') (internal quotation marks, citations, and brackets omitted).
277. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467-68 (1965), quoted in Semtek, 531 U.S.
at 504.
278. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 437 n.22 (quoting RIcHARD H. FALLON, DANIEL J.
MELTZER, & DAvID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 729-30 (4th ed. 1996)); see also id., 518 U.S. at 427 n.7 (observing with
apparent approval, "[flederal courts have interpreted the Federal Rules ... with sensitiv-
ity to important state interests and regulatory policies); Stewart Org. v. Ricoh Corp., 487
U.S. 22, 38 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing, with "cf." signal, and quoting passage
from earlier edition of Hart and Wechsler treatise similar to that cited and quoted in
Gasperini); Robert J. Condlin, "A Formstone of Our Federalism:" The Erie/Hanna Doc-
trine & Casebook Law Reform, 59 U. MIAMI L. REv. 475, 529 n.223 (2006) (statement in
Gasperini about interpreting FRCPs "with sensitivity to important state interests and
regulatory policies" is apparently "another way of saying that Federal Rules must be read
narrowly in order to avoid conflicts with state law"); Lear, supra note 274, at 1204 n.388
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Having laid out these three narrow-interpretation principles, I
will merely add my view that only the first has clear legitimacy. It is
legitimate to interpret an ambiguous FRCP narrowly when a broader,
equally plausible interpretation might well alter substantive rights
and thus violate the REA. This is simply making sure to color inside
the lines established by the REA. In contrast, interpreting an FRCP
narrowly in light of the twin aims of Erie is dubious. It treats the
FRCPs on a par with federal judicially developed rules of procedure,
when the whole point of Hanna was that the FRCPs should not be
treated the same as federal judicially developed rules.2 80 Finally, in-
terpreting FRCPs narrowly to avoid conflict with important state in-
terests or regulatory policies is akin to the principle that a federal
statute should not be interpreted to preempt a state law in a tradi-
tional area of state concern unless Congress has expressed a clear in-
tent for the federal statute to have that effect.28 1 That principle does
not readily apply to the FRCPs, however, because the FRCPs do not
operate in a traditional area of state concern. They govern procedure
in the federal courts.
28 2
In any event, it matters for our purposes which, if any, of these
narrow-interpretation principles apply, as discussed below. Before
that discussion, however, let us explore whether-if we leave a thumb
off the scale for now-state laws restricting the pleading of punitive
damages conflict with any FRCP.
(stating that Gasperini "could be read to require" an approach to conflict analysis that is
relatively "deferential" to state law).
279. See supra notes 278. Professor Woolley suggests that the "important state
interests and regulatory policies" that one narrow-interpretation principle seeks to pro-
tect "arguably encompasses outcome-determinative state rules." Patrick Woolley, Choice
of Law and the Protection of Class Members in Class Suits Certified Under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23(B)(3), 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 799, 815 n.55 (2004).
280. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 469-70 (identifying as a "fundamental flaw" the "in-
correct assumption that the rule of Erie [Railroad] Co. v. Tompkins constitutes the ap-
propriate test of the validity and therefore the applicability of a Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure"); see also Ely, supra note 7, at 721-22 (rejecting the view that the 28 U.S.C.
§ 2072(b) of Rules Enabling Act should be read to invalidate Federal Rules whose applica-
tion in lieu of state law would be outcome determinative under the modified outcome de-
terminative test of Hanna).
281. See, e.g., City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Serv., Inc., 536 U.S.
424, 432 (2002) ('When considering pre-emption, we start with the assumption that the
historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless
that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress") (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 605 (1991)).
282. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 472 ("For the constitutional provision for a federal
court system (augmented by the Necessary and Proper Clause) carries with it congres-
sional power to make rules governing the practice and pleading in those courts, which in
turn includes a power to regulate matters which, though falling within the uncertain area
between substance and procedure, are rationally capable of classification as either.").
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2. Whether State Laws Restricting the Pleading of Punitive Damages
Conflict with the FRCPs
Federal courts have found conflicts with FRCPs 8(a)(3), 9(g),
15(a), 26, and 56 but there are also decisions that deny a conflict with
any of these provisions. I am going to focus on the first three provi-
sions.28 3 I conclude that these state laws conflict with 8(a)(3) and 15(a)
but not necessarily with 9(g). The court that comes closest to this con-
clusion is Cohen. In my view, however, Cohen's analysis overlooks the
central way in which these state laws conflict with the FRCPs. The
central conflict concerns the state laws' imposition of an evidentiary
requirement for pleading punitive damages. This requirement contra-
venes the simplified system of pleading and liberal standard for
amending pleadings established by the FRCPs, which are essential
features of the present federal court system for civil actions.
a. FRCP 8(a)(3)
FRCP 8(a)(3) says that "[a] pleading which sets forth a claim for
relief.., shall contain... (3) a demand for judgment for the relief the
pleader seeks."2 84 This means that in the complaint the plaintiff
should demand the relief that he or she is seeking. FRCP 8(a)(3) obvi-
ously can be read to permit-and perhaps to require-the plaintiff
seeking punitive damages to include an explicit request for punitive
damages in the initial complaint. Nonetheless, FRCP 8(a)(3) does not
specifically address the contents of initial complaints. Nor does FRCP
8(a)(3) specifically address relief in the form of punitive damages.
FRCP 8(a)(3)'s lack of specificity on these two matters has led
some courts to find no conflict between FRCP 8(a)(3) and state laws
that prohibit initial complaints from including punitive damage re-
283. At least one court found a conflict between FRCP 8(a)(2) and a state law re-
stricting the pleading of punitive damages. FRCP 8(a)(2) requireis the complaint to in-
clude "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to re-
lief." FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). The Cohen court held "that a request for punitive damages is
not a 'claim' within the meaning of Rule 8(a)(2)," and I agree. Cohen v. Office Depot, Inc.,
184 F.3d 1292, 1297 (11th Cir. 1999). The term "claim" refers to the invocation of a legal
theory supporting relief. A request for punitive damages is a request for a particular kind
of legal relief, but is not a freestanding theory supporting such relief. Put another way,
the request for punitive damages has to be attached to some legal theory such as a type of
tort or a statutory provision authorizing private actions. See Bontowski v. Smith, 305
F.3d 757, 762 (7th Cir. 2002) (the demand for relief required by FRCP 8(a)(3) 'is not itself
a part of the plaintiffs claim"); Neill v. Gulf Stream Coach, Inc., 966 F. Supp. 1149, 1153
n.8 (M.D. Fla. 1997) (holding that Florida statute restricting the pleading of punitive
damages did not conflict with FRCP 8(a)(2) because "there can be no such thing as a free
standing 'claim' for punitive damages'); WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 257, § 1255, at 509
(to the same effect).
284. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(3).
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quests. These state laws allow the plaintiff to amend the complaint to
request punitive damages if the plaintiff can substantiate the request.
Some courts have reasoned that the state laws merely control the tim-
ing of the request for punitive damages, a matter that FRCP 8(a)(3)
does not address.2 8 5 On this interpretation, FRCP 8(a)(3) is satisfied
as long as the plaintiff who seeks punitive damages eventually
amends the complaint, in accordance with state law, to add a punitive
damages claim.
This reasoning is flawed. To begin with, FRCP 8(a)(3) does ad-
dress the contents of initial complaints. It governs the contents of any
pleading "which sets forth a claim for relief.' 286 Thus, it means that
every complaint, including an initial complaint, "shall contain" a de-
mand for the relief that the plaintiff seeks. Of course, the improper
omission of material required in the initial complaint can usually be
cured under the liberal standard prescribed in FRCP 15 for amending
complaints. 28 7 The fact that the plaintiff can easily supply the omitted
material does not mean the material was not required in the first
place.
Furthermore, FRCP 8(a)(3) is most naturally read to permit,
even if it does not require, the initial complaint specifically to demand
punitive damages if the plaintiff wants them. FRCP 8(a) prescribes
the contents of the complaint so that the complaint gives the defen-
dant adequate notice of the lawsuit. A request for punitive damages is
generally such a significant aspect of the lawsuit that the defendant
should always get specific notice when that type of relief is sought.
Accordingly, federal courts have set aside punitive damage awards
when defendants did not have adequate notice that punitive damages
were sought.28 8 The plaintiff may give notice other than in the com-
285. Jones v. Krautheim, 208 F. Supp. 2d 1173, 1178 (D. Colo. 2002) (finding that
FRCP 8(a)(3)'s requirement that plaintiff include a demand for judgment for the relief
sought "would create an obvious conflict between the statute and the rule were it not for
the fact that Rule 8 imposes no timing requirement"), discussed supra notes 224-43; Wis-
consin Inv. Bd. v. Plantation Square Assocs., Ltd., 761 F. Supp. 1569, 1575 (S.D. Fla.
1991) (holding that a Florida statute restricting the pleading of punitive damages "merely
changes the time at which a plaintiff can plead punitive claims and at which defendants
are formally exposed to such claims"); cf NAL H Ltd. V. Tonkin, 705 F. Supp. at 529
(holding that federal court's failure to apply Kansas statute would only affect timing of
when court evaluates evidentiary support for punitive damage claim), discussed supra
note 134-36 and accompanying text.
286. FED. R. CIv. P. 8(a).
287. See, e.g., WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 257, § 1255, at 511 ('CThe liberal poli-
cies reflected in Rules 15(a) and 15(b) permit the demand [for judgment required by Rule
8(a)(3)] to be amended either before or during trial.").
288. See, e.g., Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. John Labatt Ltd., 89 F.3d 1339, 1350 (8th
Cir. 1996) (upholding district court decision setting aside jury award of punitive damages
when plaintiff did not include punitive damage requests in pleadings or responses to in-
terrogatories); see also Scott v. Jenkins, 690 A.2d 1000, 1007 (Md. 1997) ("A punitive
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plaint, such as in a pretrial order. 28 9 This does not alter the fact that,
under FRCP 8(a)(3), the initial complaint itself should specify that the
plaintiff seeks punitive damages.
290
In any event, as the Eleventh Circuit observed in Cohen, even if
FRCP 8(a)(3) merely permits-but does not require-the initial com-
plaint to include a specific request for punitive damages, it conflicts
with a state law that prohibits initial complaints from including re-
quests for punitive damages. 2 9 1 In general preemption analysis, fed-
eral and state law can conflict even if it is physically possible to com-
ply with both.29 2 The same is true in a Hanna Part II analy-
damages award based upon an insufficiently pleaded complaint may render the judgment
constitutionally infirm.").
289. See, e.g., Bowles v. Osmose Utils. Servs., Inc., 443 F.3d 671, 675 (8th Cir.
2006) (affirming punitive damage award, despite plaintiffs failure to request them spe-
cifically in the original or amended complaint, because plaintiff explicitly stated in his
pretrial statement that he intended to seek them); Cancellier v. Federated Dep't Stores,
672 F.2d 1312, 1319 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that a specific prayer for punitive damages
not needed when plaintiffs' pretrial statement specified that they sought punitive dam-
ages); see also FED. R. CIv. P. 54(c) ("Except as to a party against whom a judgment is en-
tered by default, every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose
favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in the
party's pleadings."). But cf. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 424 (1975) (hold-
ing that a plaintiff may not be "entitled" to relief under FED. R. CIv. P. 54(c) if defendant
is prejudiced by plaintiffs failure to make clear that plaintiff is seeking that relief).
290. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 257, § 1259, at 520 (noting that even nar-
rowly construed, FRCP 8(a)(3) requires "assertion of the type or nature of relief re-
quested"); Barrow v. Greenville Indep. Sch. Dist., No. Civ.A.3:00CV0919-D, 2005 WL
39086, at *8 (N.D. Tex., Jan. 7, 2005) (although plaintiff does not have to expressly use
the term "punitive damages" in her complaint, to satisfy FRCP 8(a)(3) she does need to
"plead[ ] facts sufficient to put [the defendant] on notice that she seeks punitive dam-
ages"); D. DEL. R. 9.4(a) ("A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief in the nature of
unliquidated money damages shall state in the ad damnum clause a demand specifying
the nature of the damages claimed, e.g., 'compensatory,' 'punitive,' or both, but shall not
claim any specific sum."); E.D. PA. R. 5.1.1 (similar local rule); see also Scutieri v. Paige,
808 F.2d 785, 790-92 (11th Cir. 1987) (prayer for punitive damages not necessary when
body of complaint alleged that defendants' conduct was egregious enough to warrant pu-
nitive damages); Guilen v. Kuykendall, 470 F.2d 745, 748 (5th Cir. 1972) (plaintiff did not
need to "claim exemplary damages by specific denomination" where the complaint "al-
leged malice and unwarranted excessive actions"); In re Landbank Equity Corp., 83
Bankr. 362, 376 (E.D. Va. 1987) ("A failure to specifically plead and demand exemplary
damages will not bar an award of such damages under [FRCP] 54(c) where the body of
the complaint alleges facts sufficient to support the award.").
291. Cohen v. Office Depot, Inc., 184 F.3d 1292, 1298 (11th Cir. 1999), vacated in
part on other grounds, 204 F.3d 1069 (11th Cir. 2000).
292. See, e.g., Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 380 (2000)
("[Tihe fact that some companies may be able to comply with both [state and federal
statutory] sanctions does not mean that the state Act is not at odds with achievement of
the federal decision about the right degree of pressure to employ [against foreign govern-
ment]."); Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 155 (1982) (hold-
ing that state law restricting inclusion of "due on sale" clauses in loan contracts conflicted
with federal regulation that allowed such clauses to be included in loan contracts but did
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sis. Indeed, in Hanna itself, the Court found an "unavoidable" clash
between a federal rule that permitted the method of serving process
required by state law, but that also permitted other methods of ser-
vice that were not allowed by state law. 293 Because the federal rule
addressed the same subject as the state law, but was more permissive
than the state law, the two conflicted. 294 Thus, finding that FRCP
8(a)(3) permits initial complaints to include requests for punitive
damages is enough to conclude that it conflicts with state laws prohib-
iting their inclusion.
Of course, to say that FRCP 8(a)(3) permits punitive damages to
be requested in the initial complaint does not mean federal law im-
poses no restrictions on their inclusion in initial complaints. The re-
strictions are modest, however. Under federal law, the test of whether
a punitive damage claim belongs in the complaint is whether the alle-
gations, if accepted as true, state a claim for which punitive damages
can be granted. 295 To include factual allegations supporting punitive
damages in the complaint, the plaintiff does not need evidentiary sup-
port if the allegations "are likely to have evidentiary support after a
reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discov-
ery."296 These lenient federal standards for pleading punitive dam-
ages, as applied to initial complaints, conflict with the flat prohibition
not compel their inclusion). See generally California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra,
479 U.S. 272, 280 (1987) (general preemption case discussing ways besides "physical im-
possibility" of dual compliance in which state law can conflict with, and therefore be pre-
empted by, federal law).
293. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 470 (1965).
294. See id. (reading FRCP 4(d)(1) to state '"implicitly, but with unmistakable
clarity-that inhand service is not required in federal courts"); see also Burlington N. R.R.
Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 7 (1987) (holding that FRCP 38's "discretionary mode of opera-
tion" for assessing damages and costs for frivolous appeals "unmistakably conflict[ed]"
with Alabama statute mandating defined penalty when appellate court affirms judgment
that was stayed on appeal).
295. Jones v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 90-14113-CIV-PAINE, 1991 WL 236503
(S.D. Fla. Apr. 25, 1991) (applying this standard in ruling on motion to dismiss and strike
punitive damage claim asserted in federal court in connection with state-law claims);
Geisinger v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc, No. 90-0872-CIV-SPELLMAN, 1990 WL
120749 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 10, 1990); Paul v. Gomez, 190 F.R.D. 402, 404 (W.D. Va. 2000) (re-
jecting motion to dismiss or strike claim for punitive damages in medical malpractice
case; no evidentiary requirement); Carpenter v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 880 F. Supp. 758,
763-64 (D. Or. 1995); Ross-Simons of Warwick, Inc. v. Baccarat, Inc. 182 F.R.D. 386 (D.
R.I. 1998); Northwest Pipe Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Conn., No. C-02-04189JF, 2003
WL 24027882, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2003) (Plaintiff need not plead evidentiary facts
to support his contention that Defendant had the requisite mental state to impose puni-
tive damages under [state law, Calif. Civil Code] § 3294."); Jones v. Miller, No. CIV A.
6:06-CV-00014, 2006 WL 1867321 (W.D. Va., June 30, 2006) (motion to strike/dismiss pu-
nitive damages governed by federal rules, not Virginia rules of fact pleading); Lindsay v.
Kvortek, 865 F. Supp. 264, 268-69 (W.D. Pa. 1994).
296. FED. R. Civ. P. 1l(b)(3).
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that Idaho Code section 6-1604(2), as well as laws in seven other
states, puts on requesting punitive damages in initial complaints.
One court-the District of Minnesota in Kuehn v. Shelcore, Inc.-
nonetheless discerned only a "potential" conflict, but not a "direct"
conflict between FRCP 8 and state laws restricting the pleading of
punitive damages. 297 The Kuehn court cited two reasons for finding
only a potential conflict. One was that FRCP 8 has a different purpose
than the state law at issue in that case: "Rule 8 is concerned with
simplifying pleading requirements," whereas the state law at issue
there "is aimed at deterring past abusive pleading practices regarding
punitive damages in order to address a perceived insurance cri-
sis."298 In addition, the court observed, the state had a rule of civil
procedure that was "virtually identical" to FRCP 8, and the state had
not changed the rule after enacting the law restricting the pleading of
punitive damages.2
99
Neither consideration dispels the conflict. If state law and federal
law conflict in operation, it does not matter whether their purpose is
different or the same.300 Nor is it necessarily significant that a state
version of FRCP 8 was not amended after enactment of the state stat-
ute that restricted the pleading of punitive damages. This could sim-
ply reflect that FRCP 8 and these statutes are not perfectly coexten-
sive.301 FRCP 8(a)(3) addresses demands for all types of relief, includ-
ing but not limited to punitive damages, in all pleadings that contain
claims, including but not limited to initial complaints. Because FRCP
8(a)(3) is broader than state statutes prohibiting punitive damage re-
quests in initial complaints, under ordinary canons of interpretation,
the statutes would be deemed controlling over a state version of FRCP
8(a)(3). Thus, it would not be necessary to alter the earlier, general
provision for the later, specific provision to have effect to the extent it
altered the earlier provision. For example, a state version of FRCP 8
would still require (or at least permit) punitive damages to be re-
quested in amended complaints. The later statute, however, would




300. Crosby v. Natl Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 379 n.14 (2000) ("Iden-
tity of ends does not end our analysis of preemption."); see also Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 52, 66 (1941) (even though state law regulating aliens "may be immediately associ-
ated with the accomplishment of a local purpose," it was preempted by Congress's regula-
tion of aliens in the exercise of control over international affairs); Fidelity Fed. Sav. &
Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982).
301. Cf. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 30 (1988) (finding a con-
flict even though "§ 1404(a) and Alabama's putative policy regarding forum-selection
clauses are not perfectly coextensive").
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prohibit the state version of FRCP 8 from being read to allow requests
for punitive damages in initial complaints and would restrict their in-
clusion in amended complaints. In this way, the rule and the statute
would be interpreted to "co-exist," even though the statute would par-
tially repeal the rule.
30 2
In sum, the Idaho statute and similar state laws restricting the
pleading of punitive damages conflict with FRCP 8(a)(3). The conflict
arises because, and to the extent that, the latter permits (even if it
does not require) initial complaints to include requests for punitive
damages. The state laws forbid this. The conflict is clear--even
though the wording of FRCP 8 is more general (befitting its broader
applicability to all complaints, including amended complaints, and to
all types of relief) than these state laws, and even though the state
laws' purpose differs from FRCP 8(a)(3)'s. This conflict alone cause
federal law to preempt the state laws to the extent that they would
otherwise apply in federal courts.
b. FRCP 9(g)
As its title announces, FRCP 9 governs "pleading special mat-
ters." Among those special matters are special damages. FRCP 9(g)
says that "[w]hen items of special damage are claimed, they shall be
specifically stated. '30 3 If punitive damages qualify as special damages,
302. See Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods 480 U.S. 1, 7 (1987) (rejecting reliance
on the argument that Alabama statute did not conflict with Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure (FRAP) 38 since Alabama statute coexisted with Alabama appellate rule simi-
lar to FRAP 38).
303. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(g). FRCP 9(g) reflects longstanding pleading principles. The
Supreme Court observed long ago that, "[a]s a general proposition," a plaintiff is not "al-
lowed to recover for a special damage not alleged in the complaint." Roberts v. Graham,
73 U.S. 578, 579 (1867); see also Kendall v. Stokes, 44 U.S. 87, 102-03 (1845) (testimony
of special damages was inadmissible because "no special damages are laid in the declara-
tion; and in that form of pleading no damages are recoverable, but such as the law implies
to have accrued from the wrong complained of; and certainly the law does not imply dam-
ages of the description" given in the testimony). The Roberts Court explained that special
damages must be specially stated "in order that the defendant may be notified of the
charge, and come [to court] prepared to meet it." 73 U.S. at 579. This purpose reflects the
definition of special damages: they are damages that are "the natural, but not the neces-
sary, consequence, of the act complained of." Id. Because special damages do not neces-
sarily flow from the act on which the plaintiff sues, the defendant cannot assume that a
plaintiff has suffered, and will seek to recover, special damages unless the plaintiff spe-
cifically says so in the complaint. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 257, § 1310, at 349.
The suffering of special damages is an essential element of some causes of action. Id.
When plaintiff pleads one of those causes of action, the plaintiff must plead special dam-
ages to demonstrate the sufficiency of the cause of action. Id. § 1310, at 351; see also Pol-
lard v. Lyon, 91 U.S. 225, 237 (1875) (in action for slander that was not actionable per se,
plaintiffs declaration had to set forth specifically the special damages and show that they
were natural result of slanderous statement).
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FRCP 9(g) would require them to be specifically stated in pleadings-
including the initial complaint. The state laws we have been discuss-
ing bar punitive damage requests from initial complaints. Accord-
ingly, the federal district courts in Kansas and Oregon hold that these
state laws conflict with FRCP 9(g). 30 4 In contrast, a federal district
court in Colorado held that they do not conflict.30 5 Courts in these
three districts and elsewhere have assumed that punitive damages
qualify as special damages. 30 6 That assumption may be incorrect.
A threshold issue is whether federal law or state law governs the
classification of punitive damages as "special damages" in diversity
cases. 30 7 That issue, too, is an unresolved Erie issue-existing within
the broader Erie question on which this article focuses. 3 08 Resolution
304. See Pruett v. Erickson Air-Crane Co., 183 F.R.D. 248, 251 (D. Or. 1998), dis-
cussed supra notes 116-25 and accompanying text; Whittenburg v. L.J. Holding Co., 830
F. Supp. 557, 565 n.8 (D. Kan. 1993) (observing that federal district courts in Kansas have
repeatedly held that Kansas statute requiring court's leave to plead punitive damages
conflicts with FRCP 9(g)); NAL II, Ltd. v. Tonkin, 705 F. Supp. 522, 528 (D. Kan. 1989)
(finding a "direct collision" between FRCP 9(g) and Kansas statute restricting the plead-
ing of punitive damages), discussed supra notes 127-37 and accompanying text.
305. Witt v. Condos. at the Boulders Ass'n, No. CIVA04CV02000MSKOES, 2006
WL 348086 (D. Colo. Feb. 13, 2006) (holding that Colorado statute similar to Idaho's did
not conflict with FRCP 9(g) because 9(g) does not address when special damages shall be
pleaded, and Colorado statute permits punitive damages to be pleaded specifically in an
amended complaint); Jones v. Krautheim, 208 F. Supp. 2d 1173, 1178-79 (D. Colo., 2002)
discussed supra notes 224-43 and accompanying text.
306. See, e.g., Jones, 208 F. Supp. 2d at 1179 ("So long as a plaintiff can amend
pleadings to state special damages in conformance with Rule 9(g) before the issues are
tried, there is no practical conflict between the Colorado statute [prohibiting punitive
damage requests in initial complaints] and the federal rules.'); Teel v. United Techs.
Pratt & Whitney, 953 F. Supp. 1534, 1539 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (stating that 'if any rule is im-
plicated" by state law restricting the pleading of punitive damages, it is FRCP 9(g)), dis-
approved, Cohen v. Office Depot, Inc., 184 F.3d 1292, 1297 (11th Cir. 1999), vacated in
part on other grounds, 204 F.3d 1069 (11th Cir. 2000); Comeau v. Rupp, 762 F. Supp.
1434, 1449 (D. Kan. 1991) (citing FRCP 9(g) as "the only applicable federal rule relating
to pleading of special damages" in discussing defendants motion to strike plaintiffs' puni-
tive damage claim and holding that plaintiffs complied with FRCP 9(g)); NAL II, 705 F.
Supp. at 528 (FRCP 9(g) "requires, in mandatory language, that a claim for punitive
damages be set forth in a party's complaint'); cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 306 F. Supp.
310, 311 (N.D. Ill 1969) (holding that plaintiff could recover punitive damages without
pleading then specially because special damages were not an essential element of plain-
tiffs cause of action).
307. See NTBS Storage & Retrieval, Inc. v. Kardex Sys., Inc., No. CIV.
3:98CV0996-M, 2001 WL 238110, at * 1 n.2 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 30, 2001) (noting that the is-
sue of whether federal court in diversity action should consult state law to determine
"[w]hat constitutes 'special damages"' is separate from the question whether damages
classified as special damages have been stated with sufficient particularity to satisfy
FRCP 9(g)).
308. See S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. Builders Transp. Co., Inc., Civ. A. No. 90-3177,
1993 WL 232058, at *4 & n.5 (E.A. La. June 22, 1993) (noting disagreement among fed-
eral courts on this issue); see also Hogan v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 167 F.3d 781, 783 (2nd
Cir. 1999) ("Rule 9 does not define special damages, and it is not settled in this Circuit
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of the interior Erie issue would require a separate article. I can, how-
ever, identify the relevant considerations at this point and examine
the consequences of the resolution for the issue under discussion.
I tend to think that federal law governs the definition of "special
damages" for purposes of 9(g), even in diversity cases. True, FRCP
9(g) uses the term "special damages" without defining it. When FRCP
9(g) was adopted, however, the federal courts had developed a well-
established definition of the term.30 9 FRCP 9(g) is therefore appropri-
ately read to incorporate this judicially developed definition.31° Thus,
when federal courts today apply that definition to determine whether
particular kinds of damages are "special damages," they are not only
applying the federal judicially developed definition of "special dam-
ages"; they are also interpreting FRCP 9(g). An interpretation of an
FRCP should be treated as part and parcel of the FRCP itself, for
purposes of Hanna Part II analysis. For that reason, in federal diver-
sity cases the interpretation will trump conflicting state law, as long
as the underlying FRCP is valid. A federal definition of "special dam-
ages" that functions solely to identify damages that have to be
pleaded specially is valid, because it falls within Congress's power
under the Constitution and the Court's power under the REA. On this
analysis, federal law--embodied in federal case law interpreting
FRCP 9(g)-governs the definition of special damages in diversity
cases.
3 1 1
whether the law defining damages as general or special is procedural [for Erie pur-
poses].'). Compare, e.g., Nelson v. G.C. Murphy Co., 245 F. Supp. 846, 847 (N.D. Ala.
1965) (relying on Alabama law in diversity action to hold that punitive damages are not
special damages that need to be specially stated under FRCP 9(g)), with Maglione v.
Cottrell, Inc., No. 00 C2436, 2001 WL 946189, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 27, 2001) (applying
federal case law interpreting FRCP 9(g) to determine whether plaintiffs in diversity ac-
tion had to specially plead punitive damages). See also Comeau v. Rupp, 762 F. Supp.
1434, 1449 (D. Kan. 1991) (diversity action holding that FRCP 9(g) was "applicable" to
plaintiffs' punitive damage claim and that plaintiffs complied with FRCP 9(g)).
309. See supra note 303 (discussing Roberts v. Graham, 73 U.S. 578, 579 (1867),
and Kendall v. Stokes, 44 U.S. 87, 102-03 (1845)); see also, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 765, n.1 (1985) (White, J., concurring) (discussing
concept of special damages required for most actions for slander at common law, and re-
ferring separately to "special damages" and "punitive damages').
310. Cf. Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 7-9 (1985) (interpreting FRCP in light of
case law and statutory landscape that existed when FRCPs were adopted).
311. See T.G.J., Jr., Note, The Definition and Pleading of Special Damage Under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 55 VA. L. REV. 542, 553-54 (1969) (arguing that in
diversity cases federal law, rather than state law, "governs the definition [as well
as]... [the] pleading of special damage" because FRCP "9(g) implicitly contains standards
for defining both special damage and the degree of specificity with which it should be
pleaded'). The strongest counterargument that I have been able to identify would rest on
Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943). There, the Court held that, under Erie, state law
governs the determination in a diversity action of whether a defense (in that case, con-
tributory negligence) is an affirmative defense. Id. at 117. That state-law determination,
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If this analysis is correct, then we face yet another issue on
which federal courts disagree: whether, under federal law, punitive
damages are special damages.3 12 Again without resolving the matter
in turn, would presumably control whether the defense. must be affirmatively pleaded
under FRCP 8(c). (FRCP 8(c) governs burden of pleading, while 'local law" governs who
bears the burden of establishing contributory negligence at trial). See id. You could rea-
sonably argue that, just as federal courts in diversity actions must use state law to de-
termine which defenses are affirmative defenses that must be specifically pleaded under
FRCP 8(c), those courts must use state law to determine which damages are "special"
damages that must be specifically stated under FRCP 9 (g). My response to this argument
would be that the concept of an affirmative defense differs from the concept of special
damages in a way that matters for Erie purposes. Labeling a defense an affirmative de-
fense not only controls who bears the burden of pleading it, but also who bears the burden
of proving it at trial. The burden of proof is a substantive matter for Erie purposes. See,
e.g., Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 437, 446 (1959) ('Under the Erie rule, pre-
sumptions (and their effects) and burden of proof are 'substantive'.. - ") (footnote omit-
ted); Ragan v. Merchs. Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 533-34 (1949) (finding
that reliance on federal doctrine to allow state law action to be brought in federal court
that would be time-barred under state law would "addo something to the [state law]
cause of action," an impermissible result under Erie). In contrast, the concept of special
damages has--with one exception--significance solely for purposes of pleading, a matter
that is customarily considered procedural for Erie purpose. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2000)
(empowering Supreme Court to prescribe the forms of pleading); Hanna v. Plumer, 380
U.S. 460, 472 (1965) (holding that the Constitution gives Congress "power to make rules
governing the practice and pleading" in federal courts.); Hoffman, 318 U.S. at 117 (distin-
guishing the burden of pleading, which is addressed in FRCP 8(c), from the burden of
proof at trial, which is "a question of local law"). The exception is that the occurrence of
special damages is an essential element of some state law causes of action. Id. See supra
note 303. With reference to this exception, one federal court has suggested in dicta that
state law should govern the definition of "special damages" for purposes of 9(g) when they
are an essential element of a state law claim asserted in the federal court, while federal
law would govern the definition in other situations. See Hogan, 167 F.3d at 783. Although
this suggested approach differs from the approach tentatively endorsed here, the differ-
ence may not matter in the situation under discussion. I know of no situations in which
proof of punitive damages is an essential element of a cause of action. Therefore, the ap-
proach suggested in Hogan does not seem to require that state law ever govern the defini-
tion of punitive damages as special damages under 9(g). Rather, they would be governed
by federal law, as I tend to think they should be in all cases.
312. Tutor Time Child Care Sys., Inc. v. Frank Inv. Group, Inc., 966 F. Supp.
1188, 1192 n.5 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (noting disagreement among federal courts on whether
punitive damages are special damages), disapproved on other grounds by Cohen v. Office
Depot, 184 F.3d 1292, 1297 (11th Cir. 1999), vacated in part on other grounds by Cohen v.
Office Depot, Inc., 204 F.3d 1069 (11th Cir. 2000); S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. Builders Tranp.,
Inc., Civ. A. No. 90-3177, 1993 WL 232058, at *4 (E.D. La. June 22, 1993) (same); see, e.g.,
Maglione v. Cotrel, Inc., No. 00 C 2436, 2001 WL 946189, at *2 (N.D. IlM. Apr. 27, 2001)
(holding that punitive damages are not special damages under FRCP 9(g)); Dow v. Ed-
wards & Kelcey, Inc., No. CIV.A. 97-8078, WL 531838, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug 21, 1998) (ex-
pressing doubt whether punitive damages are special damages under FRCP 9(g)); In re
Harry Levin, 175 B.R.. 560, 569 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1994) (holding that punitive damages
are not special damages under FRCP 9(g)); In re Barber, 326 B.R. 463, 466, n.7 (B.A.P.
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definitively, I tend to side with the cases holding that punitive dam-
ages are not special damages. As one court has reasoned:
A noted authority defines "special damages" as "[t]hose which
are the actual, but not the necessary, result of the injury com-
plained of, and which in fact follow it as a natural and proxi-
mate consequence in the particular case, that is, by reason of
special circumstances or conditions." Black's Law Dictionary
(6th Ed.), p. 392. Thus, special damages are consequential
damages incurred by the plaintiff, and are included in the
broad category of compensatory damages. Punitive damages,
on the other hand, are not "the result of the injury complained
of." "Unlike compensatory or actual damages," which are de-
signed to make the plaintiff whole, punitive or exemplary
damages are based upon an entirely different public policy
consideration-that of punishing the defendant or of setting
an example for similar wrongdoers.... ." Punitive damages
are simply not special damages, and need not be stated spe-
cifically under FRCP 9(g).
313
Because FRCP 9(g) does not require punitive damages to be pleaded
specially, the rule does not conflict with state laws that prohibit initial
complaints from pleading punitive damages.
Even if state law, rather than federal law, governs the definition
of special damages, FRCP 9(g) would not conflict with the Idaho law
banning punitive damage requests in initial complaints. That is be-
cause Idaho law defines special damages to exclude punitive dam-
ages.3 14 Therefore, if Idaho law defined "special damages" for pur-
poses of FRCP 9(g) in diversity actions, FRCP 9(g) would not require
10th Cir. 2005 (assuming arguendo that punitive damages are special damages under
FRCP 9(g)).
313. S. Pac. Transp., 1993 WL 232058, at *4 (citation omitted); see also Maglione,
2001 WL 946189, at *2 (using similar reasoning to hold that FRCP 9(g) "does not govern
Plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages since punitive damages are not special damages").
314. See Klam v. Koppel, 63 Idaho 171, 183, 118 P.2d 729, 734 (1941) ('CThe rules
of pleading do not require that the allegations relating to exemplary damages should be
set out separately from the other averments of the complaint. Special damages must be
grounded upon separate allegations, but exemplary damages are so intimately connected
with general damages that if the general allegations are sufficient to show the wrong
complained of was inflicted with malice or oppression or other like circumstances, the
complaint will be sufficient to authorize the infliction of punitive or exemplary damages.')
(quoting Stark v. Epler, 117 P. 276, 278 (Or. 1911)); Dwyer v. Libert, 30 Idaho 576, 586,
167 P. 651, 653 (1917) ("It is not necessary to the recovery of exemplary damages that
they should be specially claimed in the complaint, but such damages may be recovered
under a claim for damages generally.'); see also, e.g., Barlow v. Int'l Harvester Co., 95
Idaho 881, 898, 522 P.2d 1102, 1119 (1974) (referring separately to "special and punitive
damages').
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them to be pleaded specially. If FRCP 9(g) is interpreted not to re-
quire punitive damages to be specially stated, then FRCP 9(g) does
not conflict with Idaho Code § 6-1604(2)'s ban on the pleading of puni-
tive damages in initial complaints.
Of course, other states may define special damages to include
punitive damages. For example, Kansas law appears to treat punitive
damages as a species of special damages. 3 15 If a federal court had to
apply Kansas law to define special damages for purposes of FRCP 9(g)
in a diversity case, FRCP 9(g) would require punitive damages to be
specially stated. FRCP 9(g) would then conflict with the Kansas stat-
ute that prohibits punitive damages from being pleaded in the initial
complaint.
3 16
In short, state laws restricting the pleading of punitive damages
may not conflict with FRCP 9(g). That depends on (1) whether federal
law or state law governs the definition of "special damage[s]" in FRCP
9(g); and (2) whether the applicable law (be it federal or state) defines
special damages to include punitive damages. I believe that federal
law governs, and that federal law defines special damages as not in-
cluding punitive damages. If that is right, the state laws do not con-
flict with FRCP 9(g) because FRCP 9(g) does not require punitive
damages to be specially pleaded. In any event, federal courts address-
ing this issue are deficient because they have all assumed that puni-
tive damages constitute special damages without recognizing the dif-
ficult issues underlying that assumption.
c. FRCP 15(a)
FRCP 15 governs the amendment of pleadings, including com-
plaints. FRCP 15 allows the plaintiff to amend a complaint as of right
(for example, without leave of the court or consent of the defendant)
before the answer is served.3 17 After the answer is served, the plain-
tiff needs leave of the court or the consent of the defendant to amend
315. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-209(g) (2005).
When items of special damage are claimed, their nature shall be specifically
stated. In actions where exemplary or punitive damages are recoverable, the
amended petition shall not state a dollar amount for damages sought to be
recovered but shall state whether the amount of damages sought to be recov-
ered is in excess of or not in excess of $75,000.
Id. The purpose of the statute 'is to put a party on notice that a claim for special damages
is being asserted so that the party defending the assessment of punitive damages may in-
vestigate details of the claim by discovery processes." Fusaro v. First Family Mortg.
Corp., 897 P.2d 123, 134 (Kan. 1995).
316. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3703, discussed at supra notes 126-37 and accompa-
nying text.
317. FED. R. CIv. P. 15(a).
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the complaint. 31 8 FRCP 15(a) says that, when the plaintiff seeks the
court's leave, "leave shall be freely given when justice so re-
quires."3 19 The Supreme Court has interpreted this language to pre-
scribe a liberal standard for amendment, and to require courts to al-
low an amendment unless the court specifies some reason for denying
it "such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the
movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previ-
ously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of al-
lowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc."
'3 20
Federal courts apparently disagree on whether state laws re-
stricting the pleading of punitive damages conflict with FRCP 15(a).
Federal courts in Colorado and Minnesota hold there is no con-
flict.3 2 1 By comparison, a federal court in Illinois seems to hold that
these state laws do conflict with FRCP 15(a). 32 2 In addition, some fed-
eral district court decisions in Idaho recognize that there is tension
between FRCP 15 and these state laws. 32 3 Finally, outside the specific
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).
321. Jones v. Krautheim, 208 F. Supp. 2d 1173, 1179 (D. Colo. 2002), discussed
supra note 233 and accompanying text; Sec. Say. Bank v. Green Tree Acceptance, Inc.,
No. Civ. 3-89-28, 1990 WL 36142, at *2 (D. Minn. Mar. 22, 1990), discussed supra note
157-62 and accompanying text; see also Neill v. Gulf Stream Coach, Inc., 966 F. Supp.
1149, 1154 (M.D. Fla. 1997) (The lack of a timing provision in Rule 9(g) read in light of
the liberal amendment provisions of Rule 15 compels the conclusion that the Rule 9(g)
and [Florida statute restricting the pleading of punitive damages] can exist side by
side... each controlling its own intended sphere of coverage without conflict.') (internal
quotation marks omitted); Teel v. United Techs. Pratt & Whitney, 953 F. Supp. 1534,
1539 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (holding that Florida law restricting the pleading of punitive dam-
ages "accords with" the "free amendment" policy of FRCPs).
322. Dewick v. Maytag Corp., 296 F. Supp. 2d 905, 906 & n.3 (N.D. Il. 2003), dis-
cussed supra notes 197-203 and accompanying text.
323. Doe v. Cutter Biological, 844 F. Supp. 602, 610 (D. Idaho 1994) (referring to
"the tension existing between the principles of Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, i.e., that leave to amend pleadings shall be 'freely given,' and the limiting pro-
visions of Idaho statutory and case law, which disfavor punitive damages). In other cases
besides Cutter, the federal district court for the District of Idaho has recognized tension
between FRCP 15(a)'s standard for amending pleadings and that imposed by Idaho law.
In Deshazo v. Estate of Clayton, for example, Magistrate Judge Boyle said the following:
[Tihough Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) encourages the liberal grant-
ing of motions to amend pleadings, due to the strict conditions precedent to
and the disfavor of punitive damages, a plaintiff will be allowed to amend the
pleadings to assert a claim for punitive damages only if, after weighing the
evidence presented, the presiding judge concludes that Plaintiffs have estab-
lished a reasonable likelihood of proving, by clear and convincing evidence,
that Defendants' conduct was oppressive, fraudulent, malicious, or outra-
geous.
No. CV 05-202-S-EJL, 2006 WL 1794735, at *11 (D. Idaho June 28, 2006); see also DBSI
Signature Place, LLC v. BL Greensboro, No. CV 05-051-SLMB, 2006 WL 1275394, at *18
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context of state laws restricting the pleading of punitive damages,
many federal courts have held that FRCP 15, rather than state law,
governs amendment of pleadings.
3 24
In my view, of all the FRCPs, Rule 15 is the FRCP that most
clearly conflicts with the Idaho law and similar state laws restricting
the pleading of punitive. That is because these state laws require an
evidentiary showing for amending pleadings that FRCP 15 does not
require.
The conflict begins when a plaintiff seeks to amend a complaint
before an answer is served. FRCP 15 allows the plaintiff during this
period to amend the complaint "as a matter of course." 32 5 In contrast,
the state laws under discussion apparently require leave of the court
whenever the plaintiff seeks to amend the complaint to request puni-
tive damages. 3 26 Thus, the state laws conflict with FRCP 15 as applied
(D. Idaho May 9 2006); Prado v. Potlatch Corp., No. CV 05-256-C-LMB, 2006 WL
1207612, at *4 (D. Idaho May 1, 2006).
324. See Loudenslager v. Teeple, 466 F.2d 249, 250 (3rd Cir. 1972) (holding that
FRCP 15, rather than Pennsylvania law, governed motion to amend pleading in diversity
case to name personal representative of estate, rather than decedent, as defendant); Gif-
ford v. Wichita Falls & S. Ry. Co., 224 F.2d 374, 376 (5th Cir. 1955) (holding in diversity
case that FRCP 15, rather than state law, governed amendment of pleadings to name
proper defendant, stating that "[t]he matter of amendment to pleadings is a procedural
matter governed by Federal law and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and not by
Erie."); Ross v. Philip Morris Co., 164 F. Supp. 683, 687 (W.D. Mo. 1958) (holding that
FRCP 15, rather than state law, governed "the propriety and legal effect of the amend-
ments made in plaintiffs third amended complaint" in diversity case); Bixby v. Chris
Craft Corp., 7 F.R.D. 80, 81 (E.D. Mich. 1946) (holding that FRCP 15 governed amend-
ment of complaint in diversity case to conform to evidence presented at trial and stating
that under FRCP 15 "a more generous interpretation is given aimed at permitting
amendments than under state rules, and on this point Erie Railroad Co. u. Tompkins...
is not applicable since it refers to substantive law. This is procedural.').
325. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Some courts recognize an exception for situations in
which the original complaint has been dismissed and the amended complaint "fails to
cure the deficiencies in the original pleading, or could not survive a second motion to dis-
miss." See Perkins v. Silverstein, 939 F.2d 463, 471-72 (7th Cir. 1991).
326. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1604(2) (2004)
In all civil actions in which punitive damages are permitted, no claim for
damages shall be filed containing a prayer for relief seeking punitive dam-
ages. However, a party may, pursuant to a pretrial motion and after hearing
before the court, amend the pleadings to include a prayer for relief seeking
punitive damages.
Id. Interestingly, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), like FRCP 15(a), allows a party to
amend a pleading as a matter of course before a responsive pleading is filed. IDAHO R.
CIv. P. 15(a). The Idaho courts, however, would apparently interpret Idaho Code § 6-
1604(2) to require leave of court even if a plaintiff sought to amend the complaint to seek
punitive damages before service of the answer on the ground that the specific statute con-
trols over the more general rule. See Ausman v. State, 124 Idaho 839, 842, 864 P.2d 1126,
1129 (Idaho 1993). Many courts in other states with similar rules of civil procedure and
similar statutes would probably take the same approach.
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to amendments that request punitive damages and that are made by
plaintiffs before service of a responsive pleading.
The conflict does not end there. Rather, it extends to the period
when a plaintiff moves to amend the complaint to seek punitive dam-
ages before a defense motion for summary judgment on the punitive
damage request would be appropriate. During this period, federal law,
as relevant here, would treat the motion to amend like a motion un-
der FRCP 12(b)(6). 3 2 7 Thus, the court would apply the liberal stan-
dard of Conley v. Gibson.328 The court would assume the truth of the
facts asserted by plaintiff in support of the request for punitive dam-
ages. 32 9 On that assumption it would deny the amendment only if it
appeared beyond a doubt that the plaintiff could prove no set of facts
entitling the plaintiff to punitive damages.3 30 This framework does
not require the plaintiff to present evidence of punitive damages or
otherwise demonstrate a likelihood of success.
3 3 1
327. In Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962), the Court construed FRCP
15(a) to require a federal court to allow an amendment unless the court found some spe-
cific reason to deny it. Among the reasons that the Court cited as grounds for denying
leave to amend was "futility." The lower courts have cited the futility ground to deny
amendment if the proposed amendment would not withstand a FRCP 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss. See, e.g., Dougherty v. Town of North Hempstead Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 282
F.3d 83, 88 (2nd Cir. 2002); Stripling v. Jordan Prod. Co., 234 F.3d 863, 873 (5th Cir.
2000); Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 121 (3rd Cir. 2000); Glassman v. Computervision
Corp., 90 F.3d 617, 623 (1st Cir. 1996); Thiokol Corp. v. Mich. Dep't of Treasury, 987 F.2d
376, 382-83 (6th Cir. 1993).
328. 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see also Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69,
73 (1984) (applying Conley standard).
329. See, e.g., Dewick v. Maytag Corp., 296 F. Supp 2d 905, 906-07 (N.D. Ill.
2003). The court states that on a motion to amend the complaint to seek punitive dam-
ages, "[The court accepts all well-pleaded allegations as true and draws all reasonable in-
ferences in [the plaintiffs'] favor." Id.; see also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506,
508 n.1 (2002).
330. E.g., Hishon, 467 U.S. at 73; Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46.
331. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974) ('The issue is not whether a
plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to
support the claims. Indeed it may appear on the face of the pleadings that a recovery is
very remote and unlikely but that is not the test."); Gamma-10 Plastics, Inc. v. Am.
President Lines, Ltd., 32 F.3d 1244, 1255-57 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that district court
erred, when ruling on plaintiffs motion to amend complaint to seek punitive damages on
her maritime law claim, "by weighing the likelihood of success on the punitive damages
claim"; stating, "[l]ikelihood of success.., is no basis for denying an amendment" under
FRCP 15(a); but affirming district court's refusal to allow plaintiff to amend complaint to
seek punitive damages on state-law claim because plaintiff did not, as required by Minne-
sota statute restricting the pleading of punitive damages, "establish[ ] a prima facie case
by clear and convincing evidence); Burkhart ex rel. Burkhart v. L.M. Becker & Co. Corp.,
No. CV-04-420-ST, 2004 WL 1920196, at *2 (D. Or. Aug. 26, 2004) (observing that in con-
trast to Oregon statute restricting the pleading of punitive damages, under FRCP 8(a)(2)
plaintiff "is not required to submit admissible evidence in support of his amendment to al-
lege punitive damages); Dewick, 296 F. Supp. 2d at 911 (holding that plaintiff was enti-
tled to amend complaint to seek punitive damages even though it [was] "too early in the
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In contrast, the state laws under discussion here do require the
plaintiff to show a likelihood of success before allowing the plaintiff to
amend the complaint to request punitive damages. These state laws
vary in articulating the required showing, but they all seem to de-
mand more than required by FRCP 15(a), as construed to incorporate
the Conley v. Gibson standard. For example, the Minnesota law has
been construed to require the plaintiff to submit admissible evidence
sufficient to avoid a directed verdict. 33 2 Idaho's law allows amend-
ment "if, after weighing the evidence presented, the court concludes
that, the moving party has established.., a reasonable likelihood of
proving facts at trial sufficient to support an award of punitive dam-
ages."3 33 The Idaho law's requirement that the court "weigho the evi-
dence presented" seems to contemplate an evidentiary showing to
support the proposed amendment. The evidentiary showing might not
be limited to presentation of evidence that would be admissible at
trial. 33 4 The Idaho law has, however, been construed to require denial
of a motion to amend "when the moving party's claims are reasonably
disputed and there is substantial evidence that supports the non-
moving party's claims."3 35 This reflects a more demanding showing
than required by FRCP 15(a), as the Idaho courts have recognized.
3 36
game to determine whether [plaintiffs] will ultimately succeed in mulcting [defendant] in
punitive damages"); Baumann v. Hall, No. 98-2126-JWL, 1998 WL 513008, at *1 & n.1
(D. Kan. Jul. 15, 1998) (finding that defendant's argument-that evidence does not sup-
port plaintiffs motion to amend the complaint to request punitive damages-is "prema-
ture" in analyzing the motion under Conley standard; court rejects defendant's argument
that motion is governed by Kansas statute restricting the pleading of punitive damages).
332. See Berczyk v. Emerson Tool Co., 291 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1008 n.3, 1010 (D.
Minn. 2003) (holding that evidence required by Minnesota statute to support motion to
amend complaint to request punitive damages must be admissible and is reviewed as a
court would review a motion for a directed verdict); Ulrich v. City of Crosby, 848 F. Supp.
861, 867 (D. Minn. 1994) ("[U]nder the strictures of Section 549.191, the Court reviews
the evidence in support of a Motion to Amend as the Court would review a Motion for a
Directed Verdict"); cf. Nereson v. Zurich Ins. Co., Civ. No. A3-91-72, 1992 WL 212233, at
*2 (D. N.D. Aug. 20, 1992) (under N.D. law restricting pleading of punitive damage, to de-
termine whether plaintiff is entitled to amend complaint to request punitive damages,
court must examine evidence to "determine if a reasonable jury could find the defendant
guilty of oppression, fraud or malice)".
333. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1604(2) (2004).
334. But cf. Strong v. Unumprovident Corp., 393 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1025-26 (D.
Idaho 2005) (finding "no competent evidence in the record" to support motion to amend
complaint to request punitive damages).
335. DeShazo v. Estate of Clayton, No. CV 05-202-S-EJL, 2006 WL 1794735, at
*11 (D. Idaho June 28, 2006); Prado v. Potlach Corp., No. CV 05-256-C-LMB, 2006 WL
1207612, at *3 (D. Idaho May 1, 2006); DBSI Signature Place, L.L.C. v. BL Greensboro,
L.P., No. CV 05-051-SLMB, 2006 WL 1275394 at *18 (D. Idaho May 1, 2006); Strong, 393
F. Supp 2d at 1026. The standard quoted in the text made sense in the Strong case, which
involved a claim of bad faith by an insurance company that denied disability coverage un-
der the "accident" clause of a policy. Id. Because substantial medical evidence supported
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True, at some point in pretrial proceedings, the showing to sup-
port a motion to amend under FRCP 15(a) may approach that re-
quired by the state laws under discussion. Several federal courts hold
that at a certain point in pre-trial proceedings, a motion to amend the
complaint should be judged under a standard comparable or identical
to the FRCP 56 standard for summary judgment.3 37 The rationale for
this holding is that the determination of whether an amendment is
"futile" depends on the procedural posture of the case. 3 38 The First
Circuit explained as follows:
both sides of the parties' reasonable dispute over whether the insured plaintiffs disability
was caused by an "accident," the court determined that the plaintiff would not likely be
able to show that, in denying coverage, the insurance company committed conduct that
was egregious enough, and acted with a sufficiently bad intent, to be liable for punitive
damages. See id. at 1026. It is not clear, however, that an identical standard should be
used for all cases in which a plaintiff moves under Idaho Code § 6-1604(2) to amend the
complaint to request punitive damages. After all, in some cases the plaintiff may be able
to establish a reasonable likelihood of recovering punitive damages even though there is a
reasonable dispute about whether the defendant's conduct and state of mind met the
standard for punitive damages and the defendant has substantial evidence supporting his
or her position. In this situation, the plaintiff would not be entitled to summary judgment
on the issue of punitive damages. See IDAHO R. Civ. P. 56; see also McCorkle v. Nw. Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 141 Idaho 550, 554, 112 P.3d 838, 842 (Ct. App. 2005) (discussing standard
for summary judgment); Ryan v. Beisner, 123 Idaho 42, 44-45, 844 P.2d 24, 26-27 (Ct.
App. 1992). The plaintiff could nonetheless have enough evidence to warrant allowing a
request for punitive damages. Cf. Doe v. Cutter Biological, 844 F. Supp. 602, 610 (D.
Idaho 1994) (finding enough evidence to allow amendment to request punitive damages,
but emphasizing that the evidence might not be sufficient to allow the request to reach
the jury); Vendelin v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 140 Idaho 416, 424, 95 P.3d 34, 42 (2004)
(quoting trial court ruling in which judge allowed amendment to request punitive dam-
ages given conflicting evidence).
336. See supra note 323 and accompanying text; see also Gamma- 10 Plastics, Inc.
v. Am. President Lines, Ltd., 32 F.3d 1244, 1254-57 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that district
court correctly relied on Minnesota statute restricting the pleading of punitive damages
to refuse to allow plaintiff to add punitive damage request to state-law claim but abused
its discretion under FRCP 15(a) in refusing to allow plaintiff to add punitive damage re-
quest to claim based on maritime law).
337. Milanese v. Rust-Oleum Corp., 244 F.3d 104, 110 (2nd Cir. 2001). The court
said in Milanese that, when a motion to amend the complaint is made in response to a
motion for summary judgment, "even if the amended complaint would state a valid claim
on its face, the court may deny the amendment as futile when the evidence in support of
the plaintiffs proposed new claim creates no triable issue of fact and the defendant would
be entitled to judgment as a matter of law under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)." Id.; Hatch v. Dep't
for Children, Youth and Their Families, 274 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 2001) ("If... leave to
amend is not sought until after discovery has closed and a summary judgment motion has
been docketed, the proposed amendment must be not only theoretically viable but also
solidly grounded in the record.'); Bethany Pharmacal Co. v. QVC, Inc., 241 F.3d 854,
861(7th Cir. 2001) ("An amendment [of a complaint] is futile if the added claim would not
survive a motion for summary judgment.'); Schmitt v. True, 387 F. Supp. 2d 622, 653
(E.D. Va. 2005); see also Watson v. Deaconess Walthan Hosp., 298 F.3d 102, 109 (1st Cir.
2002) (following Hatch standard for motion to amend).
338. Hatch, 274 F.3d at 19.
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If leave to amend is sought before discovery is complete and
neither party has moved for summary judgment, the accuracy
of the "futility" label is gauged by reference to the liberal cri-
teria of FRCP 12(b)(6). In this situation, amendment is not
deemed futile as long as the proposed amended complaint set
forth a general scenario which, if proven, would entitle the
plaintiff to relief against the defendant on some cognizable
theory. If, however, leave to amend is not sought until after
discovery has closed and a summary judgment motion has
been docketed, the proposed amendment must be not only
theoretically viable but also solidly grounded in the record. In
that type of situation, an amendment is properly classified as
futile unless the allegations of the proposed amended com-
plaint are supported by substantial evidence. 3 39
This rationale requires "substantial evidence" supporting a motion to
amend filed in the later stages of pretrial litigation, an evidentiary
standard that still arguably falls short of that required, for example,
by the Idaho statute, under which, as discussed above, some courts
deny a proposed amendment "when the moving party's claims are
reasonably disputed and there is substantial evidence that supports
the non-moving party's claims."340 In any event, the existence of some
overlap between FRCP 15 and state laws restricting the pleading of
punitive damages does not eliminate the substantial extent to which
they conflict. 3
4 1
339. Id. (citations omitted).
340. DeShazo, 2006 WL 1794735, at *11; Strong, 393 F. Supp 2d at 1026; see also
supra note 335 (criticizing universal use of standard quoted in the text); Whittenburg v.
L.J. Holding Co., 830 F. Supp. 557, 565-66 (D. Kan. 1993) (holding that, although plain-
tiffs in diversity action did not have to satisfy Kansas statute's standard for pleading pu-
nitive damages, they did have to provide enough evidence to defeat summary judgment
motion under federal standards and had failed to do so). Not all of the Idaho federal
courts appear to follow the standard quoted in DeShazo by denying motions to amend
under Idaho Code § 6-1604(2) "when the moving party's claims are reasonably disputed
and there is substantial evidence that supports the non-moving party." In two recent
cases, Chief Judge Winmill has said that, when ruling on a motion to amend under Idaho
Code 6-1604(2), "the Court will assume the truth of [the plaintiffs] allegations." Robinson
v. Raina's Residential Prop. Mgmt., LLC., No. CV-05-152-5-BLW, 2006 WL 2095871, at *1
(D. Idaho July 27, 2006); SITCO, Inc. v. AGCO Corp., No. CV-05-073-EBLW, 2006 WL
908065, at *2 (D. Idaho Apr. 7, 2006). With respect, this assumption does not square with
the text of Section 6-1604(2), which contemplates an evidentiary hearing followed by a
trial court ruling based on "weighing the evidence presented." IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-
1604(2) (2004).
341. You could plausibly argue that in diversity cases courts should interpret
FRCP 15(a)'s standard for amending pleadings--calling for amendment "when justice so
requires"--to mean "when permitted by state laws, including those restricting the plead-
ing of punitive damages." This argument has two flaws, though. First, it conflicts with the
interpretation of FRCP 15(a) in Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962), discussed supra
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This is particularly true when you consider the basic function of
FRCP 15 in relation to the other rules governing pleadings, FRCPs 8
and 9. The primary function of these pleading rules is to give the de-
fendant "fair notice of what the plaintiffs claim is and the grounds
upon which it rests."3 42 Their purpose is not to test the evidentiary
sufficiency of the pleadings; that evidence-evaluation purpose is
served, instead, by other rules, such as FRCP 56 governing summary
judgment.3 43 By requiring the pleadings to serve an evidence-
screening function, state laws restricting the pleading of punitive
damages thwart two central functions of the Federal Rules-to create
(1) a "simplified system of pleading," and (2) a liberal standard for
amending those pleadings.
344
notes 320, 327 and accompanying test. Foman recognizes that an amendment can be de-
nied if the amendment is "futile." That "futility" basis permits a federal court sitting in
diversity to consider, under an FRCP 12(b)(6) or FRCP 56 standard, the plaintiffs ability
to plead and prove entitlement to punitive damages under the state-law standard for ob-
taining a punitive damage award, but not to consider the state-law standard for pleading
punitive damages. Second, the Court rejected an argument similar to the one proposed in
this note in Stewart Organization Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988). The federal pro-
vision at issue there, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), provided for a transfer "(flor the convenience of
parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice." Id. That phrase could have been read to
incorporate an Alabama statute restricting the effect of forum selection clauses a trump.
The dissent in Stewart argued for just such an interpretation, but the majority rejected it.
See id. at 29, 31 n.10.
342. Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 125 S. Ct. 2562, 2570 (2005) (quoting Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
343. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986) The Court in Celotex
said, "with the advent of 'notice pleading,- the motion to dismiss the complaint is no
longer a "principal toolD by which factually insufficient claims... [can] be isolated and
prevented from going to trial." Id. Instead, the motion to dismiss's place "has been taken
by the motion for summary judgment." Id.; see also Leatherman v. Tarrant County Nar-
cotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168-69 (1993) ("[Flederal courts
and litigants must rely on summary judgment and control of discovery to weed out un-
meritorious claims sooner rather than later.").
344. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510, 514 (2002) (refusing to
convert an evidentiary standard to a pleading requirement; referring to the "Federal
rules' simplified standard for pleading"; and stating that "It]he liberal notice pleading of
Rule 8(a) is the starting point of a simplified pleading system, which was adopted to focus
litigation on the merits of a claim."); Conley, 355 U.S. at 47-48 ("Such simplified 'notice
pleading' is made possible by the liberal opportunity for discovery and the other pretrial
procedures established by the Rules to disclose more precisely the basis of both claim and
defense and to define more narrowly the disputed facts and issues."); RTC Mortg. Trust
1994 N-1 v. Fid. Nat'l Title Ins. Co., 981 F. Supp. 334, 344 (D.N.J. 1997) (citing a Florida
statute restricting the pleading of punitive damages as an "example of a state statute
which could reasonably be seen to impact the essential aspects of pleading in federal
court"); WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 257, § 1202, at 87-88 ("As a practical matter provi-
sions in Rule 8 have ramifications that transcend the pleading stage of federal practice.
To some degree, the functioning of all the procedures in the federal rules for... summary
judgment are intertwined inextricably with the pleading philosophy embodied in Rule
8.'); Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1049,
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3. Whether FRCPs 8(a)(3) and 15(a) Should be Construed Narrowly
to Prevent Them from Arguably Altering Substantive Rights
In subsection 1 above, I discussed the general question whether
the FRCPs should be construed narrowly, broadly, or neutrally when
determining whether they conflict with state law. I expressed the
view that the only legitimate basis for construing an FRCP narrowly
is to avoid an interpretation that would arguably alter substantive
rights (and that would, consequently, arguably violate the second sen-
tence of the REA, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b)). In subsection 2, construing the
FRCPs neutrally, I concluded that state laws restricting the pleading
of punitive damages conflict with FRCP 8(a)(3) and 15(a). Now I must
address whether those particular rules should be construed narrowly
to prevent them from arguably altering substantive rights created by
state laws that restrict the pleading of punitive damages. I believe the
answer is "no;" a narrow interpretation is not warranted.
A threshold question is how to identify "substantive rights" for
purposes of determining under 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) whether an FRCP
arguably alters such rights. Relevant to that question, the Supreme
Court held in Sibbach v. Wilson & Co. 34 5 that substantive rights in-
clude rights that, if violated, give rise to a cause of action under state
law. For example, the Sibbach Court said that substantive rights in-
clude "the right not to be injured in one's person by another's negli-
gence."3 46 The Sibbach Court recognized that substantive rights might
not be confined to laws defining causes of action. 3 47 On the other
hand, the Court rejected the argument that the term "substantive
rights" includes all "important and substantial rights" recognized by
law prior to adoption of the FRCPs.3 48 Instead, the Court concluded
that an FRCP should not be deemed to alter "substantive rights," as
long as the FRCP "really regulates procedure,-the judicial process
for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for
justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of
them."349 In a later case, the Court emphasized that rules that meet
this test do not violate Section 2072(b) merely because they "inciden-
1067 (1982) (discussing history of the Rules Enabling Act relating to its objective of pro-
viding simplified rules of pleading); Ely, supra note 7, at 722 ("[L]iberal construction and
amendment of pleading... are obviously central to the Rules' design.').
345. 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
346. Id. at 13.
347. Id. (posing the question, "Is the phrase 'substantive rights' confined to rights
conferred by law to be protected and enforced in accordance with the adjective law of judi-
cial procedure?).
348. Id. at 13-14.
349. Id. at 14.
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tally affect litigants' substantive rights," as long as they are "reasona-
bly necessary to maintain the integrity of [the FRCPs]."350
In my view, under the (neutral) interpretation proposed here,
FRCPs 8(a)(3) and 15 meet the Sibbach test, have no more than an
incidental effect on substantive rights, and are reasonably necessary
to maintaining the integrity of the FRCPs. FRCPs 8(a)(3) and 15 gov-
ern pleading. Pleading is part of the "judicial process for enforcing
rights and duties recognized by substantive law."3 5 1 FRCPs 8(a)(3)
and 15 may affect some plaintiffs' substantive right to punitive dam-
ages because they make it easier than do the state laws under discus-
sion to plead punitive damages. Specifically, a plaintiff who is entitled
to punitive damages but who cannot meet the demanding pleading
standard of state law-and who therefore would not be allowed ulti-
mately to prove entitlement to punitive damages-may be able to
meet the more lenient federal standard and then go on to recover pu-
nitive damages. The plaintiffs substantive rights are affected by the
federal rules as they have been interpreted here.35 2 But the effect is
incidental; it flows from the way that the federal rules regulate the
judicial process for requesting punitive damages.3 53 Finally, as dis-
cussed above, the rules are an integral part of the simplified system of
pleading that it was a central purpose of the FRCPs to create; that
system, in turn, interrelates with other rules for pre-trial disposition
350. Burlington N. R.R. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 5 (1987). Many commentators have
criticized Sibbach's interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) on the ground that the interpre-
tation renders this provision a dead letter. See, e.g., Leslie M. Kelleher, Taking "Substan.
tive Rights" (in the Rules Enabling Act) More Seriously, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 47, 48-49
(1998). This article does not wade into that debate.
351. Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 14.
352. Cf. Ely, supra note 7, at 722 (stating that FRCPs "that ensure the liberal
construction and amendment of pleadings [including FRCP 15(a)] have doubtless often
meant the difference between winning and losing a lawsuit).
353. Cf. Miss. Publ'g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 445 (1946) (holding that
FRCP providing for service of process throughout the state in which federal district was
located did not violate 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b). The court states as follows:
Undoubtedly most alterations of the rules of practice and procedure may and
often do affect the rights of litigants. Congress' prohibition of any alteration of
substantive rights of litigants was obviously not addressed to such incidental
effects as necessarily attend the adoption of the prescribed new rules of pro-
cedure upon the rights of litigants who, agreeably to rules of practice and
procedure, have been brought before a court authorized to determine their
rights. The fact that the application of Rule 4(f) will operate to subject peti-
tioner's rights to adjudication by the district court for northern Mississippi
will undoubtedly affect those rights. But it does not operate to abridge,
enlarge or modify the rules of decision by which that court will adjudicate its
rights. It relates merely to the manner and the means by which a right to re-
cover ... is enforced.
Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
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of cases, including FRCP 56.3 54 Interpreting the pleading rules to pre-
empt the evidentiary requirements for pleading punitive damages
imposed by certain states is therefore reasonably necessary to the in-
tegrity of the FRCPs.
This analysis gains support from Palmer v. Hoffman.355 Palmer
was a diversity case arising from an accident at a railroad cross-
ing.35 6 Defendants challenged a jury instruction stating that they bore
the burden of proving contributory negligence. 357 Plaintiff defended
the instruction on the ground that FRCP 8(c) "makes contributory
negligence an affirmative defense" that the defendant must plead and
prove. 358 FRCP 8(c), entitled "Affirmative Defenses," requires a party
in a responsive pleading to "set forth affirmatively ... contributory
negligence ... and any other matter constituting an... affirmative
defense."359 The Court held that FRCP 8(c) does not govern the bur-
den of proof. It explained, "Rule 8(c) covers only the manner of plead-
ing. The question of the burden of establishing contributory negli-
gence [at trial] is a question of local law which federal courts in diver-
sity ... cases must apply."36 0 Thus, the Court distinguished the bur-
den of pleading contributory negligence from the burden of proving
it. The first matter is governed by an FRCP, the second by state law.
The Court in Palmer did not explain why it interpreted FRCP
8(c) as not addressing burden of proof at trial.361 Perhaps the Court in
Palmer construed FRCP 8(c) narrowly to avoid an interpretation that
would violate 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) by altering substantive rights.362 On
this reading of Palmer, substantive rights under 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b)
include not only state laws defining causes of action and defenses but
also matters "bound up" with such laws. 363 Continuing with this read-
354. See supra note 344 and accompanying text.
355. 318 U.S. 109 (1943).
356. Id. at 110.
357. Id. at 116-17.
358. Id. at 117.
359. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c).
360. Palmer, 318 U.S. at 117 (internal citation omitted).
361. See Robert P. Wasson, Jr., Resolving Separation of Powers and Federalism
Problems Raised by Erie, the Rules of Decision Act, and the Rules Enabling Act: A Pro-
posed Solution, 32 CAP. U. L. REV. 519, 594 (2004) (observing that the Court in Palmer
"failed to explain how it determined that there was no direct, head-on conflict between
Rule 8(c) and the substantive state law regarding the burden of proof on an affirmative
defense").
362. Cf. Richard D. Freer, Some Thoughts on the State of Erie After Gasperini, 76
TEX. L. REV. 1637, 1648 (1998) (reading Palmer as identifying circumstances under which
federal courts in diversity cases must apply state law in the absence of a federal statute
or rule on point).
363. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 535 (1958):
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ing, Palmer identifies the burden of proof as substantive and the bur-
den of pleading as procedural for purposes of Section 2072(b).
The matter of how to plead punitive damages is more akin to the
matter of who bears the burden of pleading contributory negligence
than to who bears the burden of proving that defense. Pleading re-
quirements govern what goes into a court document and when. The
purpose of pleading rules is to identify issues that may need to be
tried. These are procedural matters. In contrast, the question of who
bears the burden of proof often turns on substantive considerations
such as "an assessment of the comparative social disutility" of errone-
ous determinations affecting one party rather than another.36 4 The
burden of proof is thus much more closely tied-to use the Court's
phrase "bound up with"-to the question of who should win and who
should lose, and is therefore more appropriately characterized as sub-
stantive for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2072 than are the burden of
pleading and other matters of pleading, including the standard and
procedures for pleading punitive damages.
3 65
In sum, the standard and procedures for pleading punitive dam-
ages are procedural for purposes of section 2072(b). Therefore, we do
not need to interpret FRCPs 8(a)(3) or 15(a) narrowly-so that they do
not conflict with state laws prescribing standards and procedures for
pleading punitive damages-to avoid causing those FRCPs arguably
to violate section 2072(b).
It was decided in [Erie] that the federal courts in diversity cases must respect
the definition of state-created rights and obligations .... We must, therefore,
first examine [the state rule] to determine whether it is bound up with these
rights and obligations in such a way that its application in the federal court is
required.
Id.; see also Freer, supra note 362, at 1648 (discussing this passage of Byrd).
364. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 786-87 (1982) ("the choice of the stan-
dard [of proof] to be applied in a particular kind of litigation should, in a rational world,
reflect an assessment of the comparative social disutility of' erroneous determinations fa-
voring one side of the litigation rather than the other side) (quoting In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358, 370-71 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)); see also Ronan E. Degnan, The Law of
Federal Evidence Reform, 76 HARV. L. REV. 275, 299 n.103 (1962) (discussing burdens of
proof as "involving predilections as to who should bear loss when responsibility for it is
not shown").
365. See Jackson v. East Bay Hosp., 980 F. Supp. 1341, 1352 (N.D. Cal 1997) (de-
termining that California law restricting the pleading of punitive damages is not "so 'in-
timately bound up' with the state's substantive law that it must be applied"); see also
Rowe, supra note 56, at 999 n.147 (endorsing use of the "bound up with" factor in 'trying
to figure out whether a state rule... has enough of a substantive nature that it would
threaten inequitable administration of the laws") (quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S.
460, 468 (1965).
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4. Whether State Laws Restricting the Pleading of Punitive Damages
Conflict with the Federal Rule for Determining Satisfaction of the
Amount-in-Controversy Requirement
In Windsor, the federal district court for the District of Idaho
held that the Idaho law restricting the pleading of punitive damages
does not conflict with the federal rule for determining whether the plain-
tiff has satisfied the amount-in-controversy requirement. 36 6 After
finding no conflict, the court determined that the Idaho law "directly
affect[s] the outcome of the case."36 7 In light of the state law's out-
come-determinative effect, the court held that Erie required the state
law to be applied in a diversity case. 3 68 The court's reasoning may well
have been correct, but, correct or not, it was beside the point.
The court was probably correct in finding no conflict between
state law and the federal rule. 36 9 The federal rule requires courts gen-
erally to go by the amounts requested in good faith in the plaintiffs
pleadings to determine whether the amount-in-controversy require-
ment is met. This rule does not concern what types or amount of
monetary relief the plaintiff can plead; it concerns the effect to be ac-
corded to what the plaintiffs pleading says on those matters. In con-
trast, the Idaho law does concern what types and amount of relief the
plaintiff can plead; the Idaho law says nothing about reliance on the
pleadings to determine whether the amount-in-controversy require-
ment has been met. Because the federal rule and the Idaho rule ad-
dress different matters, both can be given effect. When the plaintiffs
initial complaint does not plead the amount in controversy required
for diversity jurisdiction, the court can use state law to determine
whether the plaintiff should be allowed to amend the initial complaint
to request punitive damages. The court then uses the federal rule to
determine whether the complaint-as successfully amended or not-
satisfies the amount- in-controversy requirement. Indeed, this is es-
sentially the approach that the Windsor court took.3 70 This approach
lets state law and federal law operate in their separate spheres.
366. Windsor v. Guarantee Trust Life Ins. Co., 684 F. Supp. 630, 632-33 (D.
Idaho 1988), discussed at supra notes 63-83 and accompanying text.
367. Id. at 633.
368. Id.
369. As noted above, the federal rule for determining whether the plaintiff has
satisfied the diversity statute's amount-in-controversy requirement reflects an interpreta-
tion of the diversity statute. See supra note 67. Under Erie precedent, state laws that con-
ffict with a valid federal statute cannot apply in federal courts, just as is true for state
laws that conflict with a valid FRCP. To determine whether a conflict of either type ex-
ists, a court accepts existing, definitive interpretations of the federal provision.
370. See Windsor, 684 F. Supp. at 634 (taking essentially the approach proposed
in the text).
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The Windsor court also correctly concluded that the Idaho law is
outcome determinative. This is true for reasons discussed below. 3 7 1 To
summarize those reasons, if federal courts do not apply state laws re-
stricting the pleading of punitive damages, plaintiffs will often prefer
the federal courts to the state courts. By the same token, defendants
in federal courts will unfairly face punitive damage claims that oth-
erwise similarly situated defendants in state courts will not face.
The Windsor court ultimately erred, however, in both its analysis
and its conclusion. The court analyzed the Idaho law under Hanna
part I because it found no conflict between the Idaho law and the fed-
eral law. This analysis is incomplete because the court did not con-
sider whether the Idaho law conflicts with any FRCPs. To be fair to
the court in Windsor, presumably the parties did not address this is-
sue. In any event, for reasons discussed above, the Idaho law does
conflict with FRCPs 8(a)(3) and 15(a). Because of that conflict, the
Idaho law should be analyzed under Hanna Part II, and that analysis
leads to the conclusion that the Idaho law cannot apply in federal di-
versity cases. This is true even though-as the Windsor court cor-
rectly concluded-the state law is outcome determinative under
Hanna I.
D. Whether the FRCPs are Valid, as Interpreted Here
An FRCP trumps conflicting state law only if the FRCP is valid.
To be valid, the FRCP must fall within Congress's power under the
Constitution and the Court's power under the REA.372 FRCPs 8(a)(3)
and 15(a), with which the state laws restricting the pleading of puni-
tive damages have been found above to conflict, easily satisfy both
tests.
FRCPs 8(a)(3) and 15(a) govern quintessentially procedural sub-
jects: the form and contents of, and the rules for amending, pleadings
in federal district courts. Congress's power to establish the federal dis-
trict courts (among other lower federal courts) encompasses the power
to prescribe rules for the pleadings filed in those courts. This is so
clear that none of the case law discussed in Section III has questioned
the validity of FRCPs 8(a)(3) or 15(a). 3 73
371. See infra notes 380-83 and accompanying text.
372. Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006).
373. See Cohen v. Office Depot, Inc., 184 F.3d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 1999) (hold-
ing that FRCP 8(a)(3) falls within Congress's constitutional power to make rules for the
lower federal courts and within the REA); Pruett v. Erickson Air-Crane Co., 183 F.R.D.
248, 252 (D. Or. 1998) ("[IThe court finds that the Federal Rules [with which the court
had found the Oregon statute restricting the pleading of punitive damages is in conflict]
have been promulgated within the scope of the Rules Enabling Act and are constitu-
tional.'); NAL II, Ltd. v. Tonkin, 705 F. Supp. 522, 528 (D. Kan. 1989) (holding that FRCP
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So, too, the Supreme Court's power under the REA to prescribe
general rules of practice and procedure includes the power to pre-
scribe rules of pleading3 74 FRCP 8(a)(3) and 15(a) do not violate the
REA by altering substantive rights under the Supreme Court's tradi-
tional interpretation of the REA. That is because the rules "really
regulate fl procedure,-the judicial process for enforcing rights and
duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering
remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them."
375
E. Whether Courts Should Refuse to Apply State Laws Restricting
the Pleading of Punitive Damages as a Matter of Federal Common
Law
Some courts have interpreted the FRCPs not to conflict with the
state laws that restrict the pleading of punitive damages. If they are
interpreting the FRCPs correctly, this does not automatically mean
the state laws apply in diversity actions. Instead, the question be-
comes whether federal courts should refuse to apply the state laws in
the exercise of the federal courts' inherent power to make rules for the
conduct of their own proceedings. I believe that the federal courts
should so exercise that power.
376
9(g), with which the court had found the Kansas statute restricting the pleading of puni-
tive damages is in conflict, is constitutional and falls within the REA).
374. 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a).
375. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941).
376. This conclusion is in a sense the flip side of my prior conclusion that the
FRCPs should be interpreted to preclude application of state laws restricting the pleading
of punitive damages. See supra notes 283-365 and accompanying text. The federal courts'
power to interpret the FRCPs shades into their limited power to create a federal common
law of procedure. See Beul v. ASSE Int'l. Inc., 233 F.3d 441, 449 (7th Cir. 2000) (explain-
ing that federal court should reject state law in favor of federal law governing method of
instructing jury, whether federal law is considered to be an interpretation of an FRCP or
federal judge-made common law); Wendy Collins Perdue, The Sources and Scope of Fed-
eral Procedural Common Law: Some Reflections on Erie and Gasperini, 46 U. KAN. L.
REv. 751, 756 (1998) (stating that the distinction between a federal court's interpretation
of a federal enactment and its creation of federal common law "is entirely one of degree"
and "[t]he more definite and explicit the prevailing legislative policy, the more likely a
court will describe its lawmaking as statutory interpretation; the less precise and less ex-
plicit the perceived legislative policy, the more likely a court will speak of common law.")
(quoting Peter Westen & Jeffrey S. Lehman, Is there Life for Erie after the Death of Di-
versity?, 78 MICH. L. REv. 311, 332 (1980)); cf. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S.
22, 38-39 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (distinguishing federal courts' power to create
substantive federal common law from their power "to make procedural rules that govern
the practice before them"); Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Co., 384 U.S. 63, 67-68 (1966)
(distinguishing substantive federal common law from procedural rules on which state and
federal courts can differ).
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Since the federal courts' power in this area is not always recog-
nized, let us clarify the relevant precedent. In Stewart v. Ricoh, the
Court said
If no federal statute or Rule covers the point in dispute, the
district court then proceeds to evaluate whether application of
federal judge-made law would disserve the so-called "twin
aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of forum-shopping and
avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws." If appli-
cation of federal judge-made law would disserve these two
policies [and would accordingly be "outcome determinative" in
the manner with which the Erie Court was concerned] the dis-
trict court should apply state law.
37 7
The negative implication is that, if a federal judge-made law of proce-
dure does not disserve the twin aims of Erie, it trumps conflicting
state law. Furthermore, Byrd and Gasperini v. Center for Humanities,
Inc. suggest that these "federal judge-made" rules of procedure pre-
vail over state law-even if their application would disserve the twin
aims of Erie-if their application is supported by a strong enough fed-
eral interest.37 8 The precedent does not establish the source of the
federal courts' power to make rules of procedure in diversity cases. It
may stem from the FRCPs themselves-to the extent the common law
rules fill the FRCPs' interstices and preserve their integrity--or from
the statutes that create the federal courts.
3 79
Whatever the source of this common law rulemaking power, it
may authorize federal courts to disregard state laws restricting the
pleading of punitive damages. The federal courts' application of the
FRCPs in lieu of these state laws probably disserves the twin aims of
Erie. I would argue, however, that application of the FRCPs is justi-
fied by the strong federal interest in the uniform, simplified system of
pleading and liberal standard for amendment of pleading established
by the FRCPs.
Most courts considering the issue have held that the failure of
federal courts in diversity actions to apply the state laws under dis-
cussion would encourage forum shopping or result in the inequitable
377. Stewart, 487 U.S. at 27 n.6 (quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468
(1965)).
378. See Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 438 (holding that "practical reasons continue with
Seventh Amendment constraints" to require federal trial court to apply state law stan-
dard for reviewing jury awards while federal courts of appeals apply a federal standard of
review); Byrd v. Blue Rural Elec. Co-op, Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
379. See Perdue, supra note 376, at 759-60.
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administration of law, or both.380 I agree, the state laws make it
harder for plaintiffs to plead punitive damages than does federal law.
Therefore, plaintiffs who want punitive damages, and have a choice,
would rationally choose federal court over state court, all other things
being equal, if federal courts applied the liberal federal pleadings re-
quirements instead of the stricter state-law pleading require-
ments. By the same token, it seems unfair for defendants in federal
court to be exposed to punitive damage claims that could not be as-
serted against similarly situated defendants in state courts.
One might argue fairness to defendants should be measured, not
by their exposure to punitive damage claims but, rather, by their ex-
posure to punitive damage awards. On this argument, the difference
between federal rules and state laws for pending punitive damages
does not cause any relevant unfairness to defendants. This argument
is unpersuasive in my view. For one thing, even if application of these
federal rules would not be unfair to defendants, if it would encourage
forum shopping by plaintiffs, that alone is enough to cause the differ-
ence between the federal rules and the state laws to be outcome de-
terminative. 3 8 1 For another thing, the mere exposure to punitive
damage claims does often matter to defendants, and reasonably so.
Large punitive damage claims can attract publicity that is unwelcome
to defendants and that can adversely affect the defendants' ability to
settle on favorable terms. Furthermore, even unwarranted punitive
damage claims can result in punitive damage awards. True, both
state and federal court systems have procedural devices to prevent
this result, such as motions for summary judgment, for judgment as a
matter of law, and for new trial. Unwarranted punitive damage
awards also can be set aside on appeal. Nevertheless, the use of these
procedural devices costs defendants time and money, and successfully
using them ultimately to eliminate a punitive damage claim does not
necessarily avoid the bad publicity and adverse settlement pressure
arising from the mere assertion of a claim.
No doubt the problems posed to a defendant by the plaintiffs
mere assertion of a punitive damage claim are what have led eight
states to restrict the pleading of punitive damages. These states in-
clude the restrictions as an element of tort reform along with caps on
380. See supra chart entitled "Case Law Conducting Erie Qnalysis of State Laws
Restricting the Pleading of Punitive Damages (column 4).
381. See Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 753 (1980) (holding that
state law applied in diversity cases because, though federal courts' failure to apply state
law would not encourage forum shopping, their failure to do so would result in the inequi-
table administration of law); see also Stewart, 487 U.S. at 40 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (ob.
serving that, under Walker, the "failure to meet one part of the twin-aims test suffices to
warrant application of state law.').
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punitive damage awards. The Court in Gasperini held that state-law
restrictions on punitive damage awards have a "manifestly substan-
tive" objective. 3 82 You might consider restrictions on pleading puni-
tive damage claims to be part and parcel with restrictions on punitive
damage awards and accordingly to share the latter's substantive ob-
jective. It may be possible, however, to distinguish the objectives un-
derlying restrictions on pleading punitive damage caps from those
underlying restrictions on punitive damage awards. 38 3 It is also pos-
sible that objectives differ enough from state to state that generaliza-
tion is not appropriate. In any event, the strong possibility that a sub-
stantive objective underlies state laws restricting the pleading of pu-
nitive damages has only marginal effect on analysis under the modi-
fied outcome-determination test. That test focuses, not on a state's ob-
jective, but on the forum-shopping and fairness effects of a federal
court in diversity applying federal judge-made rules that differ from
the state rules applied by a state court located in the same state as
the federal court. As discussed above, the effect of applying different
federal and state rules on pleading punitive damages is likely to be
outcome determinative in a way that disserves the twin aims of Erie.
If so, only a strong federal interest might support the federal
courts' application of the federal judge-made rules in lieu of state laws
restricting the pleading of punitive damages. In two cases, the Court
has held that "countervailing federal interests" may preclude or trun-
cate federal courts' application of state law that is outcome determi-
native.3 84 The Court has not explained how to determine when a fed-
eral interest is sufficiently strong to have this preclusive effect. 38 5 I
382. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 430.
383. Professor Ely defines a procedural rule as "one designed to make the process
of litigation a fair and efficient mechanism for the resolution of disputes." Ely, supra note
7, at 724 (citations omitted). Restrictions on pleading punitive damages meet his defini-
tion if they are understood to prevent the litigation process from being used, unfairly, to
assert headline-grabbing, unwarranted punitive damage claims that force quick settle-
ments on terms unjustifiably adverse to defendants.
384. In Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 426, 431-38 the Court applied the Erie analysis to
hold that to avoid "untoward alteration of the federal scheme"--specifically "the federal
system's division of trial and appellate court functions, an allocation weighted by the Sev-
enth Amendment"-while at the same time "giv[ing] effect to the substantive thrust of' a
New York law that was found to be outcome determinative under Hanna Part I in limit-
ing excessive jury damages award. To achieve those results, the Court held that federal
district courts should apply the N.Y. law but federal courts of appeals would not. Id.; see
also Byrd, 356 U.S. at 538-39 (holding that "a strong federal policy against allowing state
rules to disrupt the judge-jury relationship in the federal courts" required federal courts
in diversity cases to refuse to apply state law assigning the determination of a particular
question of fact to the judge rather than the jury even assuming that the "outcome of the
litigation may be substantially affected" by the state law).
385. Rowe, supra note 56, at 1005 (noting that the Court in Gasperini is "cryptic
or unclear" about "what might constitute an 'essential characteristic' or 'countervailing
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would nonetheless submit that there is a sufficiently strong federal
interest in preserving the uniform, simplified system of pleadings and
liberal standard for their amendment established by the FRCPs. As
noted above, that system of pleadings and that standard for amend-
ment of pleadings are central features of the FRCPs; their design is
intertwined with other rules for ferreting out unwarranted claims and
defenses.3 86 They have become "essential characteristic[s]" of the fed-
eral system.387 To preserve these essential characteristics, federal
courts should refuse to apply the Idaho law and similar state laws
that restrict the pleading of punitive damages.
VI. CONCLUSION
Idaho law bars punitive damages claims from being included in
initial complaints in civil actions. The plaintiff in such an action may
amend the complaint to include a punitive damages claim only by es-
tablishing a reasonable likelihood of proving entitlement to punitive
damages at trial. This article has argued that this state-law restric-
tion on the pleading of punitive damages-which closely resembles re-
strictions in seven other states-does not apply in diversity actions
brought in federal court. The state-law restrictions do not apply for
two reasons, either of which, if accepted, prevents the application of
these state-law restrictions in federal diversity cases. First, the state-
law restrictions conflict with FRCPs 8(a)(3) and 15(a). Because those
rules are valid, they preempt state law to the extent the state law
would otherwise apply in diversity actions under the Erie doc-
trine. Second, even if state laws restricting the pleading of punitive
damages do not conflict with any FRCP, federal courts should still dis-
regard those state laws in the exercise of the federal court's inherent
power to make procedural rules for their own proceedings. The appli-
cation of federal-judge made rules of procedure for pleading punitive
damages, instead of more restrictive state laws, is justified by the
strong federal interest in preserving the integrity of the simplified
federal interest' sufficient to call for going beyond the Hanna 'twin aims' analysis). One
commentator has argued that, as the Court interpreted its Byrd precedent in Gasperini, a
federal interest is strong enough to outweigh outcome-determinative state law only
"when a constitutional provision looms near." King, supra note 10, at 186. In Byrd, how-
ever, the Court cited a case in which a federal court in a diversity case disregarded state
law in favor of a federal judicially developed practice that was constitutionally inspired
only in the most generalized sense. See Byrd, 356 U.S. at 538-39, 540 & n. 15 (discussing
Herron v. S. Pac. Co., 283 U.S. 91, 95 (1931). Herron is a diversity case in which the Court
upheld the federal court's entry of a directed verdict despite a state constitutional provi-
sion to the contrary and characterized a federal trial judge's control of the case as "an es-
sential factor in the process for which the Federal Constitution provides." Id.
386. See supra notes 344, 354 and accompanying text.
387. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 431 (quoting Byrd, 356 U.S. at 537).
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system of pleading and the liberal standard for amendment of plead-
ings, which have become essential characteristics of the federal court
system. The author respectfully urges federal courts for the District of
Idaho to reconsider their view that the Idaho law restricting the
pleading of punitive damages applies in federal diversity cases.
